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1 Introduction 
Due to an increased degree of price volatility, the international dairy markets have been 
the focus of public attention more and more in the past years. Historically, the European 
Union was able to protect itself from price developments on the international markets 
but this will be no longer possible in the future. The export subsidies which are neces-
sary for this undertaking for a net export country have been suspended since 2009 and 
are unlikely to be reintroduced for a long period of time, in light of pressure from the 
WTO negotiations. Furthermore, import tariffs are continually under pressure. As a re-
sult, the international dairy markets and their development are of huge importance for 
the whole dairy value chain as well as for European and German policy. In this situa-
tion, information with regard to price formation on the international dairy markets is of 
primary interest. In this context, the question of imperfect competition and market pow-
er is a central issue. MCCORRISTON (2002) argues that imperfect competition should 
matter in general for agricultural economists since it is a) more pronounced in the agri-
cultural sector than often assumed, b) important for how markets are working and c) has 
implications for policy analysis. Indeed, the preference for certain market policy in-
struments or even conceptual issues with regard to the Common Agricultural Policy can 
be influenced by imperfect competition. Market power has additional implications with 
regard to the regulatory policy that are insufficiently solved in an international context. 
In fact, signs exist for some degree of imperfect competition on the international dairy 
markets, with the supply side particularly highly concentrated. Only four export coun-
tries (New Zealand, the EU, Australia and the US) account for 80% to 90% of the dairy 
exports when measured in milk equivalent. In contrast, the demand side is much less 
concentrated. However, even when the focus is shifted away from the country level to 
the firm level, concentration remains strong. The most important player on the markets 
is the New Zealand dairy co-operative Fonterra. The Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd. 
was established in 2001 and developed from the two biggest dairy co-operatives – New 
Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi – as well as from the New Zealand Dairy Board, which 
had an export monopoly on dairy products up to the merger. After the merger, the new 
dairy co-operative Fonterra was responsible for 95% of New Zealand’s dairy exports 
(ARMENTANO et al. 2004: 41). This equals roughly one third of the total exports on the 
international dairy markets in milk equivalent. When single dairy products are consid-
ered, this share is – in some cases – markedly higher. 
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However, in addition to New Zealand’s dairy exports, Fonterra also controls – directly 
or indirectly – significant quantities of dairy exports from other export countries 
(BLAYNEY et al. 2006: 13-15). This is possible through a number of foreign subsidiaries, 
partnerships, joint ventures and agreements. The most important of these with regard to 
the international markets are agreements with Dairy America (export of US skimmed 
milk powder) and the Argentinian dairy co-operative SanCor (export of Argentinian 
milk powder and cheese) as well as an ownership stake in the Australian dairy company 
Bonlac. These kinds of operations further strengthen Fonterra’s market position. Even 
without considering them, the company already dominates the markets, particularly for 
milk powder and butter with world market shares of around 50%. The market shares are 
even higher in Asian and Southeast Asian destinations. However, a basic limitation for 
the exercise of market power should be the status as a co-operative; that is, the supply 
quantity is determined by the independent and competitive production decisions of the 
member farms (SEXTON & LAVOIE 2001: 877). It may therefore be difficult for Fonterra 
to supply less quantity in order to charge an overall higher price. A much more likely 
possibility to exercise market power in this case is to practice price discrimination with 
respect to the destination countries. 
For the analysis of market power, a number of different approaches are available. The 
New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) offers structural approaches that allow 
the estimation of behavioral or market power parameters. An overview of a wide range 
of different models and applications can be found for example in BRESNAHAN (1989), 
SEXTON & LAVOIE (2001) and WOHLGENANT (2001). However, as GOLDBERG & 
KNETTER (1999: 32) argue, most of these models have an enormous need for data – 
especially in the framework of international markets. For each destination country, a 
complete oligopoly model would have to be specified with price and quantity data 
needed for each firm that is selling in the market. Unfortunately, this data is usually not 
available – at least not at a reasonable cost. Approaches that avoid these data require-
ments – and are therefore intensively used when international markets are analyzed – 
are the pricing-to-market (PTM) approach as well as the residual demand approach. 
The PTM approach is based on the observation of KRUGMAN (1986) that import prices 
do not change by the same proportion at which exchange rates change. When this ob-
servation is not caused by a change in the overall marginal cost of the export country, 
markups are adjusted in order to smooth price changes in the destination country. This 
is exactly the behavior that is defined as PTM. The most important empirical model to 
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detect PTM is introduced by KNETTER (1989; 1993). When PTM is detected, this is a 
proof that a markup must exist, at least in some time periods; otherwise it cannot be 
adjusted downwards. The residual demand approach, however, rests on the estimation 
of the inverse residual demand whose elasticity with regard to quantity is a direct indi-
cation of market power and is even equal to the Lerner index under some conditions. In 
contrast to the market demand, in the case of the “residual” demand, the reactions of 
competitors are already accounted for. The approach was developed by BAKER & 
BRESNAHAN (1988) for single firms and adapted by GOLDBERG & KNETTER (1999) for 
usage with international markets. 
This thesis is built of three papers and considers both approaches by extending or modi-
fying them. Afterwards, they are applied in order to analyze the New Zealand dairy ex-
ports with regard to market power. For the PTM model it is shown that the key feature 
of the model proposed by KNETTER (1989; 1993) – namely, how it is controlled for the 
overall marginal cost of the export country – may pretend to eliminate a bias in the es-
timated PTM coefficients, but in fact only shifts this bias (first paper). Therefore, an 
alternative approach to control for the marginal cost is proposed – the usage of the so-
called stochastic marginal cost – that additionally allows the inference of PTM through 
changes in the marginal cost. At the same time, the basic PTM model established by 
KNETTER (1989; 1993) is extended to an oligopolistic model of PTM that a) provides an 
index of product differentiation and additionally b) identifies the source of PTM – a task 
that had not been solved until now (second paper). Furthermore, the stochastic marginal 
cost series is used in the residual demand model in order to replace cost shifting varia-
bles that often reflect only a small proportion of the marginal cost (third paper). 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 gives an overview of the three papers that 
constitute the core of this thesis. Chapters 3 to 5 represent the single papers. In Chapter 
6 some overall issues are discussed, methods and results are compared and implications 
for the international dairy markets are considered. 
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2 Overview of research papers 
This chapter presents an overview of the three papers which constitute the core of this 
thesis. The basic ideas and results are summarized. 
2.1 Pricing-to-Market in a Perfect World: Is a Correct Estimation Possible? 
The first paper focusses on the specification of the Knetter model – which is the most 
important model to detect PTM – and shows by using simulated data that the model 
provides biased PTM estimates. This is shown to be the case, despite the fact that data is 
simulated under the theoretical conditions the Knetter model is built on. 
When PTM is estimated, it is important to control for the marginal cost of the country 
whose exports are analyzed. Changes in exchange rates primarily influence the prices in 
the import country’s currency, but when these changes lead to a considerable quantity 
reaction, the price in the export country’s currency is affected too. This happens due to 
changes in the exporter’s marginal cost. This means that exchange rates and the margin-
al cost are correlated and the omission of the marginal cost in a PTM model would lead 
to an omitted variable bias. PTM would be found more often and would be more pro-
nounced since a part of the incompleteness of an exchange rate pass-through is due to a 
change of the exporter’s marginal cost. 
The basic problem concerns the fact that the marginal cost cannot simply be introduced 
in a PTM model because it is not observable. Furthermore, the usage of cost shifters 
would also lead to biased coefficients. Therefore, the Knetter model tries to infer an 
index of the marginal cost from price data. Since marginal cost is equal across all desti-
nation countries at the port of export, fixed time effects in a panel model should account 
for changes in the marginal cost. Nevertheless, this only works when the marginal cost 
also equally influences the prices across the destination countries (equal cost pass-
through). Indeed, this cannot be expected to be the case. It can be theoretically shown 
that cost and exchange rate pass-through should be equal. When exchange rate pass-
through is different across destination countries, cost pass-through is different too and 
the fixed effects only depict the average cost pass-through. As a result, the PTM coeffi-
cients can be expected to be biased toward the average PTM coefficient in the sample. 
In order to prove the severity and the behavior of such a bias, we simulate idealized data 
of a monopolistic export country that delivers to ten destination countries and practices 
different degrees of PTM. The results confirm the bias in the coefficients and show that 
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its extent is – under realistic conditions – around 50% towards the sample mean. The 
extent depends heavily on the sample selection and is increased for large degrees of 
correlation of the exchange rates, small values of the supply elasticity as well as a high 
importance of foreign inputs. The influence of the supply elasticity makes this bias es-
pecially serious in the case of agricultural commodities. 
2.2 Pricing-to-Market in an Oligopoly: An Alternative Approach to Meas-
uring Marginal Cost 
The second paper provides two innovations. Firstly, the PTM model proposed by Knet-
ter is extended to an oligopolistic model of PTM that provides an index for the degree 
of product differentiation and allows the identification of the source of PTM. Secondly, 
since the first paper indicates biased PTM coefficients for the Knetter model, an alterna-
tive approach is developed to estimate a measure of the marginal cost (the stochastic 
lower price frontier) and is directly used to estimate the PTM model. 
The PTM model established by Knetter is based on a monopolistic export firm that 
practices third degree price discrimination which directly leads to PTM behavior. Nev-
ertheless, the model can also be used for an oligopolistic market structure but is not able 
to detect the source of PTM. In general, PTM can be caused by the convexity of the 
market demand schedule (that is the usual assumption) or by the existence of one or 
more oligopolistic competitors. In addition to the ordinary PTM coefficient, our theoret-
ical extension of the model yields a competitor coefficient. This coefficient explains the 
influence of the competitor’s cost on the firm’s markup and is therefore an index for the 
degree of product differentiation that can be expected to lie between zero and the abso-
lute value of the PTM coefficient. When this coefficient is zero, PTM is caused solely 
by the market structure; when it equals the absolute value of the PTM coefficient, PTM 
is caused solely by the existence of the respective competitor. 
In this extended PTM model, the marginal cost is depicted by an estimate. The destina-
tion-specific export unit values that are already used in the Knetter model contain a lot 
of information regarding agreements of sale. They basically consist of the marginal 
cost, markups, quality premiums, measurement errors and expectation effects. By as-
suming that the other components follow certain distributions which can be estimated, 
we obtain the stochastic lower price frontier that is – under some conditions – an unbi-
ased estimate for the marginal cost. We call this estimate the “stochastic” marginal cost. 
2   Overview of research papers 
7 
The empirical results of using the stochastic marginal cost in the oligopolistic PTM 
model support the validity of the approach with regard to the interpretation of the theo-
retical coefficients, as well as with regard to the usage of the stochastic marginal cost. In 
the case of the international dairy markets which are analyzed, a significant degree of 
PTM practiced by New Zealand is present; the only exception is the market for 
skimmed milk powder. The average degree of PTM implies that around 40% of cost 
changes are smoothed out, whereas this number varies more across destinations than 
across products. Furthermore, the PTM found is mainly caused by the EU as a competi-
tor region, especially when a larger number of lags are included. 
2.3 Measuring Market Power on the World Dairy Markets: A Residual 
Demand Analysis 
The third paper uses the concept of the stochastic marginal cost (which is introduced in 
the second paper) for the estimation of the residual demand faced by New Zealand in its 
most important destination countries. While in the first two papers theoretical and 
methodological questions are more the focus, in this paper we concentrate on the empir-
ical application. 
The residual demand (in its international market version) is the demand faced by an 
export country when the competing countries reaction is already accounted for. In the 
model, this reaction is depicted through the inclusion of cost shifting variables of the 
competing countries. Furthermore, cost shifting variables are usually used as instru-
ments for the quantity as an endogenous right hand side variable. However, badly cho-
sen or unsuitable cost shifters may cause a number of problems such as biased coeffi-
cients and standard errors as well as weak instruments. Since the stochastic marginal 
cost reflects the full range of changes in the marginal cost, it can be expected to be more 
appropriate – in addition to the exchange rate as the remaining cost shifter. Furthermore, 
the stochastic marginal cost series is always available when a certain number of destina-
tion-specific unit values is available too. 
The estimation results show that the usage of the stochastic marginal cost does not solve 
the problem of weak instruments, but exhibits very precise estimates for the competitors 
that are much more often significant than the influence of their exchange rates. Since 
weak instruments are an overall problem, the estimation is done with SUR and the esti-
mates of the inverse residual demand elasticity can therefore be seen as conservative. 
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Nevertheless, the results show that in 56% of the equations, significant negative inverse 
residual demand elasticities are present with an average value that implies an optimal 
markup of about 8.6% of the price. This means that New Zealand (and therefore Fonter-
ra) has a moderate degree of market power in most of the destination countries. Alt-
hough there are some differences between the dairy markets analyzed, the estimates of 
the inverse residual demand elasticities differ much more across the destination coun-
tries than across the products analyzed. The most important competitors of Fonterra are 
Australia and the EU, whereas the US and domestic competitors in the destination coun-
try are, in most cases, unimportant. However, the extent of the market power implied by 
the estimated inverse residual demand elasticity cannot be attributed to the import mar-
ket shares – neither those of the competitors nor those of New Zealand itself. Other fac-
tors such as the perceived degree of differentiation and different distribution channels 
seem to be of more importance. 
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The empirical model proposed by KNETTER (1989; 1993) and its countless modifica-
tions represents an attempt to measure pricing-to-market for a given export country with 
respect to various destination countries. The key element of the model is the usage of a 
panel model with fixed time effects in order to control for the marginal cost. This pro-
cedure is based on the assumption that the marginal cost is equal for all destination 
countries at the port of export. Even if this is the case, the influence of the marginal cost 
on prices is not equal but instead depends on cost pass-through. When cost pass-through 
is not equal across the destination countries as theory suggests, the PTM coefficients of 
the Knetter model can be expected to be biased. In order to prove the existence, magni-
tude and the determinants of this bias, we simulate idealized data of a profit maximizing 
multi-market monopolistic export firm that practices pricing-to-market under the condi-
tions that are assumed in the Knetter model. The estimation of the Knetter model for the 
simulated data shows that the PTM coefficients are indeed biased toward the average 
PTM coefficient in the sample. Under realistic conditions the extent of the bias is 
around 50% of the distance to the average PTM coefficient. In general, the extent is 
determined by some basic characteristics of the destination countries in the sample and 
the markets that are analyzed. For commodities especially, the bias can be expected to 
be large. The results therefore imply that a different approach is needed to estimate pric-
ing-to-market unbiasedly. 
Keywords: Pricing-to-market, exchange rate pass-through, Monte Carlo simulation 
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3.1 Introduction 
Since 2007, the Financial Crises and the Sovereign Debt Crises that followed in the US 
and the EU led to large fluctuations of exchange rates. This situation is somewhat simi-
lar to the one that the first authors of pricing-to-market studies faced. After the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods System, large exchange rate fluctuations took place in the 1970s 
and 1980s. These exchange rate fluctuations were an interesting experiment with regard 
to the price formation on markets. As long as the marginal costs do not change, one 
would expect that exchange rate changes are fully passed through to import markets. 
However, in the 1970s some authors already showed that this is often not the case and 
the exchange pass-through (ERPT) is, so-to-say, incomplete (GOLDBERG & KNETTER 
1997: 1249). The first authors who linked this observation to market power were MANN 
(1986), KRUGMAN (1986), DORNBUSCH (1987) and BALDWIN (1988). The underlying 
idea is that exchange rate changes are (partly) offset through changes in the destination-
specific markups of the exporting firms. KRUGMAN (1986) labeled this behavior pric-
ing-to-market (PTM). The first attempts to empirically detect PTM were made by 
KNETTER (1989) and MARSTON (1990). Both authors explain PTM as a result of the 
profit maximization of a monopolist when the demand curve in the destination country 
has a different curvature than that which a constant demand elasticity would lead to. In 
this case, the markup – which is determined through the demand elasticity – changes 
with the price. 
The key feature of the PTM model established by KNETTER (1989; 1993) is the way it is 
controlled for the marginal cost. The coverage of the marginal cost in the model is of 
importance because the marginal cost is correlated with exchange rates and its omission 
would lead to a bias in the estimated exchange rate coefficients which measure the de-
gree of PTM. In addition to some other differences, in the ERPT literature and even in 
the model proposed by MARSTON (1990) the marginal cost is seen as observable and 
cost indices are used to display it. GOLDBERG & KNETTER (1997: 1251) argue that these 
indices may be a good measure of the average cost but not of the marginal cost. Even 
worse, they lead to a form of measurement error which can be expected to be negatively 
correlated with the marginal cost and thus introduce a bias towards a finding of PTM. 
Therefore, KNETTER (1989) proposes an alternative way to control for changes in the 
marginal cost. He argues that for a given export country, the marginal cost should be 
equal across all destination countries when it is observed at the port of export. This 
means that when a panel model is estimated for the export country in question, the in-
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troduction of fixed time effects should effectively control for changes in the marginal 
cost and hence prevent a biased estimation. In fact, the usage of multiple transactions 
from a single source country does not only help to mitigate the cost measurement prob-
lem, it also ensures that the good under consideration is much more homogeneous as in 
the case when multiple export origins are used as in the ERPT literature (GOLDBERG & 
KNETTER 1997: 1252). 
In addition to the basic model specification of KNETTER (1989), a lot of modifications 
and extensions are made in the literature. Examples are the transformation in a first dif-
ference or an error correction representation (KNETTER 1993; GAGNON & KNETTER 
1995), a modification to study the symmetry of PTM with regard to the sign of ex-
change rate changes (KNETTER 1994; GIL-PAREJA 2000) and the addition of more inde-
pendent variables. Such variables can be the exchange rate volatility or the exchange 
rate to an important competitor (e.g. PICK & CARTER 1994; ZHANG et al. 2007), the of-
fer price of said important competitor (GIL-PAREJA 2003; TANTIRIGAMA 2003), the 
market share of the export country under consideration (TANTIRIGAMA 2003) or the 
gross domestic product of the destination country (e.g. GIL-PAREJA 2003; GLAUBEN & 
LOY 2003; ZHANG et al. 2007). The basic model proposed by KNETTER (1989) and its 
countless modifications are intensively used in the literature and applied to a wide varie-
ty of countries and sectors. Some examples for studies in the area of agricultural prod-
ucts are PICK & PARK (1991), PARK et al. (1996), CAREW (2000), GRIFFITH & MULLEN 
(2001), BROWN (2001), CAREW & FLORKOWSKI (2003), GLAUBEN & LOY (2003), XU & 
SHELDON (2005) as well as JIN (2008). 
Nevertheless, the PTM approach is also frequently criticized in the literature. Some 
general criticism is that the empirical proof for PTM is often done before markets are 
analyzed in regard to the plausibility of market power (SEXTON & LAVOIE 2001: 886f). 
Other criticisms apply to the fact that it is not necessarily the adjustment of markups 
that the PTM coefficients measure. KASA (1992) shows that PTM can also be found due 
to adjustment cost. In order to avoid this effect, a higher temporal data aggregation can 
help. Furthermore, the usage of unit values in the PTM literature – which is common 
due to the need for destination-specific prices – can falsely lead to the finding of PTM 
as shown by LAVOIE & LIU (2007). This is especially likely when the product under 
consideration is heterogeneous – i.e. an aggregation of different products. AUER & 
CHANEY (2009) show that these effects are empirically not as serious as could be feared; 
nevertheless the use of disaggregated data seems to be reasonable. Further possible bi-
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ases of the PTM coefficients can occur in the case of menu costs, price stickiness and 
pricing in foreign currencies (e.g. GHOSH & WOLF 1994; KNETTER 1997a; LARUE 
2004). One response in the literature – to our knowledge only in the ERPT literature so 
far – to these kinds of problems is the usage of Threshold Cointegration techniques (e.g. 
AL-ABRI & GOODWIN 2009; LARUE et al. 2010). 
In this paper, we add a further piece of criticism to the PTM approach, more precisely to 
the PTM model proposed by KNETTER (1989; 1993). This criticism applies to the key 
feature of the Knetter model: The way it is controlled for the marginal cost. An implicit 
assumption of the Knetter model is that a complete cost pass-through takes place or that 
the degree of cost pass-through is at least equal for all destination countries in the sam-
ple. When this assumption is violated, the estimated PTM coefficients can be expected 
to be biased. Indeed, such a violation is likely since the optimization condition of a mo-
nopolist – on which the Knetter model is built – implies that cost pass-through equals 
exchange rate pass-through. This is already described by KNETTER (1995) but without 
showing the theoretical implications for the estimation of the model. We therefore simu-
late data for a profit maximizing multi-market monopolistic export firm that exports to 
ten destination countries and practices third degree price discrimination. The demand 
that the firm faces in the destination countries reacts to price changes in such a way that 
constant PTM coefficients are given. In the next step, we use this data to estimate the 
underlying PTM coefficients with the Knetter model in order to detect the bias expected 
in the estimation and identify its determinants. 
The paper is structured as follows: In Chapter 3.2 the concept of the Knetter model is 
presented. It is further argued that it can be expected to provide PTM coefficients that 
are biased toward the average PTM coefficient in the sample. Chapter 3.3 introduces the 
simulation model that is used to generate idealized data of a monopolistic export firm 
that practices PTM. In Chapter 3.4 the estimation results of the Knetter model with re-
gard to the simulated data are presented and the determinants for the extent of the bias 
expected in the PTM coefficients are identified. The paper will close with a discussion 
of the results and a conclusion in Chapters 3.5 and 3.6. 
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3.2 Detection of PTM: The Knetter model 
The model proposed by KNETTER (1989; 1993) is based on the first order optimization 
condition of a multi-market monopolistic export firm that practices third degree price 
discrimination across its destination countries. When this condition is solved for the 
export price     (in the export country’s currency) the following equation appears: 
       (
    
      
)                                                                                                                          (3.1) 
where     is the firm’s marginal cost that is equal for all destination countries and     
is the absolute value of the own price elasticity of demand for the i-th destination coun-
try at period t. The condition states that the optimal export price the firm charges equals 
the overall marginal cost of the firm plus a destination-specific markup. This markup 
directly depends on the demand elasticity that in turn varies with the price. This means 
that when the price in the destination country changes, the optimal markup changes too. 
Such a price change can be due to a change in the exchange rate (    ) or due to a 
change in the marginal cost. Based on the optimization condition, GAGNON & KNETTER 
(1995) derive the following theoretical relationship between the price and the marginal 
cost as well as the exchange rate: 
                                    (3.2) 
where the following symmetry condition applies for the coefficients: 
   (    )        
The marginal cost and the exchange rate in equation (3.2) influence the price directly as 
well as indirectly. The direct effect is proportional (i.e. it equals one) and only appears 
for the marginal cost in equation (3.2) because     is measured in the export country’s 
currency. Conversely, the indirect influence appears for both variables and is measured 
by   . This influence stems from the fact that the direct influence cause a price change 
that in turn influences the destination country’s demand elasticity and therefore the op-
timal destination-specific markup. Since the marginal cost and the exchange rate – net 
of its effect on the marginal cost – affect the price in the destination country’s currency 
equally, their influence on the destination-specific markup is equal too. FEENSTRA 
(1989) shows that this symmetry even holds for changes in import tariffs. 
Unfortunately, in empirical applications the marginal cost cannot be directly observed 
and has to be estimated or displayed through proxy variables. KNETTER (1989) argues 
that the marginal cost is equal across the destination countries when observed at the port 
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of export. Therefore, the author introduces a panel model that covers multiple destina-
tions in which fixed time effects (  ) can account for (changes in) the marginal cost: 
                                   (3.3) 
However, prices and exchange rates are often random walks that carry the risk of a spu-
rious regression. Since this can be avoided through first differencing, KNETTER (1993) 
also proposes a version of the model in first differences: 
                                  (3.4) 
where     is again the export price to country i measured by destination-specific unit 
values (in the export country’s currency),    is a fixed destination country effect in the 
version in levels that takes account of the different markup levels as well as quality dif-
ferences, and     is the error term for which the usual assumptions apply. 
In both versions of the model, the coefficient of interest is   . Although    could also 
give hints for price discrimination, it is usually only carefully interpreted in this way 
since it can be influenced by different degrees of quality. Only the value of the PTM 
coefficient    is seen as a reliable indication for market power. When    is smaller than 
zero, a rise in the exchange rate leads to a decrease of the export price. This means that 
price changes that are caused by exchange rate changes are smoothed out to a certain 
degree in the destination country’s currency. When    is minus one, price changes are 
perfectly smoothed out. In the PTM literature this is seen as proof for the existence of a 
markup. Conversely, a PTM coefficient of zero can be a sign for perfect competition but 
can also be caused by a constant demand elasticity in the destination country under the 
conditions of market power. 
The problem with regard to the model proposed by KNETTER (1989; 1993) is that the 
fixed time effects do not only measure just the marginal cost, but all kinds of variation 
that are common to the destination countries (KNETTER 1995: 8). Even if the marginal 
cost is equal for all destination countries, equation (3.2) shows that its influence on the 
export price is neither equal
1
 nor proportional as long as different degrees of PTM take 
place. The fixed time effects therefore actually measure the (change in) the marginal 
cost which is, on average, passed through to prices – in other words, the average effect 
of the marginal cost on prices in the sample. This means that the model only correctly 
controls for the marginal cost when the PTM coefficient of the respective destination 
                                                 
1
 KNETTER (1995) is aware of the destination-specific influence of the marginal cost that the symmetry 
condition implies, although he does not show the theoretical implications for the estimation of the model. 
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country lies exactly at the mean of the sample coefficients. Since marginal cost and ex-
change rates are correlated, this can also be expected to bias the PTM coefficients. More 
exactly, as this correlation is probably negative and the symmetry condition implies that 
cost and exchange rate pass-through are equal, the PTM coefficients can be expected to 
be biased toward the mean of the PTM coefficients in the sample. 
The purpose of the rest of the paper is to prove whether this hypothesized effect exists, 
how pronounced it is and which are the determinants – at least for the conditions under 
which the data is simulated. In order to estimate the Knetter model for the data simulat-
ed, we primarily use the model in first differences that is depicted in equation (3.4). 
This is because we want to emphasize that the bias is not caused by the spurious regres-
sion problem. However, both versions of the Knetter model are still in use in the PTM 
literature without further extensions or modifications. 
3.3 Simulation of data 
For the simulation of the data we assume a world consisting of a monopolistic export 
firm which is located in any country and produces a homogenous good. The firm is sell-
ing the good completely abroad to consumers located in N different destination coun-
tries. Each of the countries has its own currency whereby the exchange rates are freely 
fluctuating – i.e. are not fixed against one of the others. Trade is assumed to be costless 
and arbitrage to not be in action – that is, markets are fully geographically segmented. 
Under these circumstances, it would be profit maximizing for the firm to practice price 
discrimination across the destination countries according to the destination country’s 
demand elasticities. Because the demand elasticities are not fixed but increasing in ab-
solute value with the prices, an expected outcome of the firm’s profit maximizing be-
havior is pricing-to-market. 
Demand conditions 
The demand of destination country i in period t is given by 
   
    ( ̈  )     .             (3.5) 
where     and  ̈   are quantity and price (in the destination country’s currency) respec-
tively and     takes the changes of all other factors that have an influence on demand 
into account. In order to keep it simple and avoid modeling these factors,    is assumed 
to be a random shift variable with the properties     (   ). A suitable functional 
form for the demand has to take into account that the absolute value of the own price 
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elasticity of demand (  ) should not be constant, but should vary with the price on the 
respective destination market. This condition is necessary in order to create a pricing-to-
market behavior in the model. Furthermore, the demand elasticity should behave in a 
way that the PTM coefficient    is constant. This allows for a clear econometric proof 
of whether the coefficient is correctly identified by the Knetter model. It is therefore 
necessary to know exactly what is being measured by the PTM coefficient. KNETTER 
(1995: 5) shows this by taking the log of the firm’s optimization condition (3.1) and 
totally differentiating the equation. In the resulting expression it is possible to see how 
the PTM coefficient is connected to the demand elasticity’s curvature: 
   
     
    ̈ 
(     )  
     
    ̈ 
                                                                                                                          (3. ) 
Rearranging the expression yields: 
     
    ̈ 





                                                                                                            (3. ) 
Expression (3.7) describes how the elasticity of the “demand elasticity” with respect to 
the price should look in order to create a constant PTM coefficient   . Unfortunately, 
this expression is neither analytically transferable into a function    of price and the 
PTM coefficient, nor does it allows us to deduce a suitable functional form for the de-
mand equation (3.5). Instead, both functions have to be numerically approximated in 
order to fulfill the condition of a given constant PTM coefficient. Examples for the re-
sulting demand equations are presented in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 shows four demand curves which differ with respect to the PTM coefficient. 
They are defined as having the same demand elasticity (   = 2) at a price of p = 4,000 
and the same quantity demanded (q = 100,000) at this point. To the left of this point the 
absolute values of the elasticities are higher; to the right they are lower, respectively to a 
different degree. As the figure shows, the underlying PTM coefficient has an influence 
on the curvature of the demand curve whereby a larger absolute value of the PTM coef-
ficient makes the demand curve less convex (or even makes it concave) than in the con-
stant elasticity case. This influence on the curvature is well described and often men-
tioned in the literature (e.g. KNETTER 1993: 473), even if there have never been – at 
least to our knowledge – concrete demand curves depicted for given PTM coefficients. 
The case of concave demand curves for large absolute values of the PTM coefficients is 
also not explicitly reported in the literature. 
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Figure 3.1: Demand functions with different PTM coefficients 
 
Source: own compilation 
This, however, casts a bit more light on an unresolved issue in the literature: The con-
nection between PTM and market power. Some authors argue that PTM behavior – or, 
in general, incomplete exchange rate pass-through – is an indication of competition ra-
ther than of market power (e.g. KIM et al. 2003). In view of the demand curve in Figure 
3.1 with a very large absolute value of the PTM coefficient of -0.9, this indeed seems 
plausible. This demand curve has a very flat section which seems to be comparable with 
a residual demand curve under perfect competition. However, if an export firm would 
only act in this flat part of the demand curve, the scope for PTM becomes very small. In 
this section, the absolute value of the demand elasticity is already very high and there-
fore the markup only lasts to offset very small exchange rate changes. A possible expla-
nation for this shape of the demand curve would be monopolistic competition – i.e. an 
oligopolistic market structure with products of the respective suppliers differentiated 
among each other. If the differentiation is among export countries, this is also known as 
the Armington assumption (ARMINGTON 1969). In this case, each supplier has a certain 
space for price increases without instantaneously losing his buyers. However, even 
without heterogeneous products, an oligopolistic market structure can lead to PTM. This 
has already been shown by KRUGMAN (1986) and DORNBUSCH (1987) in their very 
basic articles for profit maximization under the conditions of a Cournot model. After all, 
a certain degree of competition seems to support PTM but it is still not possible without 
market power (KNETTER 1993: 473). BUGAMELLI & TEDESCHI (2008) (among others) 
show that PTM is primarily prevalent in oligopolistic industries which sell in advanced 
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the demand curve are seen as irrelevant. They are in a crystallized manner included in 
the assumed PTM coefficients. 
Exchange rates 
The export price to the i-th destination country in the destination country’s currency  ̈   
and the export price in the export country’s currency     are connected through the ex-
change rate as followed: 
 ̈                        (3.8) 
where      is the exchange rate between the export country and destination country i at 
period t (destination country’s currency per unit of the exporter’s currency). The ex-
change rates are modeled as autoregressive processes of the order 1, i.e. AR(1): 
                               (3.9) 
where   is the autoregression coefficient,   is a constant which is set in a way that the 
long-run expected value of the process equals 1 and      (   ) is a random error. 
The parameter   is set to a value of 0.9 in the model for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
this fits well to reality. Exchange rates are often very close to random walks (  = 1) or it 
cannot be ruled out empirically that they are random walks. Even real exchange rates 
often exhibit a high degree of serial correlation (e.g. BERGIN & FEENSTRA 2001). When 
they have a unit root, it is also clear that they are spuriously correlated with each other 
in most of the cases. This kind of correlation can be eliminated through first differenc-
ing. However, typically the first differences of exchange rates between a given export 
country and numerous other destination countries are correlated too. This is because an 
exchange rate rise can be due to an appreciation of the export country’s currency against 
all others or due to a depreciation of the respective counterpart’s currency against all 
others. The first event is common to all destination countries and therefore introduces 
the correlation, whereas the second is not. 
To illustrate this, Figure 3.2 shows the average correlation coefficient for each country 
represented. The correlation is between the first differences of exchange rates to all oth-
er countries listed in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) database in the period 1990 
to 2011
2
. As discussed above, a low correlation coefficient implies that the worth of the 
currency of the respective country does not change a lot but the worth of the other coun-
try’s currency does. This is the case for the United States in Figure 3.2, which was ex-
                                                 
2 These are in sum 169 countries and therefore 168 exchange rates, for which 14,028 bilateral correlation 
coefficients can be calculated. 
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pected because the United States has a huge economy and the US-Dollar is the world’s 
most important reserve currency. All other countries depicted have much higher correla-
tion coefficients. 
Figure 3.2: Average FD-ERC coefficients of selected countries 
 
Source: IMF (2013) 
The need to model this first difference exchange rate correlation (FD-ERC) is the sec-
ond reason for defining the exchange rates through equation (3.9) as AR processes close 
to random walks. In the case of a random walk, the first difference of the process is    . 
This means that the correlation of the first differences can be generated by creating ran-
dom numbers which are correlated over i. In order to prevent the process exhibiting the 
typical properties of a random walk (increasing variance over t and therefore a high 
chance for extreme numbers), a value of 0.9 for   is seen as a good compromise. 
Cost and supply conditions 
The costs    of the exporting firm (in export country’s currency) at period t are given by 
    (∑   (           )
 
   
)                                                                                                         (3.10) 
As equation (3.10) shows, the cost depends on the sum of quantity demanded in the 
destination countries    ∑    
 
    as well as on a random shift variable    which takes 
changes of all other factors that influence the firm’s cost into account. The first deriva-
tive of (3.10) with respect to quantity yields the marginal cost equation. For this equa-
tion the following functional form is assumed: 
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where   and   are parameters to be determined. Inverting this expression yields 
  
    
 
     
 
    
  
      
                         (3.12) 
If the export firm would act in a competitive environment, equation (3.12) would be the 
individual supply function of the firm. In this case,     could be written as “price” (in 
the export country’s currency) and   would be the own price elasticity of supply. In the 
case of market power, this is no longer valid. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity the 
parameter   is labeled as supply elasticity in this paper, even if it is in fact the elasticity 
of the marginal cost curve. As in demand equation (3.5), the random shift variable    is 
assumed to have the properties     (   ). This distribution assumption should not be 
too unrealistic. In the case of agricultural commodity markets,    can be seen as a 
weather driven harvest variable (WILLIAMS & WRIGHT 2005: 29). However, in all other 
cases this assumption is not critical. The case of markets in which a big part of the vari-
ation of    comes from imported factors whose prices depend on exchange rates is addi-
tionally analyzed in Chapter 3.4. 
Equilibrium 
At equilibrium, the monopolistic export firm maximizes its profit ( ) in period t: 
  (       )  ∑       (           )
 
   
  (∑   (           )
 
   
)                                    (3.13) 
Substituting into demand function (3.5) and maximizing equation (3.13) with respect to 
prices yields the following rearranged first order conditions: 
       (
    ( ̈     )
    ( ̈     )   
)                                                                                                        (3.14) 
Equation (3.14) equals the first order condition (3.1) on which the Knetter model is 
based whereby the demand elasticity is a function of the price in the destination coun-
try’s currency and the PTM coefficient. This means that the simulated export firm be-
haves in the same way as the Knetter model assumes. Furthermore, since the construc-
tion of the demand curve ensures a stable PTM coefficient, the simulated data can be 
perfectly described by the theoretical relationship depicted in equation (3.2) without any 
residual variation left. This means that the symmetry condition is fulfilled too. Although 
we used random numbers in the simulation model, these numbers do not have any influ-
ence on the fulfillment of the optimization condition but instead on the level of prices 
and quantities. 
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Simulation 
The model is applied in Microsoft Excel for N = 10 destination countries. The values of 
the demand elasticity and the PTM coefficient can be set for each destination country 
separately. In the initial starting period, the destination countries are defined as having 
the same number of quantity demanded for       and therefore the same market 
share, which is 10%. This means that at least in the starting period, all destination coun-
tries are equally important for the export country. How the market shares develop over 
time depends on the development of the exchange rates and the demand elasticities that 
react according to the respective PTM coefficients on price changes. The model is 
solved through the Excel solver which is an optimization add-on in Microsoft Excel. 
The Excel solver searches for the set of prices which fulfill the optimization condition 
(3.14) and thereby fixes both the marginal cost and the quantity traded. In the starting 
period, the quantity traded equals 1,000,000 and the marginal cost is 2,000. In addition 
to the starting period, 100 periods are simulated. This number is used because it is close 
to existing PTM studies. In the literature, quarterly or even annual frequencies are often 
used. The problem with monthly data is that it often poorly represents equilibrium con-
ditions. This is especially problematic in the Knetter model in first differences. 
KNETTER (1993: 476) states that even in the case of annual data, the PTM coefficient 
can still contain adjustment cost effects. This is why frequencies lower than monthly are 
the ones that are often used. Given the usage of quarterly data, the 100 periods simulat-
ed represent an observation period of 25 years. This is on the upper boundary of what is 
usually available in applications of the Knetter model. The original Knetter studies, for 
example, handle an observation period of between nine and fifteen years. 
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3.4 Estimation results for the simulated data 
3.4.1 Simulation parameters 
We have to fix, at least for the initial conditions of the simulation, several parameters of 
the simulation model. In Chapter 3.4.3, these parameters are varied in order to monitor 
their influence on the estimated PTM coefficients. For the supply elasticity, a rather 
small value of 0.2 is chosen. This value lies in a range which is more or less typical for 
commodities. In the short and medium runs, the quantities supplied cannot change 
sharply and are therefore inelastic with regard to prices. Even in the case of products 
that typically have higher supply elasticities, these numbers should be much smaller for 
the rather short time periods that the Knetter model uses as frequencies. For the demand 
elasticities, an absolute value of 2 is chosen in the starting period for all destination 
countries. As a result, only the PTM coefficient values are different between the desti-
nation countries and are set in a range between 0 and -0.9. An absolute value of 2 for 
the demand elasticity seems to be rather small as it implies a 100% markup over mar-
ginal cost. However, it is chosen because of parameter stability. Even when the form of 
the demand function described above ensures stable parameters, this breaks down when 
the markup tends to zero – i.e. when the demand elasticity tends to infinity due to in-
creased prices. The relatively low absolute value of the demand elasticity in the starting 
period efficiently prevents such cases. 
The standard deviation of the shift variables was assigned to be 0.05 and the standard 
deviation of the error term associated with the exchange rates to be 0.075. The latter 
equals the average standard deviation of the first log differences of the quarterly ex-
change rates of all countries in the IMF database between 1990 and 2011 – when ex-
treme values are excluded. For the results presented in Chapter 3.4.2, the FD-ERC is 
considered to be 0.2. This is a rather small value that is – at least on average – roughly 
the same as for the United States (Figure 3.2). 
3.4.2 Results for given simulation parameters 
Figure 3.3 shows the results of 200 simulations which are run under the described con-
ditions. Each of the ten true PTM coefficients that are depicted in the figure is associat-
ed with an otherwise identical destination country. For each simulation, the coefficients 
for the ten destination countries are estimated with the Knetter model in first differ-
ences. In Figure 3.3, the mean and the dispersion of the estimates are displayed. If the 
Knetter model would be able to estimate the PTM coefficients unbiasedly, the mean 
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should lie on the diagonal that represents the true coefficients. In addition, there should 
be no variation in the estimated PTM coefficients as the relationship that is depicted in 
equation (3.2) always holds perfectly in the simulated data. According to Figure 3.3, 
both conditions are not fulfilled. As hypothesized in Chapter 3.2, the estimated PTM 
coefficients are biased toward the average PTM coefficient in the sample
3
. The more a 
PTM coefficient deviates from the average PTM coefficient, the larger the extent of the 
bias is as well as the variance of the estimated PTM coefficients in absolute terms. 




Source: Own compilation 
This is because for PTM coefficients that lie far away from the average PTM coeffi-
cient, the cost pass-through (i.e. the influence of the marginal cost on the price) also lies 
far away from the average cost pass-through. Since the fixed time effects only control 
for the average cost pass-through, the bias is more pronounced in these cases. It is im-
portant to note that the relative extent of the bias depends on the correlation between the 
marginal cost and the exchange rate to the respective destination country. When this 
correlation is very pronounced, the estimated PTM coefficient is more affected by an 
incorrect control for (changes in) the marginal cost. Indeed, for a given correlation coef-
ficient, the relative bias toward the average PTM coefficient is constant. 
In fact, different degrees of correlation between the marginal cost and the respective 
exchange rates can explain two notable observations in Figure 3.3: Firstly, the disper-
sion of the estimated PTM coefficients and secondly, that for small absolute values of 
                                                 
3 In the results presented here, the sample always covers the full simulation population. However, a nar-
rower sample selection also exhibits PTM coefficients that are biased towards the sample mean.  
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the PTM coefficients, the estimates are relatively more biased toward the average than 
the estimates for large absolute values of the PTM coefficients. The dispersion arises 
since the market shares of the destination countries develop away from the 10% in the 
starting period throughout each simulation. This is caused by different developments of 
the exchange rates. Different market shares, in turn, cause different degrees of correla-
tion with the firm’s marginal cost and therefore different extents of the bias. The differ-
ently pronounced bias for different PTM coefficients can be explained as well. A larger 
absolute value of the PTM coefficient implies that a larger proportion of changes in ex-
change rates or the marginal cost is smoothed out. This leads to a less pronounced de-
mand response and therefore a smaller correlation with the marginal cost. 
Taken together, Figure 3.3 exhibits a sobering result because the time dummies which 
should control for (changes in) the marginal cost are the key feature of the Knetter mod-
el. GOLDBERG & KNETTER (1997: 1251) argue that without controlling for (changes in) 
the marginal cost, the PTM coefficients are biased upwards because exchange rates and 
the marginal cost are correlated. However, the same correlation leads to a bias in the 
PTM coefficients of the Knetter model when symmetry holds. Therefore, the Knetter 
model does not solve the problem of biased coefficients; it only changes the direction of 
the bias. As the symmetry condition implies, the basic problem is that the influence of 
the marginal cost on prices is not the same across the destination countries, although the 
marginal cost itself is. Even if the time effects would be a perfect proxy for changes in 
the marginal cost, this would not lead to unbiased PTM coefficients when cost pass-
though is incomplete. Instead, this would lead to a downward bias of the coefficients. 
In the case of the Knetter model in levels, the effects mentioned are even more serious. 
Because exchange rates are close to random walks and the marginal cost is too
5
, spuri-
ous correlations can occur. The bias is more or less the same as for the Knetter model in 
first differences but the standard deviation of the estimated PTM coefficients is up to 
two times as high. Furthermore, the dispersion does not decrease when the degree of 
FD-ERC rises. In the case of the model in first differences, the full variation of estimat-
ed parameters lies between the true parameter and the average parameter in the sample 
(Figure 3.3). This is because correlation coefficients were always negative. However, in 
the case of the model in levels, a part of the variation lies in the opposite direction of the 
true parameter. 
                                                 
5 In the model the “close to a random walk property” of the exchange rates often leads to a similar behav-
ior of the marginal cost series, especially with an increasing degree of FD-ERC. 
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3.4.3 Results for varying simulation parameters 
Exchange rate behavior 
As discussed above, the degree of correlation between the exchange rate to a destination 
country and the firm’s marginal cost is an important determinant for the extent of the 
bias. This kind of correlation arises since changes in the exchange rate lead to price 
changes in the respective destination country and therefore also change the import de-
mand of this country. In the case of the ten destination countries, each country’s contri-
bution to changes in the marginal cost is usually rather small. This results in low de-
grees of correlation and a moderate bias of the PTM coefficients. However, if exchange 
rates or their first differences are correlated, the picture changes dramatically. In this 
case, similar exchange rate changes take place simultaneously for more than one desti-
nation country. The correlation with each country’s exchange rate and the overall mar-
ginal cost increases and therefore the bias of the PTM coefficients increases too. This is 
depicted in Figure 3.4. The figure shows the mean of the estimated PTM coefficients for 
different degrees of FD-ERCs while all other simulation parameters are unchanged. The 
correlation coefficients displayed hold for all bilateral FD-ERCs whereas the results for 
each correlation coefficient are based on 200 simulations. 
Figure 3.4: Estimated PTM coefficients for different degrees of FD-ERC 
 
Source: Own compilation 
If the Knetter model would correctly estimate PTM, the mean of the estimated PTM 
coefficients should exhibit the true coefficients. Even with no FD-ERC, this is not ful-
filled but the bias is still moderate. However, with an increasing degree of FD-ERC the 
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close to the situation of the most developed countries (Figure 3.2) – the estimated PTM 
coefficients are already around 50% biased toward the average PTM coefficient in the 
sample. The figure shows again that low absolute values of the true PTM coefficient go 
hand-in-hand with a larger bias in relative terms. 
Of course, the FD-ERC empirically observed is not as uniform as assumed here. Some 
exchange rates are strongly correlated while others are not. The coefficients displayed in 
Figure 3.2 are average numbers. Unfortunately, these patterns are hard to model in the 
simulations. An attempt can be made by studying an extreme scenario of country groups 
whose exchange rates are correlated to varying degrees among the group but are not 
correlated between the groups. Indeed, similar patterns can be empirically observed. 
The results show that for the same average FD-ERC, the same correlation between ex-
change rates and marginal cost arises as in the uniform case. This means that the bias 
toward the average PTM coefficient in the sample is also the same as with a uniform 
FD-ERC. As a result, the degree of variation of the bilateral FD-ERC does not alter the 
results presented here – at least not in our simple simulation model that assumes equal 
market shares in the starting period. 
Different elasticity levels 
The degree of correlation between the marginal cost and exchange rates only reveals 
that there is a relationship between the variables but it does not say anything about the 
extent to which exchange rate changes lead to changes in the marginal cost – i.e. the 
slope of the relationship. This is exactly where the elasticity of the marginal cost curve 
– named as the supply elasticity here – comes into consideration. When the supply elas-
ticity, for example, tends to infinity, the marginal cost will not change at all, although 
exchange rate changes may lead to changes in the quantity demanded. If a firm can pro-
duce each quantity with the same level of the marginal cost, we do not have to control 
for the marginal cost because it does not change. Conversely, small values of the supply 
elasticity cause larger adjustments of the marginal cost. This implies that we can expect 
smaller supply elasticities to cause larger extents of the bias in the PTM coefficient. 
This hypothesis is supported by the results that are presented in Figure 3.5. The preced-
ing results are based on an assumed supply elasticity of 0.2. Figure 3.5 shows the mean 
values of the estimated PTM coefficients for varying values of the supply elasticity 
(based on 200 simulations for each value of the supply elasticity depicted). For the FD-
ERC, a value of 0.5 is assumed in Figure 3.5 as this is a typical value for most of the 
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developed countries (Figure 3.2). Obviously, the bias of the estimated PTM coefficients 
is more serious in the case of small values of the supply elasticity. Conversely, a supply 
elasticity of 10 or more ensures almost no bias of the PTM coefficients. Moreover, in 
this case the variance of the estimated PTM coefficients is very small.  
Figure 3.5: Estimated PTM coefficients for different supply elasticities 
 
Source: own compilation 
Note that in the simulation model, the export country’s domestic supply elasticity and 
its export supply elasticity are the same because no domestic consumption is consid-
ered. In fact, the value of the export supply elasticity is essential for the result presented 
in Figure 3.5. This means that the higher the export share of the production of a country 
is, the smaller the elasticity is and the higher the bias is. The same holds for a higher 
absolute value of the export country’s domestic demand elasticity. Even if the PTM 
coefficients in the Knetter model may not be seriously biased in the case of a large val-
ue of the supply elasticity, the coefficients would also not be seriously biased without 
controlling for the marginal cost at all. 
Another important issue with regard to the supply elasticity is the assumed time length 
of the supply reaction. More precisely, short-run elasticities are often smaller than long-
run ones. This has consequences for the usage of different frequencies in the Knetter 
model. If, for example, monthly data is used, the prices contain the short-run marginal 
cost reaction on exchange rate induced quantity changes. However, if annual data is 
used, the prices contain a longer-run or average reaction. Therefore, for shorter time 
lengths (or higher frequencies), the bias as well as the dispersion of the estimated coef-
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In contrast to the supply elasticity, the influence of the demand elasticity on the bias of 
the PTM coefficients is more ambiguous. For any destination country, a larger absolute 
value of its demand elasticity means that an exchange rate change causes a larger de-
mand response. This results in a larger change in the marginal cost and therefore a more 
serious estimation bias. However, for all other countries, a higher absolute value of the 
demand elasticity allows for a better absorption of the considered country’s demand 
response. Accordingly, if all demand elasticities are varied equally, the net effect is un-
clear. Unfortunately, a variation of the demand elasticity in the simulation model faces 
limitations. That is, high levels of the demand elasticity do not allow high degrees of 
PTM to take place and also endanger parameter stability in the model. Given the param-
eter assumptions inherent in the model, it is only possible to vary the absolute value of 
the demand elasticity between 1.5 and 5. In this range, the demand elasticity has no sig-
nificant influence on the bias of the PTM coefficients. Conversely, if the demand elas-
ticity of a single destination country is varied, the bias of the respective PTM coefficient 
is clearly more serious in the case of a higher absolute value of the demand elasticity. 
Supply and demand side shocks 
Shocks to supply and demand, as introduced in the simulation models through random 
shift variables in equations (3.5) and (3.10), only have an effect on the level of the quan-
tity, the marginal cost and the price. They do not have any influence on the optimization 
condition – i.e. the relationship displayed in equation (3.2) holds – and have no influ-
ence on the bias of the PTM coefficients. However, this only applies as long as these 
shocks are not correlated with the exchange rates. The crucial question is therefore 
whether these shocks are indeed not correlated with exchange rates and what happens if 
they are. On the demand side, KNETTER (1989: 202) states that “[…] exchange rates are 
at best weakly correlated with other macroeconomic variables”. Of course, the exchange 
rate would be correlated with those of a foreign competitor and therefore with its offer 
price. However, a foreign competitor is not considered in the simulation model. 
On the supply side, a correlation between shocks and exchange rates can arise when 
imported factors are of relevance for the production of the good. In this case, the ex-
change rate is positively correlated with the supply shock and therefore negatively cor-
related with the marginal cost. This leads to an amplification of the estimation bias in 
the Knetter model – provided that PTM does not take place for the imported factor. In 
order to analyze the importance of this amplification, we assume that the cost shifter in 
equation (3.10) depends directly on the exchange rates. That is, the export country pur-
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chases its inputs to an equal extent from the ten destination countries. For a FD-ERC of 
0.5 and varying values of the supply elasticity, the mean values of the estimated PTM 
coefficients which are based on 200 simulations are depicted in Figure 3.6. 
Figure 3.6: Results for different supply elasticities and imported factor shares 
 
Source: own compilation 
When Figure 3.6 is compared with Figure 3.5, it turns out that for a small value of the 
supply elasticity, an increasing share of imported factors only has a minor effect on the 
bias of the PTM coefficients – for a supply elasticity of zero there is no effect at all. 
This is due to the fact that a small supply elasticity leads to a strong influence of the 
quantity on the marginal cost and widely dampens the effect of changes in input prices; 
however, for a larger value of the supply elasticity, the influence of imported factors on 
the bias increases. If the supply shifter is completely determined by the influence of 
imported factors, this effect is so strong that the negative effect of the supply elasticity 
on the bias – which is shown in Figure 3.5 – is fully offset and the supply elasticity has 
literally no influence on the bias. 
3.5 Discussion 
In Chapter 3.4, it is shown that the Knetter model can be expected to be biased and that 
a number of parameters determine the extent of the bias. With regard to the FD-ERC, 
Figure 3.2 already revealed that a value of at least 0.5 seems to be common, when all 
countries of the IMF database are considered. However, in empirical applications only a 
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countries could expose very different average degrees of FD-ERC. This aspect alone 
makes it difficult to predict how serious the bias is in a specific case. 
In contrast to the simulation model, in empirical applications individual destination 
countries could be of different importance for an export country with regard to market 
shares (i.e. share of export country’s exports). Furthermore, they could exhibit very dif-
ferent values of the demand elasticity. This in turn results in very different degrees of 
correlation between the respective exchange rate and the marginal cost. When the de-
gree of FD-ERC rises, these differences are smoothed out but do not disappear as long 
as exchange rates are not perfectly correlated. The consequences are as follows: 
1. The bias can vary much more than reported in Chapter 3.4. 
Consider, for example, a destination country whose imports correspond to a very 
high market share and in which the export country has no market power and 
cannot practice PTM. The exchange rate to this country can be expected to be 
highly correlated with the exporter’s marginal cost. As a result, the Knetter 
model detects a significantly negative PTM coefficient although no PTM takes 
place. Furthermore, the extent of this bias is especially large when a large num-
ber of other countries in the sample exhibit markedly high PTM coefficients. 
This is because a country with a very small market share has the same leverage 
on the average PTM coefficient as a country with a huge market share. 
2. The average PTM coefficient in the sample could be biased too. 
The simulation results show that the average PTM coefficient is hardly biased. 
This is because of only moderate differences with regard to the correlation of 
exchange rates and the marginal cost across the destination countries. These dif-
ferences are introduced by the different values of the true PTM coefficients. 
However, this cannot be expected for empirical applications anymore. If, for ex-
ample, destination countries with low true PTM coefficients exhibit a high cor-
relation between the exchange rate and the marginal cost, the average PTM coef-
ficient is biased upwards in absolute terms. 
The fact that the direction of the bias is the mean of the PTM coefficients in the sample 
(and not in the population) is a problem. It implies that for a given country, the estimat-
ed PTM coefficient depends heavily on the composition of the sample. However, the 
sample in PTM studies is often far away from a random selection. In the empirical ap-
plication of the Knetter model, destination countries are typically chosen according to a) 
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the completeness of unit value series, b) sufficiently high trade quantities and c) a suffi-
ciently high variation of the exchange rate series. Indeed, significant changes of the es-
timated PTM coefficients when the sample selection is varied are a well-known phe-
nomenon, when using the Knetter approach. The paper has a convincing explanation for 
this behavior. 
The results in Chapter 3.4 also cast a bit more light on other phenomena that are de-
scribed in the literature. It is often tested whether or not PTM coefficients are equal 
across destination countries which cannot typically be rejected. However, when coeffi-
cients are biased toward the sample mean, this test is pointless. Furthermore, an often-
obtained result in PTM studies is that the United States seems to reveal a different PTM 
behavior than all other countries. PTM is often found when the US is the destination 
country but often not found when they are the country of origin. This result could at 
least be influenced by the properties of the US with regard to the parameters that deter-
mine the extent of the bias. As Figure 3.2 shows, the US exhibits a very low average 
FD-ERC. Furthermore, as a large country they should have rather high export supply 
elasticities in a number of markets as well as a lower dependency on foreign inputs.  
In fact, the only chance to avoid the bias when using the Knetter model seems to be 
choosing markets with high export supply elasticities and a low reliance on foreign fac-
tors – which would otherwise wipe out the effect of a larger elasticity. However, in such 
a scenario, the marginal cost would scarcely change at all and it is not necessary to con-
trol for it by using the Knetter model. Furthermore, this should be an uncommon scenar-
io. In the case of agricultural commodity markets, the export supply elasticities can be 
expected to be rather low and therefore the bias to be serious. It could be argued that it 
is unclear whether the symmetry condition is fulfilled in empirical applications. Differ-
ent implications for arbitrage, for example, speak against the symmetry condition. Even 
equal PTM coefficients usually change the price relations of the destination countries in 
a common currency and therefore trigger arbitrage – this is because exchange rates are 
not perfectly correlated. Conversely, an equal cost pass-through does not change the 
price relations and therefore does not trigger arbitrage. However, even when there are 
theoretical arguments against the symmetry condition, the bias only disappears if cost 
pass-through is equal across destination countries. Whether or not this is the case is an 
empirical question and should not be implicitly assumed in an empirical model. Instead, 
an empirical model should be robust against deviations from this assumption. 
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It therefore requires a different methodological approach to achieve an unbiased estima-
tion of PTM. Such an approach should allow the marginal cost to have different influ-
ences on prices across destination countries. For this purpose, KNETTER (1995) pro-
posed a non-linear model that is still based on a panel approach with fixed time effects, 
but allows the time effects to exercise a destination-specific influence. An important 
disadvantage of this model is that it hinges on the validity of the symmetry condition. 
This means that it is not possible to test whether or not symmetry is fulfilled; in the case 
of non-fulfillment, the model results are again biased. This is a strong assumption and 
there is therefore no guarantee that the model produces better results. In actuality, the 
model is not followed up in the PTM literature. 
An alternative would be the usage of an observable series as a measure of the marginal 
cost in order to estimate its destination-specific influence. Such a measure could be a 
non-destination-specific unit value series – a weighted average of the destination-
specific unit values. However, this series still contains cost and exchange rate pass-
through effects and is therefore not appropriate. Instead, the wholesale prices in the ex-
porting country can be used as a measure of the marginal cost. This measure is, for ex-
ample, used by SAGHAIAN & REED (2004) since they find strong multicollinearity be-
tween the exchange rates and the fixed effects in the Knetter model. However, this 
method comes with a number of possible problems. Firstly, the price series has to be 
available for a specific product or the specific variety of a product which is covered 
through the unit values series. Secondly, the domestic wholesale prices have to be unin-
fluenced by market power. However, when market power is supposed to be a problem 
in the export market, why should it not be a problem in the domestic market? And third-
ly, in international trade the usage of (at least) medium-term contracts is often common. 
This means that the price information in unit values could be temporally lagged and 
therefore does not fit to wholesale prices. In Chapter 4, we propose an alternative meth-
od to construct a series which can be used as a measure of the marginal cost and there-
fore to control for it in a PTM model. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The empirical model proposed by KNETTER (1989; 1993) and its countless modifica-
tions are not able to measure pricing-to-market unbiasedly. The reason for this bias lies 
in the key element of the model, the way in which it controls for the marginal cost. The 
marginal cost is assumed to be identical across destination countries at the port of ex-
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port and it can therefore be approximated with the fixed effects of a panel model. How-
ever, even if the marginal cost is equal across destination countries, its influence on 
prices is not equal; instead, this influence depends on cost pass-through. Since cost and 
exchange rate pass-through are at least theoretically symmetrical, the PTM coefficients 
of the Knetter model are biased toward the average PTM coefficient in the sample. Even 
when symmetry does not hold, for an unbiased estimation cost pass-through must be 
equal across destination countries, which is rather unlikely to happen. 
The severity and the determinants of the bias are analyzed in this paper by firstly gener-
ating data in simulations that are based on the assumptions of the Knetter model, and 
secondly using this data to estimate the Knetter model. It turns out that under realistic 
conditions, the extent of the bias is around 50% of the distance to the average PTM co-
efficient in the sample. In general, the extent of the bias is determined by a) the correla-
tion between the export firm’s marginal cost and the exchange rate to the respective 
destination country as well as b) the sensitivity of the marginal cost with regard to ex-
change rate changes. In addition to the market share and demand elasticity of the re-
spective destination country, a) is determined by the degree of correlation between the 
first differences of the exchange rates of the destination countries. When this correlation 
increases, the destination countries act more and more as a unit with regard to the de-
mand. Next to that, b) is driven by the export supply elasticity and the importance of 
foreign inputs. The bias tends toward zero only if the value of the supply elasticity is 
large (at least above 10) and foreign inputs do not play a role. However, in this case it is 
not necessary to control for the marginal cost at all, which is the main purpose of the 
Knetter model. In the case of agricultural commodity markets, the existing supply elas-
ticities can be expected to cause a serious bias. 
In summary, this means that the Knetter model delivers PTM estimates (mainly for sin-
gle destination countries) that could be highly misleading as an implication of market 
power. The results are less problematic when the average degree of PTM in the sample 
is of interest, although in this case a bias can also occur. In any case, the results should 
be interpreted with caution. Furthermore, the model in first differences is superior to the 
model in levels. In order to achieve an unbiased estimation of PTM, an alternative 
method to measuring the marginal cost is needed. This method, as well as a differently 
specified PTM model that preserves the advantages of the Knetter approach, is present-
ed in Chapter 4.  
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Appendix 3.1: Estimated PTM coefficients for the model in first differences 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.0 -0.08 -0.12 -0.15 -0.18 -0.22 -0.25 -0.28 -0.31 -0.33 -0.37
-0.1 -0.16 -0.19 -0.21 -0.24 -0.27 -0.29 -0.31 -0.34 -0.36 -0.39
-0.2 -0.24 -0.26 -0.28 -0.30 -0.32 -0.34 -0.35 -0.37 -0.39 -0.41
-0.3 -0.32 -0.33 -0.34 -0.36 -0.37 -0.38 -0.39 -0.41 -0.41 -0.43
-0.4 -0.40 -0.41 -0.42 -0.42 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43 -0.44 -0.44 -0.45
-0.5 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.47 -0.47
-0.6 -0.59 -0.58 -0.57 -0.56 -0.55 -0.54 -0.52 -0.52 -0.50 -0.49
-0.7 -0.69 -0.66 -0.65 -0.63 -0.61 -0.59 -0.57 -0.56 -0.53 -0.52
-0.8 -0.79 -0.76 -0.73 -0.70 -0.67 -0.65 -0.61 -0.60 -0.56 -0.54
-0.9 -0.89 -0.85 -0.81 -0.77 -0.74 -0.71 -0.66 -0.64 -0.59 -0.56
0.0 0.039 0.041 0.042 0.045 0.046 0.039 0.046 0.044 0.047 0.046
-0.1 0.031 0.030 0.032 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.038 0.041
-0.2 0.023 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.029 0.029 0.034
-0.3 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.020 0.019 0.023 0.030
-0.4 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.027
-0.5 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.028
-0.6 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.030
-0.7 0.022 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.023 0.027 0.029 0.027 0.037
-0.8 0.031 0.036 0.037 0.034 0.037 0.034 0.036 0.037 0.035 0.042
-0.9 0.041 0.044 0.047 0.046 0.043 0.045 0.049 0.048 0.043 0.048
Simulation parameter: Supply elasticity = 0.2, Demand elasticity at starting period = -2
Standard deviation of demand and supply shifter = 0.05
Standard deviation of exchange rate error term = 0.075
True PTM 
coefficients



















Source: Own calculations 
Appendix 3.2: Estimated PTM coefficients for the model in levels 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.0 -0.08 -0.11 -0.15 -0.19 -0.21 -0.25 -0.27 -0.31 -0.34 -0.37
-0.1 -0.16 -0.18 -0.22 -0.24 -0.26 -0.30 -0.31 -0.34 -0.37 -0.39
-0.2 -0.24 -0.26 -0.28 -0.30 -0.31 -0.34 -0.35 -0.37 -0.39 -0.41
-0.3 -0.32 -0.33 -0.35 -0.36 -0.37 -0.38 -0.39 -0.41 -0.42 -0.43
-0.4 -0.40 -0.41 -0.42 -0.42 -0.43 -0.43 -0.44 -0.44 -0.45 -0.45
-0.5 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.47
-0.6 -0.59 -0.57 -0.57 -0.56 -0.55 -0.53 -0.53 -0.52 -0.51 -0.50
-0.7 -0.68 -0.66 -0.65 -0.63 -0.61 -0.59 -0.57 -0.55 -0.54 -0.52
-0.8 -0.78 -0.76 -0.72 -0.71 -0.67 -0.64 -0.62 -0.59 -0.57 -0.54
-0.9 -0.89 -0.85 -0.82 -0.77 -0.74 -0.70 -0.67 -0.63 -0.60 -0.57
0.0 0.047 0.057 0.062 0.068 0.064 0.069 0.060 0.056 0.057 0.052
-0.1 0.036 0.043 0.049 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.054 0.052 0.049 0.047
-0.2 0.025 0.033 0.038 0.043 0.044 0.040 0.043 0.048 0.041 0.037
-0.3 0.016 0.020 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.034 0.035 0.036 0.037
-0.4 0.009 0.013 0.015 0.018 0.018 0.022 0.024 0.027 0.032 0.033
-0.5 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.014 0.019 0.021 0.024 0.029 0.033
-0.6 0.014 0.015 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.026 0.023 0.028 0.030 0.034
-0.7 0.028 0.028 0.036 0.038 0.034 0.038 0.037 0.041 0.036 0.038
-0.8 0.038 0.047 0.049 0.047 0.045 0.055 0.051 0.047 0.044 0.044
-0.9 0.051 0.055 0.059 0.076 0.067 0.073 0.062 0.057 0.059 0.049
Simulation parameter: Supply elasticity = 0.2, Demand elasticity at starting period = -2
Standard deviation of demand and supply shifter = 0.05
Standard deviation of exchange rate error term = 0.075
True PTM 
coefficients



















 Source: Own calculations 
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Appendix 3.3: Estimated PTM coefficients for different supply elasticities 
0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9
0 -0.29 -0.33 -0.36 -0.40 -0.44 -0.48 -0.52 -0.57 -0.61 -0.67
0.31 -0.22 -0.27 -0.33 -0.37 -0.43 -0.48 -0.54 -0.60 -0.66 -0.72
1 -0.16 -0.22 -0.29 -0.35 -0.42 -0.49 -0.56 -0.63 -0.70 -0.77
3.16 -0.08 -0.16 -0.24 -0.33 -0.41 -0.49 -0.58 -0.66 -0.75 -0.84
10 -0.03 -0.12 -0.22 -0.31 -0.40 -0.50 -0.59 -0.69 -0.78 -0.88
31.6 -0.01 -0.11 -0.20 -0.30 -0.40 -0.50 -0.60 -0.69 -0.79 -0.89
0 0.053 0.040 0.029 0.021 0.011 0.011 0.019 0.032 0.039 0.053
0.31 0.036 0.031 0.024 0.016 0.010 0.008 0.015 0.022 0.034 0.040
1 0.027 0.022 0.016 0.011 0.007 0.006 0.010 0.016 0.025 0.026
3.16 0.012 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.012 0.013
10 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.005
31.6 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
Simulation parameter: Demand elasticity at starting period = -2, FD-ERC = 0.5
Standard deviation of demand and supply shifter = 0.05



















 Source: Own calculations 
Appendix 3.4: Estimated PTM coefficients for different imported factor shares 
0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9
0 -0.29 -0.32 -0.36 -0.40 -0.44 -0.48 -0.52 -0.57 -0.62 -0.67
0.31 -0.26 -0.30 -0.34 -0.39 -0.43 -0.48 -0.53 -0.58 -0.63 -0.69
1 -0.21 -0.27 -0.32 -0.37 -0.43 -0.48 -0.54 -0.60 -0.66 -0.72
3.16 -0.17 -0.23 -0.29 -0.35 -0.42 -0.48 -0.55 -0.61 -0.68 -0.75
10 -0.13 -0.20 -0.27 -0.34 -0.41 -0.49 -0.56 -0.63 -0.70 -0.77
31.6 -0.11 -0.19 -0.26 -0.34 -0.41 -0.49 -0.56 -0.64 -0.71 -0.79
0 0.036 0.030 0.024 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.015 0.021 0.029 0.037
0.31 0.031 0.027 0.022 0.015 0.009 0.007 0.011 0.017 0.025 0.035
1 0.026 0.021 0.017 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.010 0.015 0.021 0.029
3.16 0.019 0.016 0.012 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.012 0.015 0.020
10 0.030 0.024 0.018 0.011 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.017 0.025 0.031
31.6 0.040 0.031 0.023 0.014 0.006 0.005 0.014 0.023 0.030 0.043
0 -0.29 -0.32 -0.36 -0.40 -0.44 -0.48 -0.52 -0.57 -0.62 -0.66
0.31 -0.28 -0.32 -0.35 -0.39 -0.44 -0.48 -0.52 -0.56 -0.61 -0.66
1 -0.27 -0.31 -0.35 -0.39 -0.43 -0.47 -0.52 -0.56 -0.61 -0.66
3.16 -0.27 -0.31 -0.35 -0.39 -0.43 -0.47 -0.52 -0.56 -0.60 -0.65
10 -0.26 -0.30 -0.34 -0.39 -0.43 -0.47 -0.52 -0.56 -0.60 -0.65
31.6 -0.25 -0.30 -0.34 -0.38 -0.43 -0.47 -0.51 -0.56 -0.60 -0.65
0 0.031 0.026 0.021 0.015 0.010 0.008 0.012 0.020 0.025 0.037
0.31 0.030 0.025 0.019 0.015 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.019 0.024 0.031
1 0.029 0.026 0.019 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.018 0.023 0.032
3.16 0.031 0.022 0.017 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.017 0.025 0.029
10 0.031 0.023 0.016 0.012 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.016 0.025 0.029
31.6 0.029 0.024 0.017 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.017 0.024 0.029
Simulation parameter: Demand elasticity at starting period = -2, FD-ERC = 0.5
Standard deviation of demand and supply shifter = 0.05











































































 Source: Own calculations 
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4 Pricing-to-Market in an Oligopoly: An Alternative Approach to 
Measuring Marginal Cost 
 
Abstract 
Pricing-to-market describes the phenomenon when an export firm adjusts its destina-
tion-specific markup in order to offset changes of the bilateral exchange rates that shift 
its marginal cost in the destination country’s currency. For this behavior, the existence 
of a markup is necessary and therefore pricing-to-market is typically used as a method 
to analyze market power. However, an open question in the literature is whether pric-
ing-to-market is caused by the characteristics of the market demand curve or by the 
market structure – i.e. the existence of oligopolistic competitors. The first innovation of 
this paper is the theoretical foundation of an oligopolistic model of pricing-to-market 
that allows the identification of its source. The second innovation is the proposal of an 
alternative approach to measuring marginal cost that avoids a biased estimation of pric-
ing-to-market and also allows detection of it through changes in a firm’s overall mar-
ginal cost. The oligopolistic PTM model is estimated for New Zealand’s exports of the 
most important dairy products. The results support the validity of the approach proposed 
here and show that pricing-to-market is present on the analyzed market to a high degree 
due to the existence of the EU as main competitor. 
Keywords: Pricing-to-market, exchange rate pass-through, international dairy markets 
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4.1 Introduction 
A possible way to detect imperfect competition and market power is to analyze the pric-
ing behavior of firms – i.e. how prices react to changes in cost. For the international 
markets, a special kind of cost change can be directly observed. The change of the bilat-
eral exchange rate between an export and an import country also changes the exporter’s 
marginal cost in the import country’s currency. Under conditions of perfect competition, 
the exporter’s price has to change proportionally to the marginal cost but in the case of 
imperfect competition, it does not have to. If the price adjustment leads to a change of 
the perceived (residual) demand elasticity in the import country, a profit maximizing 
exporter will modify its markup and thus change the price more or less proportionally. 
This behavior is referred to in the literature as “pricing-to-market” (PTM), an expres-
sion KRUGMAN (1986) used for the first time. It can usually be expected that the (resid-
ual) demand elasticity increases with the price which implies that the price increases 
less than proportionally and leads to local-currency price stability (KNETTER 1993). 
An open question in the literature is whether PTM is caused by the characteristics of the 
demand curve or by the market structure. KNETTER (1989; 1993) who presents the first 
empirical model to detect PTM considers a profit maximizing, multi-market monopo-
list. This approach is typically generalized by assuming that the demand elasticity the 
monopolistic firm faces can also be seen as residual demand elasticity. Hence, the mod-
el can also be used for an oligopolistic market structure although such a structure is usu-
ally not explicitly modeled
6
. The disadvantage of this procedure is that it is not possible 
to detect the source of PTM. Both the convexity of the market demand schedule as well 
as the presence of one or more oligopolistic competitors can change the elasticity along 
a residual demand schedule which is measured through the PTM coefficient. Other pa-
pers that analyze the connection between PTM and the market structure are either pure-
ly theoretical (e.g. FEENSTRA et al. 1996) or try to find a pattern between the market 
structure and the measured degree of PTM (e.g. BUGAMELLI & TEDESCHI 2008). 
In this paper, the theoretical framework of KNETTER (1995) – that is also used by 
GAGNON & KNETTER (1995) in principle – is extended to an oligopolistic model of PTM 
which allows us to unravel whether PTM is caused by the characteristics of the market 
demand curve or by the market structure; this is the first innovation of the paper. The 
                                                 
6
 An exception is the empirical specification of GIL-PAREJA (2003) that assumes Bertrand competition 
and includes a competitor price index but without theoretically deriving the meaning of the coefficients. 
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second innovation pertains to the way in which the marginal cost is depicted in the em-
pirical application of the model. It is important to control for the marginal cost because 
it is correlated with the exchange rates and its omission would lead to biased PTM coef-
ficients. In the empirical model proposed by KNETTER (1989; 1993; 1995) and the later 
work that is based on this approach, for the marginal cost is controlled through the time 
effects of a fixed effects panel model. However, this procedure contains several disad-
vantages and it is simply no longer possible to apply it when it comes to the estimation 
of the oligopolistic PTM model. Instead we propose an approach that is based upon the 
estimation of a stochastic lower price frontier from the available unit value data which 
can – as we will argue – be used as a measure of the marginal cost. In the next step, this 
“stochastic” marginal cost series can be used to depict the marginal cost in the oligopo-
listic PTM model. A further advantage of this approach is that it also allows the detec-
tion of PTM through overall changes in the marginal cost. 
The approach presented here is applied to the international markets for dairy products. 
These markets reveal a fairly high concentration on the supply side. The New Zealand 
dairy co-operative Fonterra accounts for approximately 95% of New Zealand’s dairy 
exports and has a world market share of about 35% in milk equivalent (ME). For single 
dairy products, this share can be even higher – in some markets it lies well above 50%. 
This is supported by the fact that Fonterra influences (directly or indirectly) huge parts 
of the dairy exports of other countries via international partnerships, joint ventures and 
foreign subsidiaries (ARMENTANO et al. 2004: 46f; DOBSON & WILCOX 2002: 5). It is 
therefore fair to suppose that Fonterra has significant market power on the international 
dairy markets. In terms of export regions, the most important competitor of Fonterra (or 
New Zealand) is the European Union with almost the same market share in ME. 
This paper is structured as follows: In Chapter 4.2 the theoretical oligopolistic PTM 
model is developed. In Chapter 4.3 the empirical specification of the model as well as 
the procedure to measure the marginal cost is presented. In Chapter 4.4 the data is dis-
cussed. Chapter 4.5 contains the estimation results for New Zealand’s dairy exports and 
Chapter 4.6 finalizes the paper with a conclusion. 
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4.2 A theoretical model of pricing-to-market in an oligopoly 
Consider an exporting firm located in any country which sells any good in N different 
destination countries. It is assumed that the firm is able to segment the destination mar-
kets so that arbitrage does not need to be taken into account. In each destination coun-
try, the firm faces a third-country firm that competes with it and therefore limits its 
market power in the respective country. For simplicity, other competitors are not con-
sidered for the moment but it is possible to generalize the approach presented here to 
more than one foreign competitor. With regard to the type of oligopolistic competition, 
price competition with product differentiation is assumed. Similar to KNETTER (1995), 
no assumptions are necessary with regard to functional forms of cost or demand func-
tions. The profits of the firm under consideration are given by: 
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)             (4.1) 
where    is the export price (in the export country’s currency) and    is the quantity sold 
to the destination country i,     is the real
7
 bilateral exchange rate (destination market 
currency per unit of the exporter’s currency),   
  is the real export price of the compet-
ing firm (in the competing firm’s currency),    
  is the real bilateral competitor ex-
change rate (destination market currency per unit of the competing firm’s currency),    
is the real income in the destination country i,   is the input price and  ( ) is the cost 
function of the export firm. For simplicity, time arguments are suppressed in (4.1). Prof-
it maximizing with respect to export prices yields the following first order conditions: 
     (   )(
   (         
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   (         
   
    )   
)             {     }                                             (4.2) 
where  ( ) stands for the marginal cost and    denotes the absolute value of the resid-
ual demand elasticity in the destination country i. As equation (4.2) shows, the optimal 
export price for a destination country should equal the marginal cost multiplied by a 
bracket term that depends on the residual demand elasticity and determines the markup. 
Both marginal cost and markup depend on the variables which determine the quantity 
demanded. While the marginal cost is equal across the destination countries, the residu-
al demand elasticity and thus the markup is not equal. In order to show how the export 
price changes when these determinants change, the logarithm of equation (4.2) is taken 
and the result is totally differentiated with respect to the firm’s and competitor’s export 
                                                 
7
 The variables are divided through the price level in the respective destination market. 
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price and exchange rate as well as the firm’s input price and income in the destination 
country. This results in the following equation: 
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where  ̈        and  ̈ 
     
   
  denote the firm’s and the competitor’s export pric-
es respectively in the destination country’s currency. On the right hand side of the equa-
tion, the numerator of the first fraction depicts how the marginal cost changes through 
changes in the determinants. In total, the fraction shows the relative change of the mar-
ginal cost when the considered determinants change. In contrast, the next fractions de-
pict in sum the relative change of the markup and illustrate how relative changes in par-
ticular determinants affect the markup and therefore the export price. However, in equa-
tion (4.3) the relative export price change still appears on the right hand side. Solving 
for the relative price change, simplifying the first fraction and introducing symbols for 
the coefficients yields: 
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Equation (4.4) represents an extension of the theoretical PTM equation KNETTER (1995) 
derived and tried to estimate
8
. The difference is that the derivation of KNETTER (1995) 
just leads to the first half of equation (4.4), i.e. the influence of the firm’s marginal cost 
and exchange rate on the export price. In this part, equation (4.4) – including the coeffi-
cient from (4.5) – is identical to his results. 
                                                 
8
 For the complete derivation of the theoretical model see Appendix 4.1. 
4   Pricing-to-Market in an Oligopoly: An Alternative Approach to Measuring Marginal Cost 
45 
The important insight given by equation (4.4) is that the five determinants affect the 
firm’s export prices through three channels or coefficients. These coefficients explain 
the influence of the determinants on the residual demand elasticity and therefore the 
influence on the markup. For all coefficients, the denominator in the fraction is the same 
(equation (4.5) to (4.7)). We can usually expect this denominator to be negative: The 
residual demand elasticity itself cannot be smaller than one when profits are maximized 
– this holds independent of the market structure. Additionally, the second term – i.e. the 
elasticity of the “residual demand elasticity” with respect to the firm’s export price in 
the destination country’s currency ( ̈ ) – should usually be positive. This implies that 
the residual demand elasticity should increase with the price level and result in a residu-
al demand curve which is less convex than the constant elasticity form. While this may 
be plausible – but not necessarily – for a market demand curve, it is clearly evident in 
the case of a residual demand curve. When the firm’s price level changes, this creates a 
difference between its price and the competitor’s price. 
Given that the elasticity of the “residual demand elasticity” with respect to  ̈  is posi-
tive, the PTM coefficient    is negative and lies between zero and minus one
9
. The more 
the residual demand curve differs from the constant elasticity form, the higher the abso-
lute value of the PTM coefficient. As already revealed by KNETTER (1995), the coeffi-
cient    applies for changes in both the firm’s marginal cost and the exchange rate – net 
of the effect an exchange rate change has on the marginal cost – since they influence  ̈  
in the same way. In equation (4.4) the influence of marginal cost and exchange rates on 
the export prices differs by one because price changes are measured in the export coun-
try’s currency. Equation (4.4) reveals that this symmetry of the influences also holds for 
changes in the competitor’s price and the competitor’s exchange rate. 
In contrast to   , the coefficient    can be expected to be positive since the numerator in 
(4.6) – i.e. the elasticity of the “residual demand elasticity” with respect to the competi-
tor’s export price in the destination country’s currency ( ̈ 
 ) – is certainly negative. This 
means that when the competitor’s price has any influence on the firm’s residual demand 
elasticity, then a higher price will reduce it and allow a higher markup. In essence,    
can be viewed as an indication of the degree of product differentiation. When the mar-
ket demand curve is not more convex than the constant elasticity form,    can be ex-
                                                 
9
 KNETTER (1995) also mentions the case of (residual) demand curves that are more convex than the con-
stant elasticity form and imply positive PTM coefficients. However, this seems to be a rather theoretical 
consideration. The bulk of literature focuses on negative coefficients that lead to local-currency price 
stability (KNETTER 1993). 
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pected to lie between zero and |  |. A value of zero means that either there is no com-
mon market (i.e. each of the firms has its own fully segmented market in the destination 
country) or the residual demand elasticity is already infinity (i.e. perfect competition 
takes place). In the case of perfect competition, the competitor’s price influences the 
firm’s price only via changes in the marginal cost. The other side of the range is a value 
of |  | for   . In order to understand why this is the case, it is useful to consider the rela-
tion between    and    at first. They both depict changes in the residual demand elastici-
ty when the respective price changes. When they are summed up, the result tells us how 
the residual demand elasticity changes, when the price of both firms changes to the 
same percentage. Since the price relation remains constant, this change in the residual 
demand elasticity must be due to a change in the market demand characteristics. This 
implies that the sum of the coefficients describes the convexity of the market demand 
curve, whereas    describes the convexity of the residual demand curve. The knowledge 
of    therefore enables us to unravel whether PTM comes from the shape of the market 
demand curve or from the market structure. However, when it is assumed that the mar-
ket demand curve is not more convex than the constant elasticity form,    cannot be 
larger than the absolute value of   . If the coefficients are exactly equal, the effects on 
the residual demand elasticity are mutually balanced out and the market demand curve 
therefore has to have a constant elasticity shape. 
The third coefficient    can be expected to be positive because the numerator in (4.7) – 
i.e. the elasticity of the “residual demand elasticity” with respect to income in the desti-
nation country – is probably negative. This is because the Engel curve predicts that the 
income elasticity will decrease with an increase in the income. Since demand functions 
are homogenous of degree zero with respect to prices and income, this also leads to a 
smaller absolute value of the demand elasticity. Therefore, the effect which is measured 
by    could be called “Engel effect”. However, it could be questioned whether or not 
this effect is large enough in order to be detected empirically. In actuality, the PTM 
model proposed by KNETTER (1989; 1993; 1995) is periodically expanded with an in-
come variable (e.g. KNETTER 1997b) but its coefficient is almost never significant. 
An important disadvantage of equation (4.4) is that it is empirically not estimable – at 
least not without a bias
10
. This is because when the competitor follows a similar func-
tion to (4.4), its price is no longer exogenous in (4.4). In order to avoid this endogeneity 
                                                 
10 GIL-PAREJA (2003) includes a competitor price index in the model but without considering a possibly 
arising endogeneity bias. 
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problem, equation (4.4) must also be considered for the competing firm. Solving the 
resulting system of equations again for relative export price change of the firm under 
consideration yields: 
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where the subscript C indicates that the respective variable or coefficient belongs to the 
competing firm. Introducing symbols for the newly composed coefficients simplifies 
equation (4.8) to: 
   
  
 (    )
   
  
   
    
   
   (
    
   
 
    
 
   
 )    
   
  
                                                (4. ) 
Equation (4.8) illuminates how the coefficients in equation (4.4) change, when the com-
petitor’s reactions are already accounted for; instead of the competitor’s price, its mar-
ginal cost appears in the equation. When    is zero in (4.8), the equation simplifies to 
the short version of equation (4.4) which KNETTER (1995) already derived (plus the in-
come term). In general, larger values of the coefficients    and   
  lead to smaller abso-
lute values of the coefficient    in comparison to the absolute value of   . This is evident 
because the larger   
  is, the more the competitor reacts to the firm’s price changes and 
the larger    is, the more the firm reacts in turn to the adjusted price of the competitor. 
For the influence of the competitor’s marginal cost and exchange rate, two effects are 
important. Firstly, the extent of its own PTM coefficient   
  and secondly, the magni-
tude by which its price influences the firm’s price via the optimal markup – i.e.   . Fur-
thermore, the coefficient    contains a direct effect that income changes have on the 
price of the firm and an indirect effect via its effect on competitor price. 
4.3 Empirical specification 
4.3.1 The oligopolistic PTM model 
Equation (4.9) constitutes the framework for an econometric time series model in first 
differences that explains export price changes to a certain destination country: 
                               
         
                            (4.10) 
where   is a constant,    is the firm’s export price for the destination country in period t 
measured by destination-specific export unit values (in the export country’s currency), 
    is the firm’s marginal cost (in the export country’s currency),     is the real bilat-
eral exchange rate (destination market currency per unit of the exporter’s currency), 
(4.8) 
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  is the competitor’s marginal cost (in the competitor country’s currency),    
  is 
the real bilateral competitor exchange rate (destination market currency per unit of the 
competitor’s currency),    is the real income in the destination country (measured by the 
real GDP) and    is the error term for which the usual assumptions apply. 
If the focus is turned to the investigated product as a whole, rather than individual desti-
nation countries, equation (4.10) can be estimated in a non-destination-specific manner. 
This requires only a slightly different definition of the variables so that    is the firm’s 
overall export price (non-destination-specific unit values are used),     is the effective 
exchange rate (i.e. the exchange rate is a weighted average of those of the major desti-
nation countries) and    is the weighted average GDP. In this case, the weights for the 
exchange rates and the GDP are the respective export shares. This procedure could be a 
first step before analyzing single destinations countries, when PTM is found to be an 
overall phenomenon in a certain product market. 
The estimation of the non-destination-specific version of equation (4.10) has an im-
portant advantage but also a possible disadvantage. The advantage is that false detection 
of PTM due to quality changes in the underlying trade flow of the unit value (LAVOIE & 
LIU 2007) should be rather unlikely. Marked quality changes in the production would 
require exporters to have a high degree of flexibility. Conversely, the disadvantage is 
that there could be an endogeneity bias in the non-destination-specific model. As the 
first fraction in equation (4.3) already shows, the marginal cost depends on the prices 
that the firm charges in the destination countries. When prices are increased, the quanti-
ty demanded decreases and the marginal cost decreases too, when it is a function of 
quantity. The marginal cost can therefore be classed as endogenous and the resulting 
endogeneity bias tends in the direction of a finding of PTM through the marginal cost 
coefficient. The severity of the bias depends on several characteristics of the market 
analyzed such as the value of the residual demand elasticity, the share of the exports for 
which the price applies and the elasticity of the marginal cost with respect to quantity. 
However, when the model is estimated for single destinations whose imports hardly 
influence the marginal cost, a possible endogeneity bias should be negligible. Even if 
this were not the case, the PTM model proposed by KNETTER (1989; 1993) basically 
faces the same problem despite using time dummies to control for the marginal cost. 
Regardless of the model version, under the conditions of perfect competition,   would 
equal one and all other coefficients would be zero; this means that the firm’s price is 
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fully explained by its marginal cost. The same result would apply under imperfect com-
petition and a constant residual demand elasticity. Similar to KNETTER (1993; 1995), it 
is not possible to distinguish between these two cases with the approach presented here. 
In contrast, when the absolute value of the residual demand elasticity increases due to a 
rise in the firm’s price,     and     would apply, whereby the effects should be 
equal so that (   )    (first symmetry condition). Additionally, when the residual 
demand elasticity is influenced by the competitor price,   and   should be significantly 
positive and equal according to theory (second symmetry condition). The relation be-
tween   and   as well as between   and   reveals whether PTM occurs primarily due to 
the market structure (i.e. the existence of the competitor) or due to the convexity of the 
market demand curve. If PTM occurs solely due to the market structure,   and   should 
sum up to zero (and   and   should sum up to one). The smaller the absolute value of   
in comparison to  , the more the convexity of the market demand curve causes PTM. 
Due to the fact that the theoretical coefficients   ,    and    reveal the pure effects 
which were illuminated in Chapter 4.2, they are of more interest. There are different 
ways that allow the identification of these coefficients. When a complete price series is 
available for the competitor too, equation (4.10) can simply be estimated for both firms. 
In this case,    can be obtained via the division of    from the firm’s equation by   
  
from the competitor’s equation or via a division of    by (    
 ). When a complete 
price series is not available for the competitor, the theoretical coefficients can only be 
identified when it is assumed that the coefficients of the firms are equal. In this case,    
can be obtained via the division of    by    or similarly    by (    ). With regard to 
the PTM coefficients, this assumption implies that the firms are facing residual demand 
curves with the same curvature in the destination country. It is unclear how critical this 
assumption actually is. At least with respect to   , equal coefficients do not seem to be 
very critical since they are a measure of the degree of product differentiation. This im-
plies that equal    coefficients could be an uncritical assumption too, at least in the case 
when PTM takes place only due to the market structure – that is, |  | equals   . 
When the empirical data reveals that in a certain market, the competitor’s marginal cost 
and exchange rate have an influence on the firm’s price, the model proposed by 
KNETTER (1993; 1995) which does not consider these variables suffers an omitted varia-
ble bias – the marginal cost and exchange rate of the competitor are omitted but corre-
lated with those of the firm. Furthermore, the model estimates   instead of  . 
4   Pricing-to-Market in an Oligopoly: An Alternative Approach to Measuring Marginal Cost 
50 
A final modification of equation (4.10) is appropriate when contracts play a role in the 
respective market. On markets for agricultural commodities, contracts are common – 
especially on the dairy markets which can have contracts of up to nine months in length. 
Contracts basically create time periods of various lengths between price setting and de-
livering of the products. Their usage implies that the export unit value reflects prices 
negotiated in different time periods – the present as well as the past. In order to incorpo-
rate this into the model, a number of lags of the right hand side variables in (4.10) can 
be introduced. According to MARSTON (1990: 226), in this case the coefficients are gen-
erally a product of two effects. That is, the share of the exported quantity subject to 
price-setting lag-length j (  ) multiplied with the respective coefficient for this lag-
length (e.g.    for the coefficient of the marginal cost). Summing up the contemporane-
ous as well as lagged coefficients yields the weighted average influence of the variable 
over all contract lengths – that is   ∑         for the marginal cost; obviously,    rep-
resents the weight and has to sum up to one over all lags. This procedure could also help 
to correct the influence of a pricing currency other than the exporter’s currency
11
. When 
PTM is only caused by pricing in a different currency in conjunction with price rigidity, 
this effect should be corrected in the following periods. 
4.3.2 Estimation of the marginal cost 
When estimating equation (4.10), the problem arises that the marginal cost is not ob-
servable, at least not directly. The common practice of using cost indices as proxy vari-
ables is criticized by GOLDBERG & KNETTER (1997: 1251) since this procedure can be 
expected to introduce a bias in the estimation. KNETTER (1989; 1993) therefore uses the 
fixed country effects of a panel model as a measure of the marginal cost and is thus able 
to control for it. However, this approach is not applicable to (4.10) since the marginal 
cost of the competitor appears in the equation too. Furthermore, in Chapter 3 we show 
that when the first symmetry condition – which is already proposed by KNETTER (1995) 
– holds, the estimated PTM coefficients are biased toward the average PTM coefficient 
in the sample. This is because the marginal cost may be equal for all destination coun-
tries at the port of export; the influence of the marginal cost on prices is not equal
12
, but 
depends on the degree of PTM. The severity of this bias depends heavily on firm, prod-
                                                 
11
 Pricing in a foreign currency together with price rigidity is a known source of falsely detected PTM. 
12
 KNETTER (1995) is aware of the destination-specific influence of the marginal cost that the symmetry 
condition implies, although he does not show the theoretical implications for the estimation of the model. 
Instead, KNETTER (1995) proposed a non-linear model of PTM that is based on the symmetry condition. 
However, this model has some disadvantages and is actually not followed up in the literature. 
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uct and market characteristics as well as on sample selection. An infelicitously chosen 
sample can also introduce a huge amount of noise in the fixed effects. SAGHAIAN & 
REED (2004) also criticize the usage of fixed effects since they find strong multicolline-
arity between the fixed effects and the exchange rates. Instead, they use wholesale pric-
es in the exporting countries. However, the main problems with this procedure are a) 
such series have to exist and b) in order to be a good measure of the marginal cost they 
should be uninfluenced by market power. We propose an alternative measure of the 
marginal cost that is independent of sample selection and market power and is always 
available when a certain number of destination-specific unit values are available too. 
The advantage of the availability of destination-specific export unit values is that they 
give a lot of information regarding a number of agreements of sale. In each period, there 
are unit values which contain various levels of markups or quality premiums and there 
are probably unit values which reflect more or less the marginal cost at the port of ex-
port. Furthermore, unit values contain measurement errors as well as expectations about 
future developments, when they – at least in part – consist of batches whose prices are 
arranged in long- or medium-term contracts. Essentially, the fixed effects of the Knetter 
model just take the average of the unit values of the sample in a given period while sim-
ultaneously correcting them for the estimated PTM. However, the underlying sample is 
often small and particular unit value series exhibit a high variation. 
The alternative to this procedure that preserves the basic idea of KNETTER (1989; 1993; 
1995) – that is, the usage of multiple transactions to estimate a measure of the marginal 
cost – would be a) to use all unit values available for a given period and b) not to apply 
a simple average with an artificial correction for the estimated PTM. Instead, the factors 
moving unit values away from the marginal cost can be expected to exhibit certain dis-
tributions. When these distributions can be estimated, an estimation of the marginal cost 
would be available too. This requires some basic distribution assumptions: 
1. Measurement error and expectation effects 
Both are assumed to be independently normally distributed with a mean of zero. 
This means that the sum of these effects should be normally distributed as well. 
2. Markups and quality premiums 
Both effects are assumed to reflect positive deviations from the marginal cost. 
This implies that the firm does not practice dumping and charges at least mar-
ginal cost. Since higher markups should not be as likely as smaller ones, a pos-
sible distribution for these effects could be a truncated normal distribution. 
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Under these assumptions, the i-th observation for an export unit value (in the export 
country’s currency) can be described as follows: 
                                                                                                                                              (4.11) 
where    is a time specific constant and         represents a composed error term. For 
the error components we assume: 
         (     
 )                                                                                                                                   (4.12) 
         
 (      
 )                                                                                                                              (4.13) 
where     and     are moreover assumed to be independently distributed (KUMBHAKAR 
& LOVELL 2003: 169). The error component     displays measurement errors and expec-
tation effects (see assumption 1) whereas     represents markups and quality premiums 
(see assumption 2). According to assumption 2, a truncated normal distribution (that is 
very flexible) is chosen for    . 
The model displayed in (4.11) is a stochastic frontier model without further explanatory 
variables. We can therefore call the fitted values of the model – i.e.    – the stochastic 
lower price frontier (SLPF). When the distribution assumptions are fulfilled, the SLPF 
equals an unbiased estimation of the marginal cost that is hereafter called the “stochas-
tic” marginal cost (SMC). The most critical point in this regard concerns the distribution 
of    . If a certain unknown minimum markup exists, the normal distribution of     is 
not truncated at zero but instead at an unknown positive value. This implies that the 
SLPF lies above the true marginal cost. Since we cannot rule out such a case, one 
should be cautious to use the SLPF as an absolute measure of the marginal cost for the 
purpose of comparisons with price series. For the usage in the PTM model, the case is 
different. The question would be rather whether the SMC series is biased in a way that 
biases the coefficients of the model. If a possible minimum markup is constant over 
time, the coefficients in equation (4.10) are not biased. Similarly, a random fluctuation 
of this minimum markup over time would not bias the coefficients but create a larger 
standard error. If, however, this minimum markup is a function of the price level, the 
coefficient of the marginal cost could indeed be biased. The probable direction of this 
bias would be positive – i.e. against finding of PTM through the marginal cost coeffi-
cient. This is due to the fact that the certain minimum markup can be expected to be 
lower in case of a higher price level. It is further worth mentioning that the distribution 
assumptions imply that the analyzed good is homogenous in the sense that a certain 
standard quality with the possibility of quality premiums should exist. However, when 
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the good is too heterogeneous and there is nothing even like a standard quality, then the 
approach could be invalid. 
Given the distribution assumptions, equation (4.11) can be estimated via maximum like-
lihood. It can be estimated with cross sectional data (T = 1) as well as (unbalanced) 
panel data (T > 1). However, according to (4.12) and (4.13) it is assumed that   
 ,   and 
  
  depend on t. This implies that only the estimation with cross sectional data is valid 
because in the case of panel data, the parameters are estimated independently of t. Of 
course, when the parameters do not depend on t, the usage of panel data is possible too. 
However, in this case the SLPF series lies a constant value below the simple time spe-
cific mean series of the original data. This does not represent an improvement in com-
parison to the usage of the simple time specific mean as a measure of the marginal cost. 
Only the variability of parameters with respect to t allows temporally non-constant de-
viations from the simple mean. The parameters can vary for different reasons: With re-
gard to    , it is conceivable that the measurement error is temporally constant but the 
expectation effects are probably not. For periods with rather unstable prices, they should 
be more important than otherwise. Similarly, the distribution parameters of     can 
change – for example, in the case of higher prices only smaller markups are optimal. 
In summary, only an estimation of (4.11) with cross sectional data should be valid. 
However, this causes a disadvantage with regard to the efficiency of estimation: The 
observations for a single period (e.g. a month) are usually rather limited and the true 
parameters    
 ,    and    
  may only change significantly with an increasing time inter-
val. Under these circumstances, the estimation efficiency could be raised by expanding 
the period specific sample – for example, through the two temporally adjacent periods. 
This means that equation (4.11) is estimated as a panel model with T = 3 in a rolling 
window over the whole time span. As long as the true parameters are constant over the 
subsequent three time periods, this procedure triples the available observations and rais-
es the estimation efficiency. Essentially, the choice of the value for T is a tradeoff be-
tween estimation efficiency and the most temporally flexible estimation. 
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4.4 Data 
For the empirical application of the model, the most important dairy products in terms 
of international trade are chosen which account for the majority of New Zealand’s dairy 
exports. These products are skimmed milk powder (SMP, HS 040210), whole milk 
powder (WMP, HS 040221), butter (HS 040510) and cheddar cheese (HS 0406900011). 
Although three out of four are just on the 6-digit level, all of them reveal a high degree 
of homogeneity and can therefore be referred to as commodities. The destination-
specific unit values (export value divided by export quantity) of WMP are obtained 
from the Global Trade Atlas (GTA 2013) and are available from 1990 to 2012. The ana-
lyzed destination countries are chosen according to the completeness of the unit value 
series, having sufficiently high and continuous trade quantities and a sufficiently high 
variation of the exchange rate series. 
As a competitor to New Zealand, the European Union (EU) is considered. Historically 
New Zealand and the EU (as well as Australia to a lesser extent) were the only im-
portant export countries in the international dairy market. Since the last decade, other 
countries such as the U.S. and Argentina have started to play an increasingly important 
role on the international dairy markets. Because cheddar is less important for the EU’s 
exports, an aggregate consisting of Gouda, edam and cheddar (HS 04069021, HS 
04069023, HS 04069078) is considered as a competing product for New Zealand. 
The data frequency is monthly for the estimation of the SMC series, as this implies the 
least possible aggregation of price information. In contrast, for the estimation of equa-
tion (4.10), quarterly data is used. This is due to three different reasons: Firstly, calcu-
lating unit values on a quarterly basis reduces the influence of measurement errors, 
temporally varying qualities and the appearance of missing values. Secondly, quarterly 
data raises the chance that a possible adjustment process is finished to a higher degree 
than in the case of a monthly frequency. This argument is less valid when lags are in-
cluded in the model but, nevertheless, for this reason it remains a commonly used fre-
quency for PTM studies. Thirdly, consumer price indices (CPI) and real gross domestic 
products (GDP) are not available for frequencies higher than quarterly. 
Bilateral exchange rates, CPIs and GDPs are obtained from the International Financial 
Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Bilateral exchange rates and unit 
values of the EU before 1999 are based on the ECU as the predecessor of the Euro. The 
CPIs are used to correct the bilateral exchange rates for the destination country’s price 
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level. For the construction of the effective exchange rates, the bilateral exchange rates 
of the fifty most important destination countries (with exchange rates available) for the 
respective product are used; the countries’ share of New Zealand’s exports serves as 
weight in the calculation. It is assumed that the considered destination countries cover 
100% of the exports, although this is only an approximation. 
4.5 Estimation results 
4.5.1 Stochastic marginal cost 
The destination-specific unit values that are on average available per month lie between 
41 and 110 whereas for the EU, the numbers are somewhat larger (Table 4.1). These 
observations reveal a fairly high variation with single observations far away from the 
average. As a result, an outlier correction was seen to be appropriate. In the first step, 
we excluded all observations which are based on less than a certain minimum quantity 
(Table 4.1). Furthermore, in the second step we excluded all observations that lay more 
than five standard deviations apart from the mean. This procedure reduces the number 
of observations available by 17% to 40%; however, in all cases, this percentage belongs 
to less than 1% of the quantity exported. 
Table 4.1: Sample characteristics and SMC estimation results
13
 
abs. % γ μ sVu
SMP 41.3 10 33.0 80% 0.63 -278 53% 3096 NZ$ 3365 NZ$ 8%
WMP 59.4 10 49.5 83% 0.79 -300 68% 3121 NZ$ 3490 NZ$ 11%
Butter 58.8 10 48.6 83% 0.88 -253 78% 2780 NZ$ 3307 NZ$ 17%
Cheese 53.0 5 38.8 73% 0.81 -623 68% 3453 NZ$ 4048 NZ$ 16%
SMP 74.6 10 53.2 71% 0.82 -375 69% 1  8 € 18   € 14%
WMP 110.3 10 91.8 83% 0.86 -124 75% 18   € 230  € 20%
Butter 109.3 10 65.3 60% 0.88 -187 77% 1843 € 221  € 17%




















Source: Own calculations, GTA (2013) 
The stochastic frontier estimation was done with cross sectional data at first. The results 
revealed that the distribution parameters vary a lot over time. However, they also follow 
autoregressive processes (AR), i.e. the larger the temporal distance is the more similar 
the distribution parameters are. We therefore decided to estimate the SMC series in a 
rolling window procedure with T = 3. As an example, the resulting time series for WMP 
is displayed in Figure 4.1 (all others are displayed in Appendix 4.2 and 4.3). 
                                                 
13
 The UV surcharge depicts the difference of unit value and SMC in relation to the unit value as average 
for the whole observation period. The UV surcharge can consist of a markup as well as quality premiums. 
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Figure 4.1: WMP unit values and the SMC series for New Zealand 
 
Source: Own compilation, GTA (2013) 
Intuitively, the SMC series in Figure 4.1 lies on the lower edge of the area with the 
highest density of destination-specific unit value observations. In Table 4.1, the average 
distribution parameters from the stochastic frontier estimations of the SMC series are 




    
 . However, since   
  is the variance parameter of a truncated 
normal distribution, it does not represent the actual variance of the error component    . 
Therefore,   does not represent the share of the variance of   in the total variance. In-
stead, this information is given by sVu in Table 4.1. On average, around 70% of the total 
variance is due to markups and quality premiums (   ), while only a small part is due to 
measurement errors and expectation effects (   ). Table 4.1 shows that larger values of 
sVu go along with larger average surcharges of the non-destination-specific unit values 
on the SMC (UV surcharges) – at least roughly speaking. Furthermore, for each product 
the UV surcharge is larger for the EU than for New Zealand. This is not necessarily a 
sign for higher markups in the EU; it could also be attributed to more product heteroge-
neity because of a larger number of exporting firms. 
4.5.2 Oligopolistic PTM model 
The results presented in this chapter are based on estimating equation (4.10) in first log-
differences. We also tried to estimate (4.10) in log-levels but most of the time series 
exhibit a unit root and are typically not co-integrated. This result could be expected for 
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average qualities of the quantities traded over time. As the trade statistics do not contain 
information about quality, it cannot be controlled for quality changes in the model. It 
can only be hoped that possible quality changes are not correlated with the descriptive 
variables in the model (see LAVOIE & LIU (2007) for possible problems in this regard). 
A second reason is that the export firm can change its destination-specific markup for 
reasons that are not represented in equation (4.10). Such reasons are often not observa-
ble and therefore cannot be modeled; they could include the appearance or disappear-
ance of competitors, a changing competition strategy or changing trade cost – FEENSTRA 
(1989) shows that tariffs have the same influence on markups as exchange rates. These 
considerations make it seem implausible that the residuals of an estimation of (4.10) in 
levels are stationary. We tested all estimated models in first log-differences for hetero-
scedasticity (Breusch-Pagan test), autocorrelation (Breusch-Godfrey test) and parameter 
stability (CUSUM test). While parameter stability is almost always unproblematic, the 
other factors are not. Therefore a heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) 
estimator of the standard errors is used. The number of lags is chosen according to the 
minimum of the usual information criteria; when the result is ambiguous, the higher 
number of lags is chosen. 
Table 4.2 shows the results of the non-destination-specific estimation of equation 
(4.10). For each product, we estimated the model without lags and with the optimal lag 
number. The optimal lag numbers reveal that price corrections and contracts take place 
up to three (or in one case four) quarters. The explained variance is – even without lags 
– quite high and increases with the introduction of lags are only moderate. An exception 
is butter, for which the R-squared is much lower than for the other products. 
The significant coefficients in Table 4.2 have, in all cases, the correct sign
14
 that is pre-
dicted by theory and change only slightly with the introduction of lags. The introduction 
of lags leads to the rejection of PTM behavior only in the case of SMP. This implies 
that 85% of the price changes can be explained with contemporaneous and lagged 
changes in the marginal cost. In actuality, this result is not surprising when PTM is seen 
as an indication of market power. Firstly, New Zealand has a lower world market share 
for SMP than for the other products; secondly, unlike the other products, SMP is more 
homogenous and intended more for industrial use than for the consumer; thirdly, Table 
4.1 already shows that the UV surcharge is smaller than for the other products. 
                                                 
14
 Note that instead of   the displayed values and t-statistics in Table 4.2 belong to  -1. This is because 
when a test has to be done for PTM with regard to marginal cost,   should be tested against one. 
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Note: The numbers in parenthesis are heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust t-statistics. Values and t-statistics of the coefficients refer to 
the sum of contemporaneous and lagged coefficients. The robust p-values appear in square brackets.
Source: Own calculations 
For the remaining products, the introduction of lags often results in a higher or more 
significant influence of the competitor variables. This implies that competition is tem-
porally lagged – a likely outcome when both export countries are using contracts and an 
outcome which is also found for the destination-specific estimates (Table 4.3). In con-
trast, the influence of the firm’s variables hardly changes. Their estimated coefficients 
are around -0.4 for the three products – that is, 40% of changes in the marginal cost or 
the exchange rates are offset through changes in the markup. Furthermore, the F-test 
shows that the symmetry conditions are fulfilled in almost all cases. Unlike the other 
coefficients, the coefficient of the GDP is almost never significant. 
According to the theoretical framework in Chapter 4.3, the theoretical coefficients   
and   can be calculated from the estimated coefficients. Because the non-destination-
specific unit value series of the EU is not comparable with that of New Zealand, the 
equal coefficient assumption is applied. Furthermore, the required coefficients   and   
are taken from an estimation of equation (4.10), which is restricted for symmetry. The 
resulting numbers for   and   are listed in the last two columns of Table 4.2. With the 
exception of the results for SMP, the numbers reveal quite a high degree of PTM, when 
the EU’s reaction is not considered. When lags are introduced, the absolute numbers are 
even higher; this is due to a larger value for the differentiation coefficient  . Since   is 
close to the absolute value of  , the PTM behavior is primarily caused by the existence 
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of the EU as a competitor. Nevertheless, the results are consistent with theory; i.e.   is 
always smaller than the absolute value of  . 
In addition to the non-destination-specific version of equation (4.10), we estimate the 
model for single destination countries and WMP. WMP is chosen since New Zealand 
has by far the largest world market share for this product. The results are depicted in 
Table 4.3. The variance explained by the model is above 50% for most of the destina-
tion countries and nearly all estimated coefficients have the correct sign. A striking ex-
ception is the Philippines, whose coefficients all have a value opposed to what theory 
predicts – although this is significant in just one case. This means that when the margin-
al cost of the EU increases, Fonterra lowers its price. This result could either be a sign 
of strategic behavior or an artifact with regard to quality changes in the unit value se-
ries; so, when the marginal cost of the EU increases, it sells less standard- and more 
premium-quality WMP, whereas Fonterra’s export composition changes the other way 
around. Despite the unusual coefficient values, both symmetry conditions are fulfilled. 
Furthermore, the summing up conditions of the firm’s and the competitor’s coefficients 
are fulfilled in a way that when all variables change by the same percentage, there is 
local-currency price stability. 
The remaining destination countries exhibit very different degrees of PTM. It is notice-
able that nearly all marginal cost coefficients   are significantly smaller than one, 
whereas just four out of sixteen exchange rate coefficients   are significant. This means 
that PTM is more often detected through changes in the marginal cost than through 
changes in the exchange rates. One reason that   is less often significant could be the 
very stable exchange rate between New Zealand and the EU. This implies that New 
Zealand’s exchange rates to the destination countries are highly correlated with those of 
the EU to the destination countries, which in turn influences the significance. Another 
reason is that the average absolute value of  -1 is quite high compared to that of   (Ta-
ble 4.3). When the marginal cost in New Zealand increases, 46% of this increase is on 
average offset through a change in the markups, but only 37% of an increase in the real 
bilateral exchange rate is offset, on average. The symmetry test shows that this is due to 
the estimates for a number of single destination countries; for the majority of countries, 
symmetry holds. This result speaks against a possible bias in the SMC series. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 4.3.2, such a bias should manifest against the finding of PTM through 
the marginal cost coefficient. Similarly, this does not speak in favor of an endogeneity 
bias as discussed in Chapter 4.3.1. Although such a bias tends in the direction of the 
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finding of PTM through the marginal cost coefficient, if anything, it should be more 
pronounced in the non-destination-specific version of (4.10) than for single destinations 
which can be assumed to have no influence on the overall marginal cost. 
When the two erroneous signs are ignored, Table 4.3 shows that in seven out of sixteen 
cases one or both competitor variables (  and  ) have a significant influence on Fonter-
ra’s price. Again, the coefficient of the marginal cost ( ) is more often significant than 
the coefficient of the exchange rate ( ) – although this is not as pronounced as in the 
case of the exporter’s variables. 









-0.65*** -0.63*** 0.01 0.43*** 0.15 1.94 0.71
(-5.73) (-2.74) [0.93] (3.17) (0.46) [0.17] (1.26)
-0.35** -0.47* 0.21 0.06 0.46* 4.27** 0.49
(-2.52) (-1.76) [0.65] (0.45) (1.82) [0.04] (1.17)
-0.57*** -0.53** 0.04 0.24** 0.05 0.43 0.19
(-4.17) (-2.33) [0.85] (2.09) (0.22) [0.51] (0.42)
-0.40*** -0.78*** 3.57* 0.18 0.20 0.76 0.94
(-4.28) (-3.54) [0.06] (1.60) (1.04) [0.39] (0.65)
-0.45*** -0.36 0.10 0.35*** 0.26 0.04 0.17
(-3.80) (-1.34) [0.76] (2.71) (0.90) [0.84] (0.63)
-0.39*** -0.19 1.34 0.41*** 0.32* 0.01 -0.38
(-3.00) (-1.01) [0.25] (2.81) (1.74) [0.94] (-0.61)
-0.34*** -0.03 4.73** 0.02 -0.29* 0.20 -0.18 -0.30 0.00
(-4.19) (-0.16) [0.03] (0.20) (-1.89) [0.65] (-0.56) -0.46 0.34
-0.47** -0.26 0.83 0.38* 0.23 0.02 0.32 -0.63 0.63
(-2.42) (-0.78) [0.37] (1.82) (0.63) [0.88] (0.63) -0.63 0.53
0.08 0.37 0.93 -0.40* -0.52 0.11 2.77*
(0.41) (1.09) [0.34] (-1.89) (-1.59) [0.74] (1.89)
-0.71*** -0.27 4.24** 0.31* 0.26 0.31
(-4.71) (-1.10) [0.04] (1.68) (0.71) [0.58]
-0.32* -0.62** 3.26* 0.12 0.39 0.06 -0.40 0.32
(-1.88) (-2.48) [0.07] (0.60) (1.17) [0.81] -0.57 0.31
-0.35 -0.11 0.25 0.15 -0.17 0.06 -0.76 -0.42 0.28
(-1.51) (-0.23) [0.62] (0.56) (-0.32) [0.80] (-0.56) -0.68 0.48
-0.42** -0.46** 0.05 0.28 0.37** 0.10 0.06
(-2.47) (-2.58) [0.82] (1.51) (2.18) [0.76] (0.10)
-0.58*** -0.25 2.42 0.25 0.02 0.00 -0.57
(-3.68) (-1.08) [0.12] (1.57) (0.04) [0.96] (-0.58)
-0.33*** -0.41** 0.14 0.10 -0.17 1.43 -2.04
(-3.86) (-2.19) [0.71] (1.04) (-0.75) [0.24] (-1.24)
-0.55*** -0.09 1.80 0.37** 0.38 0.11 0.13
(-3.08) (-0.24) [0.18] (2.25) (1.57) [0.74] (0.13)
-0.46 -0.37 0.24 0.26 ←
F-test for symmetry: The null hypothesis is that the effects are symmetric.
Average values with erroneous signs excluded
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust t-statistics. Values and t-statistics of the coefficients refer 
to the sum of contemporaneous and lagged coefficients. The robust p-values appear in square brackets.
Fiji 2 0.58 -0.90 0.88
Mauritius 0 0.61 -0.35 0.11
-0.57 0.51












2 0.81 -0.63 0.63
Mexico 0 0.47 -0.63 0.59
Sri Lanka 1 0.58 -0.50 0.34
Malaysia 2 0.65 -0.69 0.53
Venezuela 1 0.57 -0.39 0.20
China 1 0.67 1.11












Source: Own calculations 
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The theoretical coefficients   and   in Table 4.3 are calculated in two ways. When a 
complete unit value series is available for the EU and the specific destination country,   
and   are calculated with the aid of the estimates for the EU; this is the case for only 
four destination countries. The results show that the coefficients are fairly similar across 
New Zealand and the EU, although the absolute value of the EU’s coefficients is mostly 
larger. For the destination countries where no complete EU export unit value series is 
available, the equal coefficient assumption is applied. With the exception of China,   is 
always smaller than the absolute value of  . When both coefficients sum up to zero, 
PTM takes place solely due to the presence of the EU as a competitor. This is the case 
for Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent for Fiji, Indonesia and Mexico. The smaller   is 
compared to | |, the larger the proportion of PTM that is caused by the convexity of the 
market demand curve – or by the presence of other (foreign) competitors that are not 
considered in the model. In the case of Thailand where   equals zero, PTM takes place 
solely due to the convexity of the market demand curve. In general, the importance of 
the EU as a competitor implies an interesting property of the exchange rate induced 
PTM. When PTM is completely caused by the market presence of the EU, it only takes 
place when New Zealand’s currency changes its worth, but not when the destination 
country’s currency does so. This is because in the latter case, the marginal cost of both 
New Zealand and the EU in the destination country’s currency is affected while in the 
former case, only New Zealand’s marginal cost is affected. 
Generally, the results fit (at least partly) well to the European market presence in the 
destination country. In the observation period, the EU had medium and large import 
market shares in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Mexico and Indonesia that exhibit significant 
influence from the competitor variables and a rather large value of  . On the other hand, 
the results for China, Peru und Fiji are puzzling. In these countries the EU was only 
responsible for a small share of the WMP exports. 
With regard to market power, the results are not as easy to interpret. Basically, they face 
the same limitations that are described by GOLDBERG & HELLERSTEIN (2008: 424) with 
respect to the model proposed by KNETTER (1989; 1993). The most important disad-
vantage is that the approach may prove the existence of a markup but does not provide 
information about its extent. However, unlike the Knetter model, the competitor coeffi-
cient   is available, although its interpretation with respect to market power is ambiva-
lent. On one hand, a large value of   means that the price of the EU has a high influence 
on the price Fonterra charges, which implies that the product is perceived as rather ho-
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mogeneous. On the other hand, the fact that Fonterra can react to a high degree with 
their price implies that there is a sufficiently high buffer in terms of a high destination-
specific markup. However, when the product is very homogeneous, it follows that the 
relation of the export countries’ marginal cost should be stable over the long term. This 
implies that the buffer needed is not as high as it supposedly could be and the interpreta-
tion for   as a product differentiation indicator remains valid. It could therefore be ar-
gued that the best indication for market power is a large difference in the absolute val-
ues of   and  . The large | | could prove that Fonterra indeed has a high markup as a 
buffer and the small   implies that the product is differentiated enough to ensure that 
competition remains moderate. Of course, this argumentation is only valid as long as   
is not small because relevant competitors are not considered in the estimation. 
Table 4.4: Estimation results for the UV surcharge as dependent variable  
constant abs. value of beta delta
-0.05  (-0.90) 0.52**  (2.69) -0.31**  (-2.22) 9.51  [0.01] 0.46
R²
coefficients (t-values) F-test for
sum of coef. = zero
 
Source: Own calculations 
In order to test whether the argumentation above is consistent with the data, we re-
gress
15
 the destination-specific UV surcharges on the estimated values of | | and   in 
Table 4.3. The UV surcharge is surely not equal to the markup since it also consists of 
quality premiums but it is the next best alternative. The results in Table 4.4 support our 
argumentation. The table shows that the influence of | | and   is significant and has the 
expected signs. A rise in the absolute value of   increases the UV surcharge whereas a 
rise in the value of   decreases it. Nevertheless, the absolute value of the coefficients is 
not equal (F-test in Table 4.4). This implies that PTM always needs some markup in 
order to take place, even when it is caused solely by the existence of a competitor. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The approach presented here extends the known pricing-to-market approach to an oli-
gopolistic model of PTM that explicitly takes the competitor influence on the behavior 
of the firm into account. This allows us to untangle whether PTM is caused by the char-
acteristics of the market demand curve or by the market structure. Furthermore, for the 
marginal cost is no longer controlled via the fixed effects of a panel model as in the 
                                                 
15
 Since the quality premiums as a part of the error term are always positive a suitable econometric model 
should have a composed error term like equation (11). However, we tried to estimate such a model but the 
results neglected its superiority. 
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model proposed by KNETTER (1989; 1993). Instead, the marginal cost is directly repre-
sented in the model as the stochastic marginal cost series which is estimated in the first 
step with a stochastic frontier model. Therefore, PTM can no longer be detected just 
through the influence of bilateral exchange rates on the price; it can also be detected 
through the influence of the firm’s overall marginal cost on the price. 
The results of estimating the oligopolistic PTM model – in a non-destination-specific as 
well as in a destination-specific version – for New Zealand’s (Fonterra’s) most im-
portant dairy exports generally support the validity of the approach presented here. The 
majority of the estimated coefficients has the sign and lies in the range that was predict-
ed by theory. Furthermore, the calculation of the theoretical coefficients yields values 
that are mostly consistent with theory. The estimated numbers show that when one or 
more competitor variables are significant, PTM is primarily caused by the existence of 
the EU as a competitor and only to a small degree by the characteristics of the market 
demand curve or by other competitors that are not considered in the model. Unfortu-
nately, the estimated exchange rate coefficients are often not significant – especially in 
the destination-specific version. This is at least in part due to a high correlation of the 
two exchange rate series in the model. 
In essence, the coefficients of the marginal cost more often exhibit significant values 
that indicate PTM. In most of the cases, the estimated values support the symmetry 
conditions – that is, whether detected through changes in bilateral exchange rates or 
through changes in the overall marginal cost of the firm, the estimated degree of PTM is 
the same. Only in the destination-specific version are there some cases that the estimat-
ed degree of PTM via changes in the overall marginal cost is larger. However, this im-
plies that the stochastic marginal cost series is unlikely to exhibit a systematic bias. If 
such a bias would exist, it can be expected to tend in the opposite direction. An ad-
vantage of the stochastic marginal cost is that – besides the usage in a PTM model – it 
can also be used in other models of imperfect competition – for instance in the residual 
demand approach from GOLDBERG & KNETTER (1999). SILVENTE (2005) already uses 
the time effect series of the model proposed by KNETTER (1989) as instrument for the 
endogenous quantity. For this purpose, the stochastic marginal cost can be used too; 
furthermore, it can also be used to depict the competitor’s cost in the model. 
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Appendix 4.1: Derivation of the theoretical model 
Optimization condition for the export firm: 
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 income in the destination country 
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Substituting into the total differential yields: 
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the equation can be simplified to: 
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Solving for the relative price change yields: 
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Substituting into the competitor’s function yields: 
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Introducing symbols for the coefficients: 
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Appendix 4.2: SMC series for New Zealand (in 1000 NZ$) 
 
 
Source: Own compilation, GTA (2013) 
Appendix 4.3: SMC series for the EU (in 1000 €) 
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5 Measuring Market Power on the World Dairy Markets: A Resid-
ual Demand Analysis 
 
Abstract 
The international dairy markets are highly concentrated. In particular, the New Zealand 
dairy co-operative Fonterra controls – directly or indirectly – huge proportions of the 
important markets for milk powders and butter. Under these conditions, Fonterra can be 
expected to have a significant degree of market power. However, to our knowledge this 
question has not been addressed in the literature until now. The conceptual innovation 
of this paper is to therefore close this gap by using the residual demand approach to es-
timate the ability to raise the price above the marginal cost. Usually in the residual de-
mand model, cost shifting variables are used to reflect changes in the marginal cost. 
Since this entails several disadvantages, we instead use an alternative measure of the 
marginal cost, the stochastic lower price frontier; this is the methodological innovation 
of the paper. The rather conservative results of estimating the residual demand for New 
Zealand dairy exports show a significant degree of market power with an average opti-
mal markup of around 9% of the price in more than fifty percent of the destination 
countries. The most important competitors that limit the market power of Fonterra are 
Australia and the EU. 
Keywords: residual demand, market power, price discrimination, international dairy 
markets 
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5.1 Introduction 
The international dairy markets are highly concentrated. On the supply side, only four 
large exporting countries – New Zealand, the EU, Australia and the US – make up 80% 
to 90% of all dairy exports. On the opposite side, demand is much less concentrated. 
However, even when the focus is shifted from countries to companies, the international 
supply side concentration remains strong. The most remarkably company is the New 
Zealand dairy cooperative Fonterra that developed in part from the New Zealand Dairy 
Board, and is still responsible for 95% of New Zealand’s dairy exports (ARMENTANO et 
al. 2004: 41). This alone equals roughly a third of the international dairy exports, 
whereas in some markets the share is much higher. Furthermore, through foreign sub-
sidiaries, partnerships, joint ventures and agreements, Fonterra can directly or indirectly 
influence the exports of other countries (BLAYNEY et al. 2006: 13-15). Taking this into 
account, Fonterra controls more than half of the market, especially in the case of the 
important markets for milk powder and butter. This raises the suspicion that the compa-
ny has a noticeable degree of market power, particularly in destination countries where 
competition is weaker. This is additionally supported by the fact that DAIRY AUSTRALIA 
(2008: 18) observe differences in dairy products with respect to quality, safety and func-
tionality according to the country of origin. To our knowledge there are no studies that 
analyze New Zealand’s (or Fonterra’s) market power on the international dairy markets. 
In this paper, we close this gap in the literature by applying the residual demand ap-
proach to New Zealand’s exports of the most important dairy products. The approach 
rests on the estimation of the residual demand curve faced by a single firm or a group of 
firms; in other words, the demand curve obtained when the reaction of the competitors 
is already considered. In the case of perfect competition, the residual demand curve is 
flat – that is, the firm (or the group of firms) is not able to raise the price by reducing its 
quantity. Conversely, for a monopolist the residual demand curve equals the market 
demand curve since no competitors are in place. By estimating the residual demand, it is 
possible to distinguish between the case of perfect competition and the alternative of 
some degree of market power. Under some conditions, it is even possible to quantify the 
markup in terms of the Lerner index. The residual demand approach is developed by 
BAKER & BRESNAHAN (1988) for single firms while GOLDBERG & KNETTER (1999) use 
the approach to analyze market power on international markets and thus on the country 
level – that is, groups of firms are usually considered. In general, the approach is used 
for a wide variety of products and markets – for domestic markets and single firms as 
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well as in the international framework at the country level. Examples of studies at the 
country level in the area of agricultural and food products are CARTER et al. (1999), 
GLAUBEN & LOY (2003), NARDIS & PENSA (2004), REED & SAGHAIAN (2004), 
POOSIRIPINYO & REED (2005), TASDOGAN et al. (2005) as well as FELT et al. (2011). 
Nevertheless, the residual demand approach also entails some econometrical estimation 
challenges. In order to estimate the influence of the endogenous export quantity on the 
export price, suitable instruments are necessary. For this purpose, cost shifting variables 
of the export country are usually used. When these cost shifters depict only a small frac-
tion of the marginal cost, the estimated coefficients and its standard errors can be ex-
pected to be biased. A similar result can occur when the considered cost shifters are not 
able to explain the export quantity at all – that is, they prove to be weak instruments. 
These kinds of problems seem to be common when international markets are analyzed 
(GOLDBERG & KNETTER 1997: 1266-1268). Therefore, instead of using usual cost shift-
ing variables we rely on using a measure of the marginal cost that is always available, 
when a certain number of destination-specific unit values are available: the stochastic 
lower price frontier. This represents the methodological contribution of this paper. The 
concept is introduced in Chapter 4 and builds on the basic idea from KNETTER (1989; 
1993) to use prices – measured by unit values – in order to control for changes in the 
marginal cost. Indeed, SILVENTE (2005) already uses a series obtained from an applica-
tion of the model proposed by KNETTER (1989) as a measure of the marginal cost in a 
residual demand model. 
The paper is structured as follows: In Chapter 5.2 the concept of the residual demand 
curve is developed as derived by GOLDBERG & KNETTER (1999), and the connection 
between the residual demand curve and the relative markup is established. This is fol-
lowed by the presentation of the empirical specification of the model in Chapter 5.3 
along with typical estimation problems and the introduction of the stochastic lower 
price frontier as a measure of the marginal cost. In Chapter 5.4, the data that is used for 
the estimation of the New Zealand export market is discussed. Chapter 5.5 contains the 
estimation results for the most important dairy products and Chapter 5.6 finalizes the 
paper with some conclusions. 
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5.2 The residual demand and its connection to market power 
GOLDBERG & KNETTER (1999) consider a group of   firms located in a certain export 
country and exporting a homogenous good to a particular destination country. In the 
destination country, the group of export firms faces competition from firms of   differ-
ent export countries. This could be groups of firms (as in the export country) or only a 
single firm per country. While the good exported is always homogeneous (or a perfect 
substitute) for firms located in the same country – which implies that the firms always 
charge the same price –, it may be a perfect substitute or an imperfect substitute for the 
goods produced in other countries. This assumption of product differentiation according 
to the country of origin is also known as the Armington assumption (ARMINGTON 1969). 
Under these conditions, the common inverse demand function that the group of export 
firms faces and the inverse demand function that the k-th competing country faces are: 
       (            )            (5.1) 
     (         |         )           (5.2) 
where     is the export price (in the destination country’s currency) charged by the 
group of export firms and     is the total quantity exported to the particular destination 
country by these firms;    is the export price (in the destination country’s currency) 
charged by the export firm or group of export firms of the k-th competing country and 
   is the corresponding export quantity;   is a vector of demand shifters in the particu-
lar destination country. The profit that the i-th export firm makes with exports to the 
destination country is: 
  
  (  
  )       
        
  (  
     
  )          (5.3) 
where   
   is the export quantity of the i-th firm,    is the bilateral exchange rate be-
tween the export and the destination country (units of destination country’s currency per 
unit of export country’s currency),   
   is the cost of the firm (in the export country’s 
currency) and   
   is a vector of cost shifters. When the destination-specific profit de-
fined in equation (5.3) is maximized with respect to the quantity exported, we obtain the 
first order condition: marginal cost equals perceived marginal revenue. It is the per-
ceived marginal revenue instead of the actual revenue that appears in the first order 
condition because the marginal revenue depends on the conduct of the competitors at 
home and abroad; the firm is not aware of this conduct and can only make conjectures 
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about it. This can be seen in the following equation where the first order condition is 
solved for export price: 
          
     
  
    
    
(  ∑
   
  
   
  
 
   
)(  ∑
    
   
 
   
    
 
   
)                                       ( .4) 
Equation (5.4) states that the perceived optimal price for the group of export firms con-
sists of the marginal cost in the destination country’s currency       
   (the argu-
ments of the marginal cost are suppressed) plus the perceived optimal markup as the 
second term on the right hand side. The two bracketed terms in the perceived optimal 
markup depict the conjectured conduct of the competitors. The first bracketed term 
shows the reaction of the domestic competitors and is hereafter labeled   . Under per-
fect competition, each quantity change by the firm will be offset by its competitors and 
   is therefore equal to zero. On the other side, a value of one reflects the situation in a 
perfect cartel (or a monopoly). The second bracketed term captures the reaction of the 
foreign competitors and is hereafter labeled  . Again, a value of zero indicates perfect 
competition whereas a value of one implies a perfect cartel. When the bracketed terms 
are replaced by the symbols introduced above, equation (5.4) simplifies to: 
          
     
   
    
    
               (5.5) 
Equation (5.5) is still based on firm-level data that is often not available for the purpose 
of an econometric estimation – especially in the framework of international trade. 
GOLDBERG & KNETTER (1999) therefore prefer to use market share weighted industry 
averages. The set of first order conditions for the group of   firms is multiplied with 
their respective market share    and summed up for all firms in the group. Therefore, the 
result based on market-level data becomes: 
                
    
    
              (5.6) 
where      ∑     
  ,     ∑  
   and   ∑  
   . Similar to equation (5.6), the first 
order conditions can be derived in the same way for the competing countries. For the  
k-th competitor, this is: 
              
   
   
              (5.7) 
Up to this point, the approach is very general and not specific for the residual demand. 
The demand equations (5.1) and (5.2) as well as the supply equations (5.6) and (5.7) 
could be estimated in a system after defining suitable functional forms. However, the 
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specificity of the residual demand approach is that these equations are manipulated in a 
way that only one equation remains: the residual demand. For this purpose, GOLDBERG 
& KNETTER (1999) start by solving a system of    competitor demand and competitor 
supply equations that are defined in equations (5.2) and (5.7). When the competitor de-
mand function (5.2) is substituted into the competitor supply function (5.7), we obtain: 
          (     )     
   
   
(         |         )           (5.8) 
Solving the system of competitor equations yields for the k-th competitor:  
      (           )            (5.9) 
where    is a vector of the cost shifters of the   competing countries and    is the 
vector of the conduct parameters. The function depicted in (5.9) explains the perceived 
optimal competitor prices depending on cost shifters of the competitors, demand shifters 
in the destination country and quantity supplied by the export country. Because     is 
the only endogenous right hand side variable, equation (5.9) represents a function of 
partial-reduced form. When the equation is substituted into equation (5.1) for all 
  {     } and common variables are grouped together, we obtain the inverse residu-
al demand function of the export country in the particular destination country: 
       (       ( )       ( )   ) 
        (           )                                                                                                            ( .10) 
This is again a function of partial-reduced form with quantity exported, supply shifters 
of the competitors and demand shifters as observable arguments. Note that the cost 
shifters of the export country are not represented in the function. Moreover, their exclu-
sion ensures that the inverse residual demand function is econometrically identified. 
However, the cost shifters of the export country are the perfect candidates as instru-
ments for the only endogenous right hand side variable    . 
The key variable in equation (5.10) is     since it reveals whether the group of export 
country’s firms has market power in the particular destination country. When the price 
of the export country can be fully explained by the competitors’ costs and demand con-
ditions, and the firms’ export quantity has no influence at all, the group of the export 
country’s firms has no market power. Conversely, the more elastic the price is with re-
spect to the firms’ export quantity – i.e. the higher the inverse residual demand elasticity 
(RDE) is –, the more pronounced the market power of the group of export country’s 
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firms is. The composition of the RDE (   
   ) can be illustrated, when the logarithm of 
equation (5.10) is taken and the result is differentiated with respect to    . This yields: 
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                                                        ( .11) 
The equation reveals that    
    is composed of two elements: Firstly, the (inverse) own 
price elasticity of demand     for the variety of the good produced in the export coun-
try. Secondly, the elasticity of the competitor interactions – this is the sum of the (in-
verse) elasticities with respect to competitor prices       multiplied by the elasticities of 
the competitors’ prices with respect to changes in the export quantity of the group of 
export country’s firms      . BAKER & BRESNAHAN (1988) show that the RDE can be 
even more precise in indicating market power than suggested above. When the marginal 
cost is brought to the right hand side in equation (5.6), both sides are divided through 
    and equation (5.11) is applied, the following equality appears: 
        
   
     
                                                                                                                                ( .12) 
where      is now the marginal cost in the destination country’s currency. This means 
that the RDE is equal to the relative markup, also known as the Lerner index (LERNER 
1934). However, in this strict sense this is only true under certain conditions. In fact, 
while the firms choose their profit maximizing price according to the conjectured con-
duct of the competitors, the estimation of the residual demand is instead based on the 
actual conduct of the competitors. Therefore, the equality displayed in (5.12) only holds 
when the actual and the conjectured residual demand coincide. This is generally the 
case in a Consistent Conjectures Equilibrium that is described by BRESNAHAN (1981). 
BAKER & BRESNAHAN (1988: 289-290) report four cases in which it can be safely as-
sumed that the equality with the Lerner index holds. These cases are a) perfect competi-
tion as non-cooperative case, b) a firm that is a Stackelberg leader, c) a dominant firm 
with a price-taking fringe and d) a significant degree of product differentiation. Howev-
er, even when the equality with the Lerner index does not hold perfectly, GOLDBERG & 
KNETTER (1999: 39) argue that a higher absolute value of the RDE still indicates a 
higher degree of market power. 
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5.3 Empirical specification and estimation problems 
5.3.1 The residual demand specification 
Equation (5.10) reveals the variables that determine the residual demand. With regard to 
the functional form of the residual demand, GOLDBERG & KNETTER (1999: 40) propose 
a double-log specification that allows interpreting the coefficients as elasticities. The 
general form of the resulting time series model for a particular destination country is: 
    
          
                
           (5.13) 
where   
   is the export price (in the destination country’s currency),   
   is the endoge-
nous quantity exported by the group of export country’s firms,    is a vector of demand 
shifters in the destination country (and in its currency),  
  is a vector of the competing 
countries’ cost shifters and    is an error term for which the usual assumptions apply. 
The most important parameter in equation (5.13) is   since it represents the estimate for 
the inverse residual demand elasticity (RDE). According to its relation to the Lerner 
index, we can expect it to lie between zero and minus one; zero indicates perfect com-
petition and significant absolute values smaller than zero indicate market power. In con-
trast, the parameters    and    do not have a clear interpretation. They both depict direct 
effects on the demand the group of export country’s firms face as well as indirect effects 
based on the adjustment of the competitors (BAKER & BRESNAHAN 1988: 297). 
Variables that should usually be among the demand shifters are the real gross domestic 
product (GDP), the consumer price index (CPI) and a time trend. Furthermore, dummy 
variables can account for changes in barriers to trade such as the change of tariff rates or 
the occurrence of free trade agreements. Typical cost shifting variables are the factor 
prices for important inputs such as wages, interest rates as well as prices for raw materi-
als, intermediate goods and energy. However, these variables often do not reveal a high 
variation and follow similar patterns across exporting countries. This is problematic 
because the econometric identification of the residual demand requires specific cost 
variables for the considered country groups of firms at least for the group of export 
country’s firms that is analyzed (BAKER & BRESNAHAN 1988: 289). This is where the 
advantage of international markets as a research object comes into play. GOLDBERG & 
KNETTER (1999: 41) argue that the bilateral exchange rates (ER) between the export or 
competitor country and the destination country are ideal cost shifters. They move the 
costs of the export country and its competitors independently of each other and usually 
exhibit a substantial amount of variation. 
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The cost shifting variables of the group of export country’s firms – including its ER – 
are not represented in equation (5.13) since this allows the econometric identification. 
However, these variables are the natural instruments for the endogenous export quantity 
of the group of export country’s firms (  
  ). They do not appear in equation (5.13), are 
exogenous and are therefore not correlated with the error term but correlated with the 
export quantity. 
5.3.2 Instrumentation problems and cost shifting variables 
FROEB & WERDEN (1991: 42-46) discuss some typical problems that may arise when the 
residual demand has to be estimated. Although the authors have primary national mar-
kets and single firms in mind, we will argue that on international markets these prob-
lems can be even more serious. The problems concern the need for cost shifting varia-
bles – firstly as suitable instruments for the endogenous quantity, and secondly to depict 
the competitors’ marginal costs in equation (5.13). Even if cost shifting variables are 
available in empirical applications, they are not necessarily good candidates. At best, 
such variables should reflect a high proportion of the variance of the marginal cost. 
When cost shifters do not reflect a high proportion of the marginal cost, the instrumental 
variables (IV) estimator reveals an increasing variance and may even be biased
16
. The 
latter is true when the observed and unobserved proportions of the marginal cost are 
correlated. Suppose that    is the observed and     the unobserved proportion of the 
group of export country’s firms’ marginal cost, while    is the observed and    the 
unobserved proportion of the marginal cost of a competing country. When    and    
are correlated, both the IV and the OLS estimator are biased since    is part of the error 
term. The case is similar when    is correlated with   . This again results in a bias of 
the IV estimator because     serves as instrument (FROEB & WERDEN 1991: 44-45). 
Therefore, the instrument is not valid. As described in Chapter 5.3.1, the most important 
cost shifters that are used on an international markets framework are ERs since they 
shift the marginal cost in the destination country’s currency. However, ERs are also 
correlated with determinants of the marginal cost in the country of origin (GOLDBERG & 
KNETTER 1997: 1251). They influence a) the prices of imported goods in the country of 
origin and b) the exported quantity of the good and therefore the marginal cost. Moreo-
ver, in residual demand studies on international markets, cost shifting variables other 
than the ERs are hardly used. 
                                                 
16 The same holds for the two step least squares (2SLS) estimator. 
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However, even if the observed and unobserved parts of the marginal cost are not corre-
lated with each other, the IV estimator suffers an increased variance when the respective 
parts are correlated among the exporting countries – that is,    is correlated with   
and     is correlated with   . In fact, the larger this correlation is and the smaller the 
proportion of the marginal cost that is observed, the larger the variance of the IV esti-
mator is (FROEB & WERDEN 1991: 45-46). Indeed, a lot of cost shifters – for instance 
factor prices – show very similar trends and patterns across exporting countries. This 
also applies for ERs as cost shifters and is especially important when the variation of the 
ERs is primary caused by a changing worth of the destination country’s currency. 
In the case of inappropriately chosen cost shifters which do not explain the quantity 
exported well, the additional problem of weak instruments arises. Weak instruments 
imply that the endogenous right-hand side variable is poorly explained in the first step 
of 2SLS. This causes two serious problems with the estimator. Firstly, the estimator is 
biased in the direction of the OLS estimator. This is due to a finite-sample bias that can 
be – even in large samples – quite serious, and may in the worst case be more pro-
nounced than for OLS. Secondly, the estimated standard error of the replaced endoge-
nous right-hand variable is biased downwards so that the null hypothesis of a coefficient 
of zero is too often rejected (MURRAY 2006: 120-128). Furthermore, when the endoge-
nous right-hand variable is only explained by the other exogenous variables of equation 
(5.13), this introduces quite a high amount of multicollinearity in the model and again 
influences the standard errors (FROEB & WERDEN 1991: 42). 
For international markets, the danger of weak instruments for the export quantity seems 
very pronounced in general. GOLDBERG & KNETTER (1997: 1266-1268) discuss that 
bilateral export quantities reveal a high degree of volatility that is probably too high in 
order to be explained by changes in fundamental factors such as demand. The authors 
refer to their own work as well as to AW (1993). They suspect an improper data collec-
tion as a reason for this observation. GLAUBEN & LOY (2003) report explicitly that they 
were not able to explain export quantity in the first step of 2SLS with the bilateral ex-
change rate for the markets they analyze. Unfortunately, in all other residual demand 
studies that we know of, the issue of weak instruments is neither explicitly mentioned 
nor are tests reported. It is therefore unclear whether this problem applies in general 
with international markets. 
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In order to avoid the problem of weak instruments, FROEB & WERDEN (1991: 42-44) 
propose to use either price or quantity as the left-hand side variable depending on which 
one reveals the lower correlation with the cost shifters. In the case of an elastic residual 
demand, that is price; for an inelastic residual demand, that is quantity. However, if 
quantity is on the left-hand side,   in equation (5.13) actually measures the residual de-
mand elasticity, not the inverse one. That introduces a disadvantage with regard to the 
testing procedure for market power. When the inverse residual demand elasticity is test-
ed against zero, this is a test for market power at the same time. In contrast, the residual 
demand elasticity cannot be tested against infinity, only against particular values. 
An alternative way to get rid of the problem of weak instruments is to stick to OLS. 
BAKER & BRESNAHAN (1988: 298) state that the OLS estimates are most likely biased in 
the direction of rejection of market power. Therefore, they can simply be seen as a con-
servative estimate for the RDE. This is also supported by the results of GOLDBERG & 
KNETTER (1999) who compare SUR estimates with IV and 3SLS estimates. In general, 
FROEB & WERDEN (1991: 43-44) show that the severity of the bias depends on the rela-
tion between the variance of the error term and the variance of the group of export 
country’s firms’ marginal cost as the natural instrument. The smaller the variance of the 
error term is in comparison to the variance of the marginal cost, the less serious the en-
dogeneity bias of OLS is. This implies that when a larger part of the competitors’ mar-
ginal costs is represented via   
  in equation (5.13), the price of the group of export 
country’s firms can probably be explained to a higher degree; therefore, the variance of 
the error term decreases and the endogeneity bias decreases too. Since 2SLS has a bias 
in the same direction as OLS in finite samples, this applies for 2SLS as well. 
5.3.3 A measure of the marginal cost as an alternative 
As discussed in Chapter 5.3.2, the reliance on cost shifting variables instead of the mar-
ginal cost can lead to serious problems. Unfortunately, the marginal cost is not directly 
observable and therefore cannot be introduced in equation (5.13). However, in the pric-
ing-to-market (PTM) literature, the model proposed by KNETTER (1989; 1993) provides 
a measure of the marginal cost that is estimated through the use of fixed time effects in 
a panel approach. In fact, SILVENTE (2005) uses the series thus obtained as a measure of 
the marginal cost in a residual demand equation. The fixed effects of the Knetter model 
basically depict the average price by means of unit values in the sample while simulta-
neously correcting them for PTM. The resulting series is surely connected to the mar-
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ginal cost, but may be noisy and even biased when the markup contained therein varies 
due to imperfect cost pass-through; in any case, it is not necessarily the best approxima-
tion available for the marginal cost. 
Based on the key idea of KNETTER (1989; 1993), we use an alternative measure of the 
marginal cost that we explain in detail in Chapter 4.3.2. In addition to the marginal cost, 
the observed unit values contain several further elements such as markups, quality pre-
miums, measurement errors and expectation effects – for the case that contracts are 
used. While the marginal cost is equal for all destinations at the point of export, the oth-
er elements are not. Finding a good approximation for the marginal cost requires de-
composing unit values into these elements. In a statistical sense, a complete decomposi-
tion is even not necessary when something is known about the basic characteristics of 
these elements. We can then estimate distributions for these elements and distinguish 
them from the marginal cost. In doing so, we can separate the elements into two groups: 
Measurement errors and expectation effects (first group) can be expected to be inde-
pendently normally distributed with a mean of zero; thus their sum is normally distrib-
uted with zero mean as well. Markups and quality premiums (second group) on the oth-
er side are positive deviations from the marginal cost. Since larger markups are more 
difficult to defend, a truncated normal distribution is a natural candidate for a suitable 
distribution. This implies that the i-th export unit value (in the export country’s curren-
cy) at time t is composed as follows: 
                                                                                                                                              ( .14) 
where for the composed error term (       ) it is assumed: 
         (     
 )                                                                                                                                  ( .1 ) 
         
 (      
 )                                                                                                                             ( .1 ) 
Additionally, the error components are assumed to be independently distributed 
(KUMBHAKAR & LOVELL 2003: 169). The first error component     contains measure-
ment errors and expectation effects whereas the second error component     contains 
markups and quality premiums. 
Equation (5.14) is a stochastic frontier model that is usually estimated via maximum 
likelihood and provides the stochastic lower price frontier (SLPF) as fitted values – that 
is   . When the distribution assumptions hold
17
, the SLPF is an unbiased estimate of the 
                                                 
17 See Chapter 4.3.2 for a discussion of consequences when the distribution assumptions are violated. 
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marginal cost; this estimate is hereafter called the “stochastic” marginal cost (SMC). 
Since, for example, the level of the markups can vary over time, the distribution param-
eters depend on time too. Therefore, equation (5.14) cannot be estimated for the whole 
time span but separately for each point in time. However, in order to increase the num-
ber of observations and therefore the estimation efficiency, we prefer to estimate the 
model in a rolling window procedure for three consecutive points in time. As long as 
the distribution parameters are similar for adjacent periods and only change significant-
ly over longer time periods, the increase of efficiency can be expected to outweigh the 
loss of temporal flexibility in the estimation. 
In general, the SMC is estimated in the respective export country’s currency. This 
means that the ERs remain in equation (5.13), while all other cost shifters are replaced 
by the SMC of the respective country. Nevertheless, in combination with the SMC, the 
ERs do not exhibit the problems discussed in Chapter 5.3.2, but depict the full range of 
variations of the marginal cost in the destination country’s currency. In summary, the 
usage of the SMC in a residual demand model has the following advantages: 
 There is no need to search for cost shifters whose appropriateness with respect to 
the good analyzed may not be clear. Conversely, the SLPF can always be esti-
mated when a certain number of destination-specific unit values are available. 
 Instead of relying on cost shifters, the SMC depicts the complete range of 
changes in the marginal cost. Therefore, the danger of a higher variance and a 
bias of the 2SLS estimation are averted. 
 The marginal cost can be expected to be a stronger instrument than single cost 
shifters. 
 The usage of the SMC for the competing countries can be expected to explain a 
larger fraction of the price and therefore reduce the endogeneity bias in OLS and 
also in 2SLS that is biased toward the same direction in finite samples. 
A possible disadvantage of the SMC is that it carries the risk of some degree of endoge-
neity. However, as we argue in Chapter 4.3.2 this risk can probably be neglected when 
the SMC is used in equations for single destination countries.  
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5.4 Data 
The international dairy markets cover a wide range of products traded. For the estima-
tion of the residual demand, we chose the four most important products. They are 
skimmed milk powder (SMP, HS 040210), whole milk powder (WMP, HS 040221), 
butter (HS 040510) and cheddar cheese (HS 0406900011)
18
. Together, these products 
account for the majority of New Zealand’s dairy exports. Furthermore, all of them are 
commodities and therefore quite homogeneous. The destination countries selected for 
the analysis have to fulfill certain conditions. That is, the quantity traded should be suf-
ficiently high in order ensure that the trade data is of reliable quality with (almost) no 
periods where trade is not observed. 
As competitors of New Zealand, we consider the respective domestic competitors in the 
destination country as well as the EU and Australia (for SMP the US is also consid-
ered). On average, New Zealand and its competitors account for around 90% of the im-
ports of the destination countries and products considered. The remaining foreign com-
petitors are very small and are only of regional importance. This means that the most 
important sources of competition should be represented in the model. 
The data for prices and quantities required for the estimation of the residual demand is 
gathered at the port of export. As measure of the prices, we use unit values (i.e. trade 
volume divided by quantity). Furthermore, we also use them to estimate the SMC
19
. The 
data is obtained from the Global Trade Atlas (GTA 2013) for a time period of 1995 to 
2012. For New Zealand and the EU, the data would be available from 1990 onwards but 
the availability for Australia restricts the start year to 1995. For the estimation of equa-
tion (5.13), we use quarterly data
20
. Quarterly or even annual data is often used in resid-
ual demand studies. Unlike monthly data, this holds the advantage that the number of 
missing values in the trade data is reduced and thus more destination countries can be 
analyzed. Furthermore, a lower frequency increases the accuracy of the trade data since, 
for example, the unit values are based on larger quantities traded. Finally, FROEB & 
WERDEN (1991: 40-42) also suggest the usage of lower frequencies since this reduces 
problems that stem from the dynamic properties of the data. When the observations do 
                                                 
18 Because Cheddar cheese is of less importance for the EU, we instead use as competing product a com-
position consisting of Gouda, Edam and cheddar cheese (HS 04069021, HS 04069023, HS 04069078). 
19
 The sample characteristics of the unit values and the estimation results for the SMC series are listed in 
Appendix 5.1 and discussed in general in Chapter 4.5.1. Furthermore, both destination-specific unit val-
ues and the SMC series are depicted in Appendix 4.2, 4.3 and 5.2. 
20 In contrast, for the estimation of the SMC series we use monthly data and transform the obtained series 
afterwards into a quarterly frequency. 
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not represent static equilibriums, the estimated RDEs may just represent short term re-
actions. However, lower frequencies also entail a number of problems. If the dynamic 
process itself is the object of interest, aggregation clearly makes no sense; but even if 
not, aggregation may cause a bias and reduces the number of degrees of freedom. 
Therefore, quarterly data seems to be a good compromise. 
Since we use the unit value data to estimate the SMC in the currency of the country to 
which it belongs, we need the nominal ERs as additional cost shifters. They are ob-
tained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS). In order to depict the competi-
tors from the destination country in the model, we use the milk price in the respective 
destination country as a cost shifter which is obtained from FAOSTAT. Furthermore, as 
demand shifters, the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) are again obtained from the IFS. 
5.5 Estimation results 
In residual demand studies, equation (5.13) is usually estimated in levels without check-
ing for the time series properties of the variables – that is whether the variables exhibit a 
unit root or not, and if so whether they are co-integrated. An exception is GLAUBEN & 
LOY (2003); they explicitly tested for this and mostly rejected the existence of a long-
run relationship. We experience a similar result. Some – but not all – variables exhibit a 
unit root whereas in almost all cases the Engle-Granger test cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis of no Cointegration. This implies that the estimation in levels and in an error 
correction representation is not valid, and equation (5.13) has to be estimated in first 
differences. This at least has the advantage that it is not necessary to control for changes 
in the trade policy, such as changing import tariffs. Import tariffs changed in the obser-
vation period, for example, due to a number of free trade agreements between New Zea-
land and some of the destination countries. Indeed, we would not have detailed infor-
mation about all of those changes that supposedly took place in the observation period. 
As discussed in Chapter 5.3, the right hand side variable quantity is endogenous and has 
to be instrumented. Therefore we started estimating the first difference version of equa-
tion (5.13) with 2SLS. Unfortunately, the preferred instruments – that is, the SMC of 
New Zealand and its ER to the destination country – turned out to be very weak instru-
ments. Indeed, they are mostly not even significant at the ten percent level in the first 
stage. This means that the usage of the SMC does not solve the weak instrument prob-
lem – at least not in our dataset. Additionally, we tried to use the milk price and the 
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milk production in New Zealand as well as the lagged change in quantity as instru-
ments, but this does not change the result
21
. If the model is still estimated with 2SLS, 
the estimated RDE shows very unusual values. We therefore decided to estimate the 
model in the next step with OLS. Since the Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null hypothe-
sis of no contemporaneous correlation of the residuals across the equations, we finally 
estimated the equations for each product as a system with seemingly unrelated regres-
sions (SUR). For contemporaneously correlated errors, SUR increases the estimation 
efficiency. However, since OLS and SUR yield conservative estimates of the RDE, the 
true absolute values can be expected to lie above the estimated coefficients. 
In general, all equations are tested for heteroscedasticity (Breusch-Pagan test), autocor-
relation (Breusch-Godfrey test) and parameter stability (CUSUM test). In almost all 
equations, the coefficients are constant whereas in the majority of the cases the errors 
are homoscedastic and are not serially correlated. In order to address a lagged adjust-
ment of the price, we include several lags of the right hand side variables into the mod-
el. The lag numbers used are chosen according to the minimum of the information crite-
ria AIC, BIC and HQK. When lags are included, we depict the sum of the contempora-
neous and lagged coefficients in the tables; the t-statistics belong to this sum too. 
In Table 5.1, the estimation results for SMP
22
 as well as the average surcharge of the 
unit values on SMC (UV surcharge
23
) and the import market shares of New Zealand are 
shown. In addition to the variables displayed in the table, we include a constant, the 
GDP, the CPI, a time trend (that equals a quadratic trend in the model in levels) and 
quarterly dummies. However, changes in GDP and CPI do not exhibit a high amount of 
variation and are only significant in three cases. The same is true for the time trend that 
is only significant in one case. On the contrary, at least one quarterly dummy is signifi-
cant in twelve out of sixteen equations. According to the information criteria, for half of 
the equations no lags are optimal, while for the other half mostly one lag is optimal. 
This means that competition is significantly lagged for half of the destination countries. 
A possible reason for this could be the usage of medium- and long-term contracts. 
Nonetheless, the model explains a high share of the changes in the prices. The coeffi-
                                                 
21 Even if the model is estimated in levels the instruments turn out to be weak. 
22 The order of the destinations in the table represents their importance with respect to New Zealand’s 
total export quantity in the observation period. 
23 The UV surcharges are calculated similar to the Lerner index with unit values serving as prices. That is, 
they depict the difference of unit value and SMC in relation to the unit value as average for the whole 
observation period. The UV surcharges can consist of a markup as well as quality premiums and are 
therefore not a measure of market power by themself. Nonetheless, since a quality premium cannot be 
negative, they represent the upper limit of the actual markup for the respective destination country. 
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cient of determination has an average value of 0.60, which is quite high for time series 
models in first differences. Single equations exhibit even higher R-squared values, but 
there are also equations with rather low values. 
Table 5.1: SUR estimation results for SMP 
SMC ER SMC ER SMC ER
-0.07** 0.78*** 0.45 0.04 0.20 0.25*** 0.02 -0.04
(-2.41) (4.15) (1.32) (0.19) (0.58) (2.94) (0.06) (-0.06)
-0.13*** 0.53*** 0.11 0.45** 1.06*** 0.03 0.54 -0.38
(-4.40) (3.28) (0.32) (2.61) (3.02) (0.38) (1.48) (-1.02)
0.01 0.07 0.23 0.59*** 0.61** 0.18*** -0.21 0.01
(1.29) (0.57) (0.83) (5.43) (2.67) (3.33) (-0.18) (0.08)
-0.06* 0.75*** 0.83** -0.02 -0.15 0.19* -0.01 0.04
(-1.71) (4.65) (2.61) (-0.09) (-0.46) (2.00) (-0.03) (0.21)
-0.02 0.74*** 0.26 0.19 0.58 0.07 0.38 1.49**
(-1.09) (3.45) (0.62) (0.82) (1.40) (0.59) (0.98) (2.06)
0.01 1.13*** 0.86 -0.06 1.41*** 0.10 0.81
(0.21) (3.69) (1.64) (-0.19) (3.02) (0.53) (0.90)
0.04** -0.11 0.57 0.82*** 0.38 0.23*** 0.37 -4.60**
(2.18) (-0.60) (1.40) (4.50) (1.02) (2.80) (0.98) (-2.18)
-0.07*** 0.38*** 0.25 0.25** 0.32 0.04 0.29
(-3.73) (3.15) (0.92) (2.11) (1.34) (0.77) (0.96)
-0.10*** 0.74** 0.18 0.15 1.17** 0.13 0.38
(-3.76) (2.59) (0.30) (0.52) (2.14) (1.03) (0.57)
0.01 0.17 -0.09 0.69*** 0.87 -0.03 -0.09 0.68
(1.48) (0.75) (-0.14) (2.91) (1.59) (-0.31) (-0.18) (0.74)
0.00 0.42** 0.49 0.54*** 0.78** -0.01 -0.12 0.41
(-0.81) (2.62) (1.28) (3.48) (2.31) (-0.13) (-0.25) (0.74)
-0.09*** 0.72** -0.20 -0.10 1.16* -0.65
(-2.75) (2.41) (-0.22) (-0.56) (1.70) (-0.85)
0.00 0.88*** 0.55 0.19 0.68 0.07
(0.15) (3.27) (1.06) (0.70) (1.43) (0.56)
-0.05*** 0.18 -0.03 0.77*** 0.78** 0.05 0.21 -1.03*
(-3.54) (1.11) (-0.09) (4.74) (2.43) (0.63) (0.43) (-1.84)
-0.02 0.50** 0.37 0.41* 0.23 0.13
(-0.87) (2.35) (0.90) (1.81) (0.67) (1.27)
-0.13*** -0.52 -3.76* 1.68* 4.42** 0.21 1.12 0.08
(-2.93) (-0.61) (-1.79) (1.99) (2.24) (0.52) (0.73) (0.09)













































Note: The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics; the asterisks denote the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance level. For coefficients 
the average applies to the significant ones that have the correct sign. The import market share is calculated by dividing New Zealand´s 










0Sri Lanka 0.62 11.2%
34.1%
0 91.7%
51.2%Hong Kong 0.58 12.4%1
Source: Own calculations, GTA (2013) 
The key coefficients in Table 5.1 are the estimates of the inverse residual demand elas-
ticity (RDE,   in the table). In eight out of sixteen equations, the table shows a signifi-
cantly negative RDE. The mean of these values is -0.085. This implies that the optimal 
markup would be 8.5% of the price. In comparison, the average UV surcharge for the 
same destinations is 9.5%. Therefore, the majority of the deviations from the marginal 
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cost seem to be markups and not quality premiums. However, even for the destination 
countries with non-significant RDE estimates, the UV surcharges are 8.8% on average. 
In general, the RDE estimates and UV surcharges in Table 5.1 are only weakly correlat-
ed; a fact that also applies for the results for WMP, butter and cheese (Tables 5.2, 5.3, 
5.4). This can be explained as follows: Firstly, the endogeneity bias can be more serious 
in some equations than in others. Secondly, the UV surcharge can be highly affected by 
different qualities. Thirdly, the RDE estimates indicate the actual optimal markup that 
can deviate from the one that is perceived by Fonterra. In the case of Malaysia, Singa-
pore and Australia, the markups implied by the RDEs are even higher than the UV sur-
charges. Thus, Fonterra could charge a higher markup than it is obviously doing. 
The equation for Australia is especially notable for a number of idiosyncratic aspects. 
Firstly, Australia is an important export country that produces under world market con-
ditions, but imports SMP itself. Since these imports are almost exclusively from New 
Zealand, the competitor variables only explain a small fraction of the price changes (the 
R-squared is only 0.26). Secondly, the estimated RDE implies that Fonterra can charge 
a markup of 7% of the price. However, the average unit value Fonterra is actually 
charging in the observation period just equals the SMC. This low UV surcharge also 
speaks against some kind of special quality. The answer could be that Fonterra delivers 
SMP at cost price to the Australian dairy company Bonlac in which it has an ownership 
stake of 50% (ARMENTANO et al. 2004: 49). Nevertheless, two further equations also 
exhibit low R-squares, those of South Korea and Mexico. In both countries Fonterra has 
a very low market share of about 10% and the UV surcharge is about 16%. Therefore, 
Fonterra could supply some niche or premium qualities. While this fits to the relatively 
high estimate of the RDE in South Korea, it does not fit in the case of Mexico. 
In the case of Mexico, the lack of influence of the US is particularly surprising. Mexico 
is the most important destination country for the US, reaching an import market share of 
around 70%. However, as Table 5.1 shows, the US only has influence in a few destina-
tion countries, and when it does have influence, it is rather small
24
. The reason for this 
could be an agreement of Dairy America – an association of seven US dairy companies 
– with Fonterra. This agreement concerns the selling of US-SMP on the global markets 
and makes Fonterra the most important exporter of US-SMP (ARMENTANO et al. 2004: 
46-47). The agreement could enable Fonterra to protect itself from US-competition. 
                                                 
24 Note that the expected values for the SMC and the ER lie between zero and one; zero, when there is no 
influence at all and one, when the price is completely determined by the marginal cost of the competitor.  
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Moreover, as a competitor for Fonterra even the domestic dairy industry in the destina-
tion countries is rarely important. This is indicated by the estimated coefficients for the 
milk prices in the destination countries. Only in the case of Thailand is there a signifi-
cant positive coefficient. As a result, only the EU and Australia remain as important 
competitors. For both countries, there are just four destinations in which they do not 
have any influence, but there is no destination that is not influenced by at least one of 
the competitors. Furthermore, almost all of their variables’ coefficients have the ex-
pected sign, but the SMC has more often a significant influence than the ER – especial-
ly in the case of the EU. This could be because the ERs included are correlated to a ra-
ther high degree or that the official ERs may – in some cases – not be the actual ones. 
In addition to the different significance of the ERs in the case of the EU and Australia, 
there are further differences. Although the average t-value of the EU’s SMC is larger 
than for Australia, a highly significant influence of the Australian variables seems to be 
more often associated with a non-significant RDE. This would mean that Australia more 
effectively restricts the market power of Fonterra. This could be a sign of different kinds 
of competition with the EU in comparison to Australia. In the case of the EU, SMP is 
subject to the intervention scheme and its export was subsidized until 2007. This result-
ed in very volatile EU exports of SMP and probably periods with larger overall price 
gaps between the competitors as well as a high competition pressure – even without 
products necessarily perceived as being highly homogenous across origins. Conversely, 
changes in the bilateral ERs could be offset to some degree by the export subsidy policy 
that allowed (in part) country specific payments. For Australia, the situation is different. 
Exports stayed on a similar level and a high degree of competition could be due to simi-
lar distribution channels or products being perceived as more similar. 
These considerations are supported by an interesting detail with regard to the lag num-
ber of the equations. When the lag numbers are increased, the influence of the EU’s 
SMC and ER increases (the value of the coefficients and the value of the t-statistics), 
whereas Australia’s importance as a competitor decreases. If there is no difference with 
respect to the contract practice, this could be a sign that the switch to Australian SMP is 
easier and faster than to SMP from the EU. Furthermore, the significant quarterly dum-
mies could be a sign for different degrees of competition throughout the year. In the 
quarters in which competition is rather weak, Fonterra could increase its price relative 
to its competitors. This kind of seasonality is probably caused by a strong seasonality in 
the milk production as is the case for New Zealand and Australia. 
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Table 5.2: SUR estimation results for WMP 
SMC ER SMC ER
0.00 0.24* 0.49* 0.61*** 0.35 0.08 0.63
(0.13) (1.85) (1.86) (5.22) (1.57) (0.71) (0.81)
0.01 0.18 0.58** 0.52*** 0.29 0.23 0.91
(0.95) (1.02) (2.03) (3.41) (1.03) (0.74) (1.52)
-0.15*** 0.10 0.33 0.58*** 0.39 -0.16 1.16 2.99**
(-3.17) (0.64) (0.97) (3.89) (1.13) (-0.42) (1.23) (2.12)
-0.16*** 0.17 0.48 0.42*** -0.02 0.38 2.15 0.25
(-4.00) (1.00) (1.52) (2.85) (-0.08) (0.76) (1.63) (0.56)
0.01* 0.70*** 1.08*** 0.35* -0.10 -0.19 0.55 1.41
(1.89) (3.37) (3.07) (1.91) (-0.25) (-0.25) (1.08) (1.05)
-0.05** 0.49*** 0.39 0.38*** 0.60*** -0.29 1.82* 0.66
(-2.04) (3.83) (1.66) (3.29) (3.01) (-0.74) (1.83) (0.72)
-0.02 0.12 0.44* 0.52*** 0.39* -0.10 0.41 0.03
(-0.52) (0.86) (1.82) (4.16) (1.68) (-0.23) (0.72) (0.04)
-0.05*** 0.49*** 0.31 0.44*** 0.55* 0.05 -0.56 -0.14
(-3.17) (3.02) (1.09) (3.04) (1.96) (0.21) (-0.34) (-0.30)
-0.04** 0.21 0.22 0.38*** 0.26 1.42** 3.00 -0.92
(-2.17) (1.28) (0.77) (2.69) (0.94) (2.56) (1.48) (-0.97)
-0.07* 0.47*** 0.62* 0.22 0.27
(-1.78) (2.69) (1.88) (1.41) (0.93)
-0.07*** -0.02 0.73*** 0.71*** -0.04
(-3.06) (-0.12) (2.76) (5.19) (-0.17)
-0.11*** 0.58** 0.44 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.10
(-4.33) (2.21) (0.74) (1.27) (0.53) (0.13) (0.04)
-0.04** 0.43* 0.30 0.44** 1.18*** 0.26 -1.08 -0.61
(-2.32) (1.97) (0.73) (2.30) (3.25) (0.48) (-0.84) (-0.52)
0.03 0.85*** 0.52 0.08 0.35 0.37 -1.59 0.09
(1.25) (4.30) (1.53) (0.45) (1.43) (1.13) (-0.82) (0.08)
-0.02 0.46*** 0.41 0.38*** 0.24 0.65** -1.88 -0.60
(-0.83) (3.01) (1.31) (2.99) (0.98) (2.10) (-1.26) (-0.65)
0.02 0.58*** 0.34 0.25** 1.06*** 2.00 -0.22
(1.63) (4.42) (1.41) (2.18) (4.68) (1.60) (-0.34)
Average -0.08 0.53 0.66 0.46 0.76 0.61 10.9% 59.4%
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics; the asterisks denote the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance level. For coefficients 
the average applies to the significant ones that have the correct sign. The import market share is calculated by dividing New Zealand´s 








































































Source: Own calculations, GTA (2013)  
In Table 5.2, the results for WMP are displayed. In general, they are very similar to 
those for SMP. This applies, for instance, to the average R-squared value, the non-
significance of demand shifters and competition from the destination country as well as 
to the estimates of the RDE itself. There are nine out of sixteen equations with signifi-
cant negative RDE coefficients and an average value of -0.082. This proximity to the 
RDE estimates for SMP is surprising since Fonterra has a markedly higher market share 
for WMP. Even when the same destination countries are considered, the estimates are 
almost always very similar. A further similarity is that the RDE estimates are hardly 
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correlated with the UV surcharges or with the market share of New Zealand and its 
competitors – this is a general result for all products analyzed. The market share alone 
seems to have no influence on the degree of market power indicated by the RDE. 
Some differences between the results for SMP and WMP exist with respect to the com-
petitor influence. Again, only the EU and Australia remain as main competitors but the 
EU’s variables are less often significant than the Australian variables when compared to 
SMP. Furthermore, the average t-values of the SMC coefficients are smaller for the EU 
and larger for Australia compared to SMP – although the average SMC coefficient of 
the significant variables is larger for the EU than for Australia. This could be due to a 
different supply behavior of the EU. WMP is not subject to the intervention scheme and 
– in contrast to SMP – WMP exports are hardly volatile in the observation period and 
exhibit a downward trend. This implies that there is not a similar competition pressure 
from highly fluctuating EU exports as is the case for SMP. Furthermore, in the case of 
WMP, the competition is often less lagged and the t-statistics of the EU’s SMC and ER 
generally do not increase anymore when the lag number is increased. 
An interesting case with regard to the RDE estimates is Singapore. The country has 
huge RDE estimates for all products (including butter and cheese), but for SMP and 
WMP it has very low UV surcharges (5.5% and 1.2%). The country is a net importer 
but exports noticeable amounts of dairy products. When these exports are actually re-
exports, this could explain the RDE estimates which imply a markedly larger markup 
than the UV surcharges would allow – at least for milk powder. In this case, a low price 
would facilitate re-exports and therefore also increase the exports to Singapore, while 
for a higher price only the domestic consumption will probably remain. 
The estimation results for butter in Table 5.3 show some differences to those for the 
milk powders, SMP and WMP. Although the mean of the significant RDE estimates of 
-0.078 is again similar, the coefficients are significant in more cases – that is, in twelve 
out of eighteen cases. This goes along with a) lower coefficients of determination (i.e. 
changes in competitor prices explain a lower fraction of changes in Fonterra’s prices), 
b) smaller average coefficients for competitors’ SMC (competitor ER’s are significant 
only in a few cases) and c) markedly higher UV surpluses. On the contrary, the market 
share lies between those of the milk powders. All this suggests that butter is more heter-
ogeneous (or differentiated) across origins than the milk powders. However, for the av-
erage degree of markup implied by the RDE coefficients this hardly matters. 
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Table 5.3: SUR estimation results for butter 
SMC ER SMC ER
-0.08*** 0.28* 0.99** 0.32** -0.20 0.30
(-4.75) (1.68) (2.47) (2.64) (-0.50) (0.79)
-0.13*** 0.62*** -0.14 0.03 2.99 3.00
(-3.16) (5.39) (-0.48) (0.10) (1.27) (1.38)
-0.01 0.32*** 0.54** 0.31*** 0.19
(-0.96) (3.70) (2.42) (4.63) (0.88)
-0.03** 0.18 0.67 0.30*** 0.02 0.88 2.01 -1.36
(-2.15) (1.28) (1.66) (2.68) (0.07) (1.20) (1.19) (-0.88)
-0.08*** 0.30* 0.59 0.23* 0.76* -0.07 3.08**
(-7.50) (1.90) (1.29) (1.89) (1.94) (-0.38) (2.58)
-0.06*** 0.63*** 0.04 0.22 0.62 0.36 -0.44 2.27
(-4.12) (3.37) (0.08) (1.41) (1.36) (1.11) (-0.16) (0.70)
-0.11*** 0.21 -0.02 0.28*** 1.06*** -0.54 -0.58
(-3.31) (1.60) (-0.06) (2.72) (3.14) (-0.61) (-0.73)
-0.01 0.28 0.41 0.44*** 0.05 -0.89 -2.25** 1.54
(-0.31) (1.38) (0.84) (2.81) (0.10) (-1.10) (-2.36) (1.03)
-0.11*** 0.26 0.24 0.35** -0.10 1.16 -0.27
(-5.89) (1.43) (0.40) (2.51) (-0.20) (0.77) (-0.10)
-0.09*** 0.65*** 0.55 0.03 -0.19
(-2.75) (3.63) (1.35) (0.19) (-0.53)
-0.05 0.34* -0.30 0.30 0.74 -0.42 -0.88 3.92
(-1.13) (1.69) (-0.60) (1.64) (1.34) (-0.68) (-0.68) (1.41)
0.05* -0.05 0.22 0.82*** 0.61 0.10 -3.13 -1.15
(1.84) (-0.27) (0.43) (4.92) (1.18) (0.27) (-1.17) (-1.55)
-0.05*** 0.42** 0.54 0.31** 0.46 0.77 3.57 -1.42
(-3.30) (2.48) (1.17) (2.22) (1.03) (0.94) (1.30) (-1.07)
-0.08*** 0.34*** 0.39 0.26** 0.63** 0.76 0.22
(-6.88) (2.85) (1.23) (2.64) (2.07) (0.50) (0.28)
0.02 0.76 -1.27 0.24 2.21* -0.70 -6.34 -9.43
(0.48) (1.60) (-1.01) (0.63) (1.79) (-0.12) (-1.57) (-0.85)
-0.05*** 0.29** 0.86*** 0.36*** 0.05 0.02 0.31 -0.29
(-3.62) (2.60) (2.92) (4.03) (0.16) (0.19) (0.35) (-0.18)
0.03 0.56*** 1.35*** -0.09 0.14 -0.32 2.61** 2.30
(1.13) (3.08) (2.82) (-0.59) (0.32) (-0.35) (2.26) (1.34)
-0.07*** 0.49** 0.25 0.14 -0.01
(-5.33) (2.51) (0.44) (0.89) (-0.02)

















Russia 1 0.61 5.7% 31.7%
Australia 1 0.39 14.0% 95.4%
Taiwan 0 0.57 13.5% 65.2%
Saudi 
Arabia
0 0.26 13.2% 25.7%
China 0 0.50 14.0% 72.0%
USA 1 0.70 11.4% 46.2%
Hong Kong 1 0.59 19.7% 48.6%
Mexico 1 0.48 17.7% 26.8%
Singapore 0 0.42 13.0% 21.0%
Arab 
Emirates
2 0.61 15.5% 37.7%
Malaysia 2 0.56 21.3% 53.8%
Indonesia 0 0.52 19.2% 49.6%
Philippines 0 0.40 25.9% 64.7%
Fiji 0 0.49 13.3% 75.9%
Japan 1 0.31 17.7% 16.3%
South 
Korea
0 0.65 15.9% 31.4%
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics; the asterisks denote the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance level. For coefficients 
the average applies to the significant ones that have the correct sign. The import market share is calculated by dividing New Zealand´s 
exports in the period 2000 to 2012 through the total exports to this destination.
Thailand 1 0.52 19.4% 52.6%
Bahrain 0 0.36 12.2% 54.2%
Source: Own calculations, GTA (2013) 
The most important competitors in the butter market are again the EU and Australia. As 
for WMP and cheese, the US is almost absent from these markets and domestic compet-
itors again do not have any influence. Essentially, the degree of competition seems to be 
similar, whether it comes from the EU or Australia. The number of significant coeffi-
cients is almost equal, although the EU’s SMC has on average a moderately higher in-
fluence. The situation with regard to the competitors is somewhat similar to that in the 
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SMP market. In the EU, butter is the subject of the intervention scheme and its export is 
rather unsteady in the observation period, although not as pronounced as for SMP. 
Therefore, while the EU’s SMC often has a significant influence on the price Fonterra 
charges, this seldom goes along with small or non-significant RDE coefficients. 
Table 5.4: SUR estimation results for cheese 
SMC ER SMC ER
-0.03 0.14 0.37 0.45*** 0.27 -0.61 0.16 -1.28
(-1.04) (1.04) (1.55) (4.87) (1.16) (-0.53) (0.25) (-0.91)
-0.11*** 0.60*** -0.12 -0.23 0.62 1.97
(-2.88) (4.92) (-0.54) (-1.07) (0.35) (1.25)
-0.06*** -0.11 0.16 0.31 0.21 -0.03 -2.36 3.69
(-3.05) (-0.36) (0.28) (1.42) (0.40) (-0.08) (-0.77) (1.06)
0.06*** 0.23 -0.04 0.51*** 0.86** 1.00 -1.85 -6.34*
(3.63) (1.09) (-0.09) (3.31) (2.16) (1.47) (-0.92) (-1.80)
-0.02 0.61*** 0.14 0.65* 1.20 0.81
(-1.50) (3.19) (1.03) (1.99) (1.53) (0.34)
-0.06*** 0.81*** 0.30 0.19 0.17 0.05 0.12 -0.99
(-2.84) (5.02) (1.10) (1.43) (0.69) (0.11) (0.11) (-0.96)
0.00 0.44*** 0.32 0.52*** 0.72** 0.17 -0.04
(0.20) (2.75) (1.11) (4.48) (2.53) (0.33) (-0.08)
-0.05*** 0.44** 0.39 0.07 -0.01 0.24 -0.32 0.49
(-3.10) (2.30) (1.16) (0.41) (-0.02) (1.36) (-0.15) (0.80)
-0.01 0.38*** 0.12 0.55*** 0.34* 0.21 -0.62
(-0.73) (3.26) (0.55) (6.42) (1.73) (0.59) (-1.45)
-0.01 0.31* 0.30 0.76*** 0.96*** 0.13 -0.96 0.76
(-1.02) (1.78) (0.93) (6.11) (3.32) (1.09) (-0.89) (0.57)
-0.04*** 0.24 0.65 0.55*** 0.20 0.43 -0.55 -0.33
(-3.38) (1.02) (1.55) (3.24) (0.48) (1.27) (-0.25) (-0.55)
-0.06 0.22 0.37 0.36** 0.08 0.29 -0.16
(-1.35) (1.02) (0.90) (2.30) (0.23) (0.19) (-0.20)
-0.01 0.16 0.16 0.53*** 0.29
(-0.99) (1.15) (0.63) (5.24) (1.25)
0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.44*** 0.51** 0.45
(0.76) (-0.09) (-0.33) (5.13) (2.53) (0.82)
-0.07*** 0.13 0.44 0.56*** 0.29 0.05 -0.72 0.28
(-6.76) (0.51) (0.90) (3.02) (0.58) (0.09) (-0.50) (0.15)
-0.01 0.28 0.03 0.45* 0.70*
(-0.39) (0.95) (0.07) (1.71) (1.79)
-0.13*** -0.41 -0.08 0.77*** 1.64*** -0.84 -1.96
(-3.40) (-1.19) (-0.14) (2.69) (2.91) (-0.52) (-1.39)
-0.19*** -0.10 1.31 0.76** 0.41 0.10 -1.90
(-8.03) (-0.24) (1.49) (2.49) (0.53) (0.04) (-0.46)
-0.10*** 0.39* 0.54 0.05 0.67* -0.40 -0.56 -0.14
(-8.87) (1.69) (1.30) (0.34) (1.68) (-0.51) (-0.54) (-0.10)
-0.17*** 0.60 -0.60 -0.56 -1.40* 3.40 3.50
(-4.13) (1.52) (-0.94) (-1.62) (-1.80) (1.25) (1.65)
Average -0.10 0.50 0.55 0.78 0.48 18.5% 50.5%
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics; the asterisks denote the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance level. For coefficients 
the average applies to the significant ones that have the correct sign. The import market share is calculated by dividing New Zealand´s 
exports in the period 2000 to 2012 through the total exports to this destination.
Hong Kong 1 0.67 23.8% 8.9%
Singapore 0 0.39 26.8% 12.5%
Thailand 0 0.55 24.5% 21.9%
Fiji 1 0.55 40.9% 77.7%
Malaysia 0 0.42 15.4% 26.0%
Arab 
Emirates
2 0.46 21.4% 7.3%
Guyana 0 0.45 16.6% 88.9%
Grenada 0 0.39 24.8% 94.4%
Indonesia 0 0.60 21.0% 48.1%
Barbados 0 0.22 21.2% 81.1%
Trinidad 0 0.65 13.0% 68.0%
Panama 0 0.58 9.8% 61.4%
Egypt 0 0.56 4.3% 42.6%
Jamaika 0 0.27 15.3% 86.3%
Belgium 0 0.43 8.3% 85.6%
Saudi 
Arabia
1 0.68 10.6% 27.1%
USA 0 0.23 12.6% 15.2%
United 
Kingdom
0 0.44 22.9% 56.3%
Japan 0 0.51 17.1% 31.8%

















Source: Own calculations, GTA (2013) 
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For cheddar cheese (Table 5.4), the results share some of the same tendencies that the 
butter results already showed. These tendencies are smaller R-squared values and larger 
UV surcharges. This could again be a sign of a less homogeneous product, which is 
plausible in the case of cheese. As already mentioned in Chapter 5.4, cheddar cheese 
only plays a minor role in the EU’s exports, so instead we use the observations of an 
aggregation of similar cheese varieties. Indeed, the EU variables are often not signifi-
cant – the SMC is significant in just eight out of twenty cases and the ER never. For 
Australia this is quite different, the SMC and ER lack significance in only three destina-
tion countries. In general, this result does not hinge on a different market presence of 
the two competing countries; there are no systematic differences. Instead, Australian 
cheddar cheese seems to be a closer substitute to New Zealand cheddar cheese than is 
the case for the EU. The weak competition from the EU may also cause a larger average 
value of the significant RDE coefficient of -0.099 in comparison to the other products. 
Nonetheless, only half of the RDE coefficients are negative and significant at all. 
The equations for destination countries that are themselves important dairy producers 
and exporters show some particularly interesting results. These include Australia, the 
US and the UK and Belgium as EU member states. As for SMP and butter, the equation 
for Australia again shows a high optimal markup indicated by the RDE estimate, in con-
junction with a high import market share. In contrast to SMP, the UV surcharge for but-
ter and cheese support the utilization of this market power in Australia. This is surpris-
ing since Australia is the most important competitor for Fonterra on foreign markets but 
on its own domestic market, the conditions seem to be different. The case is somewhat 
similar for the US where a significant RDE of -0.06 is found for both butter and cheese. 
However, it can be suspected that this is a result of the usage of a tariff rate quota. For 
cheese, GAST (2002) already reports that Fonterra takes advantage of the complete in-
quota quantity and also exports an important additional quantity to the US. Furthermore, 
the author discovers signs of price discrimination; that is, important unit values differ-
ences between in-quota and out-quota imports from New Zealand. This can explain the 
significant RDE estimates since it implies that a change of the quantity has an influence 
on the average unit value. Although Fonterra also has licenses for EU tariff rate quotas, 
a similar effect does not seem to be in place for the EU. The equations for the UK and 
Belgium do not show significant negative RDE coefficients. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we use the residual demand approach as proposed by GOLDBERG & 
KNETTER (1999) to analyze New Zealand’s exports of the most important dairy products 
with respect to market power. This approach usually relies on the usage of cost shifting 
variables to depict changes in the marginal cost for the exporting country and competing 
countries. However, this method has several disadvantages, may bias coefficients and 
standard errors, and the cost shifters cannot be expected to be the ideal instruments in 
the 2SLS estimation. The methodological innovation of the paper is that we use a meas-
ure of the marginal cost that reflects the full range of variations in the marginal cost: the 
stochastic lower price frontier (SLPF). We call this estimate of the marginal cost the 
“stochastic” marginal cost (SMC) and first propose the concept in Chapter 4. 
The estimation of the residual demand is done with SUR in first differences. This is 
because the variables are not co-integrated and the usage of the SMC does not solve the 
problem of weak instruments, but is still used for the competing countries. The results 
show that in 56% of the equations, significant negative RDEs are present with an aver-
age value of -0.086. This means that in more than half of the destination-product com-
binations, Fonterra is able to charge an optimal markup that is, on average, 8.6% of the 
price. Since we are forced to use OLS (or SUR) instead of 2SLS (or 3SLS), these esti-
mates could even be considered conservative. The unit value surcharge on SMC is 
compatible with an even higher markup. Nevertheless, these values are only weakly 
correlated with the optimal markups implied by the RDE. The same is true for the im-
port market shares of New Zealand as well as of its competitors. None of them has any 
influence on the optimal markup implied by the RDE. The perceived degree of differen-
tiation and different distribution channels seem to be of more importance. 
As a limitation of Fonterra’s market power, competition from the US and the respective 
destination country is mainly unimportant. Instead, the overall most important competi-
tor is Australia, and the second most important is the EU. However, while the influence 
of Australia is similar across products and seems to be more restrictive on the RDE, the 
EU’s influence is most pronounced for SMP and butter – products that are subject to the 
intervention scheme and exhibit volatile exports for the EU. Conversely, the EU’s influ-
ence is less pronounced for WMP and least pronounced for cheese. Again, these results 
cannot be explained by large differences in the import market shares but seem to be the 
result of perceived differences between the competitors’ products. 
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Appendix 5.1: Sample characteristics and SMC estimation results
25
 
abs. % γ μ sVu
SMP 41.3 10 33.0 80% 0.63 -278 53% 3096 NZ$ 3365 NZ$ 8%
WMP 59.4 10 49.5 83% 0.79 -300 68% 3121 NZ$ 3490 NZ$ 11%
Butter 58.8 10 48.6 83% 0.88 -253 78% 2780 NZ$ 3307 NZ$ 17%
Cheese 53.0 5 38.8 73% 0.81 -623 68% 3453 NZ$ 4048 NZ$ 16%
SMP 28.6 10 25.6 90% 0.45 -136 36% 2715 AU$ 2948 AU$ 7%
WMP 33.2 10 28.4 86% 0.84 -558 73% 2670 AU$ 3356 AU$ 21%
Butter 30.5 5 26.6 87% 0.92 -444 85% 2313 AU$ 2922 AU$ 21%
Cheese 36.5 5 27.5 75% 0.86 -538 75% 3214 AU$ 3922 AU$ 18%
SMP 74.6 10 53.2 71% 0.82 -375 69% 1  8 € 18   € 14%
WMP 110.3 10 91.8 83% 0.86 -124 75% 18   € 230  € 20%
Butter 109.3 10 65.3 60% 0.88 -187 77% 1843 € 221  € 17%
Cheese 99.6 5 59.9 60% 0.89 -26 81% 228  € 2823 € 20%






















Source: Own calculations, GTA (2013) 
Appendix 5.2: SMC series for Australia (in 1000 AU$) 
 
 
Source: Own compilation, GTA (2013) 
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6 Discussion 
In this chapter some overall issues with respect to the papers that shape the core of this 
thesis are discussed. These primarily focus on the challenges for the estimation of the 
stochastic marginal cost, the connection between the approaches in Chapters 4 and 5 as 
well as a comparison of the respective results. Finally, some implications with respect to 
the international dairy markets are considered. 
6.1 A note on the stochastic marginal cost 
The main innovation of this thesis is clearly the usage of the stochastic lower price fron-
tier (SLPF) as a measure of the marginal cost – when interpreted in this way, we call the 
estimate the “stochastic” marginal cost (SMC). In Chapter 3, we argue that it is im-
portant to control for the marginal cost when PTM is analyzed. At the same time, we 
show that the usage of fixed time effects in a panel model to do so leads to PTM coeffi-
cients that are biased toward the average PTM coefficient in the sample. Alternative 
ways to depict the marginal cost in a PTM model may allow a destination-specific in-
fluence on the price – which is the key problem of the usage of fixed effects – but can 
be expected to bias the coefficients too. This is in general the case for cost shifting vari-
ables, non-destination-specific unit values or wholesale prices in the country of origin. 
As we argue in Chapter 5, the case is somewhat similar for the residual demand model. 
Therefore, the usage of the SMC can represent a significant improvement in both ap-
proaches in contrast to the existing procedures. 
However, there are some challenges that are inherent in the estimation and the proper-
ties of the SMC. With regard to the estimation, one of these challenges is the question 
of outliers and their influence on the estimation. Of course, the SLPF already accounts 
for measurement errors in the unit values but some observations can hardly be seen just 
as measurement errors. There are, for example, single destination-specific unit values 
that are up to fifty times higher than the average or, in contrast, equal to just a quarter of 
the average. An explanation for these observations could be that their values have simp-
ly been incorrectly typed in at the data collection points. The problem is how to identify 
and how to deal with these observations. In any event, they cannot be expected to exhib-
it the same distribution as the actual measurement errors. 
As already mentioned in Chapter 4.5.1, we decide to try to exclude outliers from the 
samples in two ways: Firstly, we exclude all destination-specific unit values that are 
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based on less than a certain minimum quantity. The number of observations excluded in 
this way is quite high but represents only a small proportion of the quantity traded. This 
procedure assumes that, for a lower quantity and volume, typing errors affect the unit 
values more strongly. Furthermore, very low quantities could belong to premium varie-
ties of the product and show, in general, a larger variation in the unit values. Alterna-
tively, we tried to let the distribution parameter depend on the level of the quantity but 
this does not yield significantly different results. Secondly, we exclude all observations 
that lie outside the range of five standard deviations around the mean. This is a more 
direct way of excluding outliers and usually concerns only a very limited number of 
observations. In this procedure, the most critical may be a) the choice of the number of 
standard deviations where the border is defined and b) the choice of the observations 
that are used for the calculation of the standard deviation. The number of standard devi-
ations we actually use is large enough to ensure that only extreme outliers are excluded. 
This is especially important since the observations are not normal distributed – this is 
the main assumption of the SLPF estimation. Therefore, the standard deviation proce-
dure entails the risk of biasing the SLPF estimation. Furthermore, the value of the 
standard deviations is calculated by using the observations that are in the outlier cor-
rected sample for the single time period considered. The value is additionally restricted 
to be at least as high as the average standard deviation of the full observation period. 
Nonetheless, we also estimate the SMC with a number of different outlier specifications 
with regard to the minimum quantity and the number of standard deviations – including 
a bootstrap procedure. It turns out that the outlier specification does not heavily influ-
ence the results. A variation of the minimum quantity does not have a systematic influ-
ence whereby a smaller number of standard deviations around the mean usually results 
in a moderate increase of the average SMC estimated. The latter is because the standard 
deviation procedure mainly has an effect of restricting the observations with large val-
ues; this is due to the fact that the observations are not normally distributed. Therefore, 
we interpret this as a bias in the level due to a restriction that is too narrow. However, 
when we estimate the oligopolistic PTM model with differently outlier specified SMCs, 
the estimated coefficients do not significantly change, but the average standard error 
changes. The smallest standard errors appear in the case of a cautious outlier specifica-
tion (i.e. a small minimum quantity and large number of standard deviations around the 
mean). As a result of the issues discussed, we use such a cautious specification. 
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A further challenge for the estimation of the SMC is the choice of the length of the roll-
ing window. As discussed in Chapter 4.3.2, the distribution parameters of the composed 
error term of the stochastic frontier model can be expected to vary with time. The use of 
a rolling window procedure is therefore a tribute to limited observation numbers. For 
the dairy markets that are analyzed in this thesis, the observation numbers may be suffi-
ciently large in the case of New Zealand and the EU, but for Australia the average num-
bers only lie between 26 and 28 per month – outliers already excluded. In all cases, the 
usage of a three month rolling window procedure leads to a less noisy SMC series while 
not significantly changing the single estimates. This means that the estimation efficien-
cy is increased. Strictly speaking, this procedure is only valid if the distribution parame-
ters do not change significantly within three months. Indeed, the parameters always fol-
low an AR(1) process and are therefore – on average – more different when the time 
gap is larger. Furthermore, in the majority of cases, F-tests cannot reject that adjacent 
periods have the same distribution parameters. However, since the monthly SMC series 
is transformed into a quarterly one in order to estimate the approaches in Chapters 4 and 
5, a three month rolling window is not seen as critical – although there may be some 
adjacent periods with significantly different distribution parameters. 
Nevertheless, the length of a rolling window should not be too large and a certain min-
imum number of monthly destination-specific unit values should be given in order to 
estimate the SMC. This has some implications such as the fact that it is not possible to 
analyze each export country, in both the PTM and the residual demand approach. In the 
latter, the same applies for less important competitor countries or those that are just of 
regional importance (and therefore do not exhibit enough observations). In the case of 
the international dairy markets, these are countries like the US (for some products), Ar-
gentina, the Ukraine or Uruguay. In general, the observation number restriction can also 
be expected to limit the markets available for the approach. When certain markets are 
not of huge importance at all, or specific for a limited number of import countries, it is 
probably not possible to estimate the SMC for even a single export country. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 4.3.2, the SMC estimation further assumes a rather homogenous 
product – whereby the consequences of a violation of this assumption are not clear. This 
further restricts the number of appropriate markets. As a result, the SMC can probably 
mainly be estimated (and used in the PTM or residual demand approach) in the case of 
heavily traded commodities and important export countries. However, when niche, 
highly processed or premium products are considered the case may be different. 
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Two further challenges remain with regard to the properties of the SMC; this is its rela-
tion to the marginal cost and the question of exogeneity. It is already mentioned in 
Chapter 4.3.2 that the SMC is at best a noisy measure of the marginal cost, and at worst 
biased through the correlation of a certain minimum markup with price. The most im-
portant questions are therefore whether such a bias is likely, and if so, how serious it 
can be expected to be. In general, the existence of a minimum markup is necessary for 
such a bias. Although a minimum markup may be very likely in some markets, the re-
sults in Chapter 5 speak against a minimum markup or at least against the fact that such 
a markup is very pronounced. However, even if it exists and is negatively correlated 
with the price, the resulting bias would be much less than in comparison to the usage of 
non-destination-specific unit values or the wholesale price. This is an implicit result of 
the non-destination-specific estimation of the oligopolistic PTM model in Chapter 5.2. 
In general, the results do not give any hints for the existence of this bias. However, if 
this bias still exists, it should be quite small, and additionally, it should tend in the direc-
tion against finding of PTM – that is, producing a conservative estimate for PTM. 
The last challenge – the risk of the endogeneity of the marginal cost and therefore of the 
SMC – is a serious issue. Such a bias would tend in the direction of finding of PTM 
through the marginal cost coefficient. The basic problem is that the SMC cannot be in-
strumented; in this case the advantages of using the SMC vanish. Furthermore, the us-
age of cost shifters – that are probably the best instruments available – lead to biased 
coefficients as already described in Chapters 3.1, 4.3.2 and 5.3.2. Therefore, the ques-
tion is whether a possible endogeneity bias can be expected to be serious. As argued in 
Chapter 4.3.2, a price change in single destination countries without a huge market 
share should have a negligible influence on the overall marginal cost of the export firm 
– especially when it is compared to the influence of the marginal cost on the price. In-
deed, the destination-specific estimation results of the PTM model (Chapter 4.5.2) show 
that the absolute value of the SMC coefficient is mostly not larger than the absolute 
value of the exchange rate coefficient (Table 4.3) – that is, symmetry is fulfilled. Inter-
estingly, when the average SMC coefficient for WMP is compared between the destina-
tion-specific and the non-destination-specific model version (Table 4.2), the latter is 
even smaller (in absolute terms). This means that endogeneity may not be a problem – 
even in the non-destination-specific case. The results certainly show no hints of a prob-
lem. Furthermore, in the estimation of the residual demand model (Chapter 5.5) the ex-
port country’s SMC turned out to be a valid instrument. 
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6.2 The connection between PTM and the residual demand 
When Knetter’s basic PTM model that is depicted in equation (3.3) is compared with 
the residual demand model in equation (5.13), the approaches seem to be quite different. 
Much of this difference disappears when the models introduced in Chapter 4 and 5 are 
compared – that is, the oligopolistic PTM model and the residual demand model with 
the stochastic marginal cost (SMC) used. 
In both models, the left hand side variable is New Zealand’s export price, measured by 
destination-specific export unit values – except that they are measured in different cur-
rencies
26
. Furthermore, in both models the SMC and bilateral exchange rate of the com-
petitors appear on the right hand side. Although the residual demand model covers more 
than the single competitor in the oligopolistic PTM model, the latter can be generalized 
for a larger number of competitors. Furthermore, the GDP appears in both models. A 
notable difference is that the destination milk price and the CPI do not appear in the 
PTM model. This is, however, not of importance since both a) are almost never signifi-
cant in the residual demand model and b) could theoretically also be included in the 
oligopolistic PTM model. The same holds true for a time trend and the quarterly dum-
mies
27
. As a result, only one important difference of the models remains: Instead of the 
export country’s SMC and bilateral exchange rate – as in the oligopolistic PTM model – 
the export quantity appears in the residual demand model. However, the export quantity 
can again be instrumented by the former variables when 2SLS is used. 
These considerations may raise the question whether or not the competitor variables – 
as the main similarity – measure the same thing in both models. In fact, this is not the 
case, at least not exactly. As equation (4.3) reveals, the competitor’s price – which in 
turn depends on the competitor’s SMC and its bilateral exchange rates – influences the 
price charged by the export country in two ways
28
. Firstly, it has an influence on the 
marginal cost of the export country (marginal cost channel), and secondly, it also influ-
ences its optimal markup (markup channel). Since the marginal cost of the export coun-
try is directly represented in the PTM model, only the influence on the optimal markup 
                                                 
26
 The export price is measured in the export country’s currency in the case of the PTM model and in the 
destination country’s currency in the case of the residual demand model. 
27
 We also tried to include quarterly dummies in the oligopolistic PTM model. Interestingly, and opposed 
to the residual demand model, they are almost never significant. 
28
 The theoretical derivation that is depicted by this equation is also valid with regard to the residual de-
mand model – except that the exporter’s price as dependent variable is measured in the exporter’s curren-
cy, instead of the destination country’s currency. Moreover, the residual demand model could also be 
based on this equation with clear theoretical interpretations of the coefficients. 
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remains as a statement of the competitor variables in the PTM model. For the residual 
demand model the case is different; both channels are at work. 
What can be said about these channels? As already described in Chapter 4.2, the magni-
tude of the markup channel is determined through the perceived degree of product dif-
ferentiation in the destination country (the coefficient  ). Conversely, when measured in 
the export country’s currency, the marginal cost channel should be equally pronounced 
in each destination country – at least in the case of the SMC coefficient. This is because 
the competitor’s SMC has an influence on the competitor’s price in all destination coun-
tries, which in turn influences the export quantities and therefore the export country’s 
overall marginal cost. The magnitude of this influence can be expected to be determined 
by the overall degree of product differentiation in addition to the export share for which 
the export country faces competition from the competing country. However, since the 
price in the destination country’s currency is used in the residual demand model, the 
magnitude of the marginal cost channel may actually vary to a certain degree across the 
destination countries. This happens when the competitor’s SMC is correlated with the 
exchange rates between the export country and the destination countries. Conversely, 
for the competitor’s exchange rate coefficient the marginal cost channel cannot be ex-
pected to be equally pronounced across the destinations – this holds true independent of 
the currency. The reason for this is that an exchange rate change influences the competi-
tor’s price (and therefore export quantities and export country’s marginal cost) only in 
the respective destination country. Since exchange rates are correlated (Chapter 3), the 
prices in other destination countries can also be affected to a certain degree. Neverthe-
less, the marginal cost channel can always be expected to be more pronounced for the 
SMC coefficient than for the exchange rate coefficient. 
These considerations have some implications for the competitor coefficients in the re-
sidual demand model and their linkage to those of the oligopolistic PTM model. Firstly, 
unlike the PTM model, the effects that are measured by the SMC and the exchange rate 
coefficient cannot be expected to be symmetric anymore. Secondly, the values of the 
competitor coefficients can be expected to be larger in the residual demand model. 
Thirdly, the value of the SMC coefficients in the residual demand model can be ex-
pected to lie around a constant value above the one in the oligopolistic PTM model. 
Finally, the last point implies that even when a competitor plays no role in a certain des-
tination country, it can still exhibit significant coefficients of its SMC and exchange rate 
in the destination country’s equation. 
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Furthermore, it is clear that a large competitor coefficient in the residual demand model 
can be caused by a large magnitude of the marginal cost channel as well as by a large 
magnitude of the markup channel. The question is whether both channels equally re-
strict the value of the inverse residual demand elasticity (RDE) – that is, the ability to 
charge a markup. Usually, a large competitor coefficient (close to one) in the residual 
demand model implies that the exporter’s price is largely explained by the competitors’ 
costs. In such a case, no space is left for the exporter to increase the price by reducing 
the quantity. However, when a noticeable proportion of the competitor coefficient is 
caused by the markup channel, it is unlikely that the markup is small or even zero. The 
oligopolistic PTM estimates for WMP (Chapter 4.5.2) suggested that a large   coeffi-
cient (markup channel) does not reduce the markup as much as the markup is raised 
through the necessary   coefficient. A pronounced markup channel therefore implies 
the existence of a certain markup. This means that a large competitor coefficient in the 
residual demand model does not necessarily go along with the absence of market power. 
Conversely, the marginal cost channel is consistent with the lack of a markup. Moreo-
ver, in the case of perfect competition only the marginal cost channel can operate. 
These considerations could explain the results in Chapter 5.5. The coefficients of the 
EU as a competitor are often large but its pattern is not clearly connected with low abso-
lute values of the RDE. Conversely, for Australia – as a competitor – such a connection 
seems to be more pronounced. In Chapter 5.5 we speculate that this observation could 
be due to a different kind of competition. Indeed, the reason could be that the Australian 
coefficients are stronger driven by the marginal cost channel. New Zealand and Austral-
ia compete in mostly the same markets. Conversely, the overlap of markets is much 
smaller for New Zealand and the EU, and the EU’s coefficients could therefore be 
caused to a higher degree by the markup channel. 
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6.3 Comparison of the estimation results 
As discussed in Chapter 6.2, the competitor coefficients constitute a link between the 
oligopolistic PTM model and the residual demand model. Since both contain an influ-
ence that we call the markup channel, we expect the coefficients to be related. Firstly, 
the competitor coefficients in the residual demand model should lie above those in the 
PTM model. Figure 6.1 shows that this condition is mostly fulfilled for the SMC coeffi-
cients in the WMP
29
 market. In thirteen out of sixteen cases, the SMC coefficients are 
larger (or equal) in the residual demand model than in the PTM model. Secondly, we 
hypothesized that the difference between the SMC coefficients of the models is almost 
constant across the destinations. As Figure 6.1 shows, this is not the case. Nonetheless, 
the coefficients exhibit a correlation coefficient of 0.43 across the models. 
Figure 6.1: Comparison of competitor coefficients for WMP 
 
Source: own calculations 
There are a lot of possible reasons why the expectation of constant differences is not 
fulfilled and the SMC coefficients are only loosely linked across the models. One rea-
son is that a constant difference can only be expected when the price (as the dependent 
variable in the residual demand model) would be measured in the export country’s cur-
rency. Furthermore, Australia – as an additional foreign competitor – was considered in 
the residual demand model but not in the oligopolistic PTM model. This means that the 
EU’s coefficients in the oligopolistic PTM model could be influenced by the omission 
of Australia when the variables are correlated. Finally, for most of the destination coun-
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 Since the destination-specific version of the oligopolistic PTM model is only estimated for WMP, the 
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tries the number of lags introduced in the oligopolistic PTM model is larger than in the 
residual demand model. This further complicates any comparison. 
However, this raises the question of why the optimal lag numbers are so different across 
the models. The most likely explanation for this is that New Zealand’s SMC and ex-
change rate – that are not part of the residual demand model – cause the need for more 
lags. Contrary to this explanation, however, we understand that a larger lag number in 
the oligopolistic PTM model (Chapter 4.5.2) primarily has an influence on the EU’s 
coefficients. Alternatively, in the residual demand model a significant further lag of a 
certain variable could be overshadowed by a lack of significance of the lags of the large 
number of other coefficients. Since most of the variables can be expected to be correlat-
ed, we always used the same lag number for all variables included in the model. In addi-
tion to the lag number, a further difference in the results is that for the residual demand 
model quarterly dummies are significant, whereas for the PTM model they are not. This 
means that when New Zealand`s marginal cost is accounted for, the price does not show 
any seasonal anomalies. Conversely, when only competitors’ marginal costs are consid-
ered, seasonality is an issue. This supports our explanation in Chapter 5.5 of seasonal 
differences in competition, probably due to seasonality in the milk production. 
Since a PTM model usually only provides proof of whether market power is existent or 
not, these results can hardly be compared with the estimate of the RDE. In general, only 
information on whether market power is supported by the models can be compared, not 
the extent of the market power. However, the case is different for the oligopolistic PTM 
model. In Chapter 4.5.2 we hypothesized that a large difference between | | and   can 
be seen as an indication of a large markup. We tested for this hypothesis by regressing 
the UV surcharges on the coefficients’ values. Since this procedure delivered significant 
results, the fitted values of the regression could be used for a comparison with the opti-
mal markup indicated by the RDE estimates. This is done for WMP in Figure 6.2. In 
addition to the fitted values and the optimal markup, the UV surcharges are displayed in 
the figure. As shown in Figure 6.2, the fitted values are very close to the actual UV sur-
charges, with the exception of Singapore where a large difference is depicted. Interest-
ingly, the RDE estimates support the large fitted value for Singapore. Besides this, the 
optimal markups indicated by the RDE estimates and the fitted values of the UV sur-
charges do not show a similar pattern nor are they correlated at all. Moreover, the PTM 
results indicate the presence of market power for each destination country while the 
RDE estimates only support the existence of markups for single destinations. This result 
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could be expected for two reasons. Firstly, the RDE estimates already showed no link-
age to the UV surcharges, and secondly, the value of the EU’s SMC coefficient in the 
residual demand model is not connected to the RDE estimates. Remember that the com-
petitors’ coefficients constitute a link between the approaches. 
Figure 6.2: Comparison of market power indicators
30
 for WMP 
 
Source: own calculations 
A number of reasons can be considered for the lack of agreement between the two des-
tination-specific measures of Fonterra’s market power. Both measures may not show 
the actual markup. For the RDE, it is discussed in Chapter 5.3.2 that the usage of OLS 
(or SUR) can be expected to bias the RDE estimates in the direction of rejection of 
market power – we therefore speak of conservative estimates. Such a bias can be differ-
ently pronounced across the destination countries. However, even when the RDE esti-
mates would be unbiased, according to the discussion in Chapter 5.2, they show the 
optimal markup of the firm and not the actual markup which can differ from the former. 
In the case of the fitted values (PTM approach), it is not clear at all whether these values 
can be considered a good approximation of the markup. If quality premiums play an 
important role on the market, the assumptions of the OLS error term are surely violated 
since quality premiums are only positive surcharges and not zero on average. If the 
quality premiums are uncorrelated with the variables of the oligopolistic PTM model, 
they only bias the constant of the OLS model – i.e. the level of the fitted values. If, 
however, the quality premiums are correlated with the SMC or the exchange rate, the 
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which is consistent with theory, they are not used to calculate the regression results in Table 4.4 and no 








fitted values PTM model
absolute value of the RDE
6   Discussion 
109 
coefficients are biased too. Indeed, such a correlation is discussed in Chapter 4.5.2 and 
is considered to be possible. Therefore, the results in Table 4.4 could – in an extreme 
case – just imply that PTM is a good indicator of the existence of different qualities. 
Even if this case is not likely for the dairy markets, it illuminates the possible problems 
with regard to fitted values in Figure 6.2. A further general problem is that PTM may 
prove the existence of a markup but a markup can also exist without observing PTM. 
This is the case when the (residual) demand elasticity in the destination country is con-
stant. This situation may be most likely when no competitors exist in the destination 
country, since the results in Chapter 4.5.2 show that PTM is mainly caused by the EU’s 
existence as a competitor. However, because the destination-specific results for WMP 
also show that PTM takes place in almost all single destinations analyzed, this problem 
seems to be negligible in our dataset. Moreover, another observation suggests that the 
fitted values may be not as bad in indicating market power as might be supposed. When 
the fitted values are compared with New Zealand’s import market shares, a correlation 
coefficient of 0.33 is exhibited. Although this value is not significant (p-value = 0.24), it 
is more promising than the lack of correlation in the case of the RDEs. 
Nonetheless, since both indicators of market power in Figure 6.2 face limitations, we 
prefer using them to define a possible range for the markup. The actual markup should 
at least be as high as the minimum of both the UV surcharge and the absolute value of 
the significantly negative RDE. Conversely, the actual markup should not exceed the 
minimum of both the UV surcharge and the fitted value of the PTM model. 
However, there is one clear similarity between the approaches. When the results are 
compared across the products, they do not change a lot – this holds true in both ap-
proaches. For the residual demand approach, this applies for the average RDE and the 
share of significant RDEs. In the case of the non-destination-specific version of the oli-
gopolistic PTM model, this is true for the PTM and competitor coefficient. There is 
only one exception: SMP. For SMP, a non-destination-specific PTM does not take 
place, but the RDE estimates imply the same degree of market power as for the other 
products. When the market for SMP is compared to the other markets, there are only 
two noticeable differences. Firstly, SMP can be expected to be more homogeneous and 
secondly, the US – as a third foreign competitor – is active in the market. 
  
6   Discussion 
110 
6.4 Implications for the international dairy markets 
The results for both the pricing-to-market approach as well as the residual demand ap-
proach support the existence of market power for New Zealand, and therefore for Fon-
terra. Essentially, the extent of this market power seems to be moderate. When all desti-
nation-product combinations are considered, 56% of the RDE estimates are significantly 
negative with an average that implies an optimal markup of 8.6% of the price. These 
values can – in general – be expected to be conservative, that is, they are probably bi-
ased downwards. In comparison, the unit value series for the destination countries 
shows, on average, a surcharge on the SMC (UV surcharge) of 13.7%. While this value 
can (in parts) be influenced by quality premiums, the PTM results prove the existence of 
a markup for almost all destination countries – at least for WMP.  
Figure 6.3: Comparison of the optimal markup implied by the RDE estimates 
 
Source: own calculations 
The degree of market power seems to be rather different across the destination countries 
– although this is not as pronounced in the PTM results as it is in the residual demand 
results. In contrast, the product analyzed is of less importance. This fact is illustrated in 
Figure 6.3. The figure depicts the optimal markups implied by the RDE estimates for all 
destination countries
31
, with estimates available for at least three products. A lot of the 
RDE estimates vary only slightly for a given destination country. In general, this pattern 
of market power across the destination countries is hard to explain. Observable facts 
that should theoretically be helpful for this task – such as New Zealand’s import market 
share or those of the competitors – do not offer an explanation. This is true for the pat-
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tern generated by the RDE estimates and also – to a lesser extent – for the pattern that 
arises when the PTM approach is considered. This leads to the conclusion that the de-
gree of market power in a certain destination country should be caused by some differ-
ent, unobservable and qualitative factors. Such factors could include the perceived de-
gree of differentiation, buyer loyalty, distribution channels used, historical roots of the 
suppliers, transparency in the market and so on. Conversely, the actual degree of differ-
entiation should be rather low. The products analyzed are typically standardized and 
therefore very homogeneous. 
The limiting element with regard to Fonterra’s market power is essentially the competi-
tion from Australia, and to a lesser extent the competition from the EU. Nonetheless, the 
import market shares of both competitors are often similar in the destination countries 
analyzed. Therefore, the larger importance of Australia for the degree of Fonterra’s 
market power could stem from products perceived as being more similar or the usage of 
similar distribution channels. This probably explains why Fonterra is trying to gain a 
foothold in the Australian dairy industry. This is done, for example, by holding an own-
ership stake of 50% in the Australian dairy company Bonlac. However, other competi-
tors hardly seem to play any role. The US is only important in the case of SMP and for a 
limited number of destinations; domestic competitors in the destination country are, in 
the majority of cases, not important. In the case of the US, Fonterra can probably keep 
down the competition, since it exports a huge proportion of the US’s SMP by itself. As 
already discussed in Chapter 5.5, this is due to an agreement with Dairy America. The 
products of the domestic competitors in the destination countries can, however, be ex-
pected to differ to those of New Zealand with respect to quality, safety and functionali-
ty. This is due to the fact that most of the important destination countries do not have a 
well-developed dairy value chain. The degree of self-sufficiency is often well below one 
hundred percent and many farmers produce for their own use. 
The results of the oligopolistic PTM model show that Fonterra uses its existing markup 
in order to smooth out changes in the marginal cost to a certain degree. Such changes in 
marginal cost in the destination country’s currency can be caused by changes of Fonter-
ra’s overall marginal cost or by changes in the bilateral exchange rate. However, while 
Fonterra widely smoothes out changes in the marginal cost when the EU’s marginal cost 
does not change, it more or less renounces a smoothing when the EU’s marginal cost 
changes at the same time and to the same degree. The latter happens, for example, when 
the destination country’s currency changes its worth against all other currencies. This 
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behavior helps in conserving import market shares in the destination countries while 
staying on a similar markup level in the long-term
 32
. 
This kind of PTM behavior that is detected in Chapter 4.5.2 has some consequences for 
the international integration of the dairy markets and transmission of price signals. Ob-
viously the price levels in the destination countries can be quite different. When the 
estimates of the RDE are compared across the destination countries, the smallest and 
largest values differ by nineteen percentage points. Furthermore, changes in the margin-
al cost are not proportionally transmitted into price signals. When only the marginal 
cost in New Zealand changes – for example, due to a drought –, this leads to price 
changes that may only equal around 60% of the change in the marginal cost. Since this 
also causes a smaller effect on the trade quantities, the competitor’s marginal cost can-
not be expected to also change proportionally. Conversely, under perfect competition 
the trade quantities would change until the marginal cost of New Zealand and the EU 
are equal again, when measured in a common currency. However, in the case of PTM, 
the marginal cost of New Zealand and the EU can be expected to be more loosely con-
nected. This can further cause different price levels in New Zealand and the EU – even 
if the countries charge the same price in the destination countries in which they compete 
against each other. Since 2007, there are indeed huge price differences (at least partial-
ly) in the overall export prices for Oceania (New Zealand and Australia) and the EU. 
The less pronounced differences up to 2007 could be explained by considering that the 
European Commission could have based the amount of the flexible export refunds on 
the prices in Oceania. 
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 This is additionally supported by the CUSUM tests of the residual demand model that in almost all 
cases cannot reject the null hypothesis of stable parameters such as the RDE. 
